Sunday,
August 6, 2006
Vol. III No. 16 |
Sunday,
August 6, 2006
Vol. III No. 16 |
Welcome
to the
Over the
Airwaves
aviation journal. This complimentary bi-weekly e-mailing
is being sent to pilots and aviation enthusiasts around the
world. Its aim
is to promote
flight safety, encourage students and new pilots, and to build
enthusiasm for aviation in general.
Dear Pilots and Aviation Enthusiasts:
Not surprisingly, AOPA's Air Safety Foundation has taken issue with this publication's claim that, based upon NTSB data, the risk of fatal accident in a general aviation aircraft is 100 times greater than in an airliner. While they do not dispute the math, the ASF insists that this comparison is unjust because of significant differences between air carrier and general aviation operations. They say, "It is like comparing ocean liners and small boats, or buses and motorcycles, or NFL football and sandlot football." Air carrier and general aviation, the ASF insists, are not comparable! On the macro level, the ASF is correct. More powerful, weather capable airplanes and two pilot professional crews with rigid supervisory oversight go a long way in helping to prevent accidents. These are the essential characteristics that enable air carriers to safely transport 400 people at a time between continents. In this context, we are comparing apples and oranges. It is at the micro level, however, where our apples and oranges turn into the same peas in the pod. At this level, it all comes down to the basic airmanship skills of the guy or girl sitting in the left seat. Annual and semi-annual recurrent pilot training are required in all air carrier operations. We GA pilots have no such requirement. In fact, we GA pilots can fly indefinitely with as little as one hour of dual flight instruction every two years. Even more astonishing, we GA instrument pilots remain legal to fly in the clouds forever without any third-party evaluation of our skill on the gauges.
And the guy or girl in the left front seat has a minimum of 1,500 hours of experience . . . likely many times that amount. And they are required to receive annual and semi-annual recurrent training designed and administered by sophisticated flight training departments. We GA pilots, on the other hand, perform our own dispatch department functions. We evaluate our own weather and plan our own routes. We fly minimally equipped airplanes, often without autopilots and weather avoidance devices. We fly into and out of postage stamp size runways. Yet we have no meaningful recurrent training requirements. This lack of meaningful recurrent training, alone, is responsible for at least two-thirds of the difference in air carrier and GA accident rates, in my opinion.
The ASF implies that we GA pilots are prone to "human factors." We forget, we are distracted, we get fatigued, we get overwhelmed, and we suffer "brain fade." The presumption is that air carrier pilots are immune from such human frailties. Is this really a valid observation? The ASF goes on to suggest that aircraft systems or lack thereof contribute to the GA accident rate. We run out of gas because we do not have low fuel warning lights. We forget to lower the gear because of the lack of effective electronic reminders. Excuses, excuses . . .
Instead, it shifts the blame to seemingly uncontrollable factors thereby giving us GA pilots a false sense of security. And it is this false sense of security that contributes, in large part, to our deplorable GA accident rate. The simple truth is that GA pilots who receive the same high standard of initial and recurrent training as air carrier pilots will begin to approach the same high level of flight safety. In other words, if we want to achieve the same remarkably high level of safety in our GA aircraft as the air carriers, then we must train like an air carrier pilot. And the quality of our flight instruction must, likewise, be on a par with airline flight training departments. Unfortunately, we GA pilots must search long and hard to find this quality flight instruction. We can do this voluntarily or we can promote a higher FAA-mandated standard of required initial and recurrent training. Unfortunately, there are too many powerful forces in our industry working diligently to discourage or prevent either remedy. As for you and me, however, we can decide what is best for us. As for me, I regularly train and teach because of one indisputable fact. The GA fatal accident rate, for whatever reasons we choose to believe, remains 100 times greater than airline flight. This is a fact that the ASF does not dispute.
For example, I routinely file PIREPs to report cloud bases/tops and the presence or absence of ice in the clouds. These two conditions, alone, help my colleague flight instructors determine whether or not they can safely train in a particular area. The form and content used when making a PIREP are not as important as the information itself. Rest assured, the ATC facility taking our PIREPs will arrange them in the proper order when entering it into the system. The important thing is that we include the required pieces of information.
Below is an example of a properly coded PIREP that we typically see when self-briefing by computer.
In this case, a 5,400 hour, 61 year old CFI was simulating an engine failure scenario in a Diamond Katana to his 21 year old female student, a 2005 graduate of the Air Force Academy. According to the NTSB Report, the aircraft struck unmarked 30 foot high power lines while demonstrating an engine-off emergency landing into otherwise open farm land. Below is a statement made by the student pilot to the NTSB before she succumbed to fatal burns:
A better alternative to simulated emergency landings . . .
Actually, the training effect is enhanced because the student is given the opportunity to actually land dead-stick on the waiting runway below. Accidents of this kind occur far too often. Power lines and towers are being erected everyday throughout the United States. What may have been a known clear area yesterday suddenly takes the lives of hapless pilots and their passengers as they engage in low flying over what was thought to be obstruction-clear areas.
There is no question the EAA's AirVenture celebration in Oshkosh, Wisconsin every July is the greatest aviation event on the globe. It is the peak event of the year where the best of the best gather to show their stuff. The Good Pictured left, for example, is an F-22 Raptor literally hanging in the deafening roar of its own thrust high above the show crowd. For most Americans, AirVenture is the only place where we get to see the latest in aviation technology. While EAA is very good at hosting the "best of the best," it does a questionable job of helping us to understand the risks associated with such intense gatherings of airplanes, many of which are flown by inexperienced or nonproficient pilots. The Bad and the Ugly This year, as in all other years, AirVenture 2006 was not without its tragic crashes and resultant loss of life. While clearly NOT the fault of EAA, we continue to see very little effort on the part of EAA to publicly acknowledge these accidents in ways that might help to prevent them in the future. One day before show opening this year, for example, we saw a two-seat airplane experience a classic stall/spin fatal crash just short of Oshkosh Runway 27. Both pilot and passenger were killed. Could the pilot of this aircraft have been spending too much time looking for other aircraft or listening to ATC instruction instead of "flying the airplane?" As pictured elsewhere in this OTA issue, we saw a TBM Avenger chew up the tail feathers of an RV-6 while taxiing for departure from Oshkosh. The passenger in the RV-6 was killed. Certainly no blame can be assigned to EAA for this tragic accident. Unfortunately, however, EAA continues to remain silent in helping us to understand how and why such senseless accidents can occur in the first place. It is their silence in this matter that is deafening! While not directing
attention to such accidents may be good for show attendance, it
does little to help us understand and prevent them from
happening again in the future. Lets hope that EAA gets the
message that they have the vehicle and the power to help us all
to learn from these tragic accidents.
A runway incursion is . . . "Any occurrence in the airport runway environment involving an aircraft, vehicle, person, or object on the ground that creates a collision hazard or results in a loss of required separation with an aircraft taking off, intending to take off, landing, or intending to land."
There are many reasons for runway incursions. One of the most common reasons is our failure to read, understand, and abide by airport signage. There are six types of signs that may be found at airports. The six types of signs are:
Samples of Airport Signs
While we would like to believe that ground and tower controllers are keeping an eye us as we taxi from the ramp to the active runway, this is not always true. They rightfully assume that we pilots know, understand, and can abide by airport signage. Sadly, when we fail to
do this, the results can range from a simple bust (FAA letter in
the mail) to a collision with another airplane! Take a few
minutes and review the airport signs illustrated above.
Pictured below is another example of where "heads up" in the cockpit pays huge dividends. In this instance, the TBM Avenger apparently overtook an RV-6 while taxiing for departure at Oshkosh on Sunday, July 30. The TBM's spinning propeller sliced through the back of the RV-6, killing the passenger.
Accidents such as this are preventable simply by paying attention to the space around us, both in front, on the sides, and in back. A simple distraction, a brief moment of NOT watching where we are going, or a quick gap in vigilance can instantly turn a routine flight or day at the airport into a life-changing tragedy.
We can easily point
fingers of fault in accidents like this but, truth be told,
every pilot has moments of attention lapse . . . . all of us.
Our goal should be to keep these moments at a minimum!
Take the case of a student pilot of a PA29-140 flying to the nearby Youngstown, OH Airport to meet his designated pilot examiner to take his private pilot checkride, for example. For some reason, the pilot found himself low and slow. A witness observed the airplane from his porch, flying eastbound, when it "appeared to be turning around." The airplane then entered a "spiraling nose dive," and impacted the ground "nose first." The student pilot died in the crash. Exceed the critical angle of attack with a
yawed wing . . . . spin results! Unless a pilot experiences the sudden falling off of one wing, the rotation of his or her aircraft around its vertical axis, and the view of ground rotating his windshield, he or she is not fully sensitized to his vulnerability to a spin. Not being so sensitized, such pilots lack visceral awareness of the possible results from exceeding his aircraft's critical angle of attack. This is precisely WHY spin training should be included in the private pilot curriculum. Regrettably, the opponents to such training were successful in having this lifesaving experienced removed from the Private Pilot Practical Test Standards (PTS). More regrettably, the accident data illustrates this. Nearly one quarter of all fatal accidents are attributed to stall/spins! But my airplane is not spin certified!!!! Spin training, actually spin awareness training, can be conducted in any aircraft certified in the normal category in accordance with FAA AC 61-67C (see extract below). The key is to initiate spin recovery before the completion of the first full turn or 3 seconds, whichever takes longer. This training maneuver keeps the aircraft in the incipient spin phase only. It does, however, provide the student with a kinesthetic (visceral) awareness of what a spin feels like.
Practice Exercises . . . While much of the flight training community is resistant to providing spin training to primary pilots, the following stall exercises, when properly performed, do illustrate the vulnerability of airplanes to spins. Let's hope that all primary pilots are, in fact, being given these basic stall exercises. Ideally, each of these stall exercises are allowed to develop into the first turn of a spin!
In other words, effective stall training can go along way in sensitizing pilots to the insidious nature of spins and, more importantly, how to recover from them.
After several years of dreaming and planning by a group of us associated with the Akron, NY Airport, the first organizational meeting of the Christian Airmen Educational Foundation (CAEF) was held on Wednesday, August 2, 2006. "We have our certificate of incorporation and our IRS 501(c)(3) tax determination letter, so we are officially in business," says CAEF board chairmen, David Gray. The CAEF goal is to support and encourage young people entering the field of aviation through educational programs, tuition assistance, and scholarships. Its aim is also to support nonprofit aviation organizations around the world. The CAEF is currently seeking candidates for its expanding board of directors. "We're looking for men and women who have a deep and abiding interest in the future of aviation," adds Gray. Interested candidates can contact CAEF through Over the Airwaves by clicking HERE.
There are many ways to reduce the GA accident rate but one that offers the greatest promise is the FAA WINGS program, with two simple caveats. The first caveat is, we pilots need to complete a WINGS phase every year.
As detailed in FAA AC 61-91H, the three hours of required flight instruction to complete an FAA phase must include the following:
Imagine if every general aviation pilot completed one phase of the FAA WINGS program EVERY year, our accident rate would tumble! Our insurance rates would decline. The public fear of little airplanes would be lessened; our pilot numbers would begin to increase.
I recently stood on the airport ramp and waved so-long to a father and son pilot team as they were departing on a first time, transcontinental flight from Buffalo, NY to Seattle, WA and back in their recently acquired turbo-charged Piper Arrow. Both were low-time pilots, one with a new instrument rating and the other still working on his. As they taxied to the active runway, I pondered the challenges that stood before them. Variable weather including serious cross-winds on short fields, fuel and engine management issues, high altitude flight with jet stream winds, mountain flying and associated mountain waves, and long-range navigation were the big factors. As their flight instructor, I asked myself if these new pilots had the requisite airmen skills and aeronautical decision-making ability to safely complete this challenging flight. Clearly they did! Unlike much of what goes on in traditional flight instruction that centers around the home airport with monotonous exercises in the practice area and an occasional trip to a nearby airport, each of these two pilots trained in the real world of long distance IFR flight. Much of this training was conducted in busy Class B airspace, e.g., Cleveland, Washington DC, Toronto, and New York City. Short and soft field training was conducted on short and narrow grass strips both locally and in the Adirondack Mountains. Each of these pilots were as comfortable in clouds and other serious weather as local VFR pilots making pattern flights in their homedrome on a lazy Sunday morning. Every risk factor they would face in their transcontinental flight had already been experienced in their training. Properly trained, current, and proficient I chuckle when aviation pundents claim that air carrier flight is safer than general aviation because their airplanes are larger, because they have two-person crews, and close company supervision. No, the truth is, in the hands of properly trained, current, and proficient pilots, general aviation approaches the same high level of safety as the airlines. Unfortunately, the percentage of GA pilots who fall in the properly trained, current, and proficient category is far smaller than we would like. So, instead of making excuses for the vast disparity in air carrier versus general aviation fatal accident rate, we need to focus on the real source of the problem. Let's focus on the troubling number of GA pilots who are not being properly trained and who are not current and/or proficient and ask ourselves why. Let's face facts. The frequency and quality of training received by the majority of private pilots is, frankly, appalling. And every time the FAA comes forth with ways to resolve this problem, the big GA organizations raise their standard objections regarding "burdens" on the pilot and associated "costs." These same organizations work to REDUCE training requirements for GA pilots, not increase them, e.g., the 20 hour light sport pilot certificate and the elimination of the six hour rule in the IFR pilots' "6-6-6" currency requirements. As for the quality of flight training, this is an even more serious shortcoming. We have numerous flight schools throughout the US who crank out private and instrument pilots with just enough skills to safely pilot an airplane on a no-wind, CAVU (clear and visibility unlimited) day. No crosswind training, no stall/spin training, no long distance, in the system, navigation training, no aeronautical decision making and risk management skills development, and no real weather training. And what training they do receive is rendered by inexperienced CFIs whose own training was provided by the same seriously deficient system. The important thing to them is that they get their students through the checkride in the minimum time possible. In summary, if we could fix these two basic flight training problems, GA flight safety could easily rise to the level enjoyed by air carriers. The reality, however, is that the flight training system in the US is NOT going to change. There are too many powerful forces in place to protect it. But we pilots can change. We can seek out the best quality flight instruction and we can engage in aggressive annual recurrent training, e.g., completion of an FAA WINGS phase every year. When we do this, we will rise out of the GA mediocrity that results in the 100 times greater risk we face in our little airplanes than our air carrier brethren.
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Over the Airwaves
is not intended to be your typical training,
official news, or club-type social journal.
Instead, its intent is to stimulate thought,
enhance aviation critical thinking skills, to
encourage the strong pilot, and to disturb the
weaker pilot. With this breadth of scope,
Over the Airwaves will evoke a number of
reactions. Please feel free to share these
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Air
carrier pilots fly more capable and highly automated
aircraft. They have dispatch departments who
evaluate the weather and plan their routes.
They operate, for the most part, on long, wide ILS
equipped, obstacle free runways. 
The
ASF suggests that it is the "Bozo" factor that
contributes to the higher GA accident rate.
These are our rogue pilots who through ignorance,
carelessness, and arrogance cannot be reached by
voluntary training seminars, online courses, and
publications, which is the ASF's preferred
method of improving flight safety. These
"Bozos" are in the system and there is nothing we
can do about them. Do we really believe this?
We
can attempt to explain away the 100 times greater GA
fatality rate in any number of different ways as the
ASF and others in the GA organizational community
have attempted to do. This GA industry self-defensive
response, however, is not solving the problem. 
ATC
facilities are required to solicit pilot weather reports (PIREPS)
anytime the ceiling is below 5000 feet and/or the visibility is
below 5 miles. But we can file a PIREP anytime we wish . .
. even if it is to confirm CAVU (ceiling and visibility
unlimited) conditions.
A
student pilot and CFI died in a senseless crash last September
while engaged in a training flight near Pleasanton, Texas.
Unfortunately, the circumstances of this fatal wreck are all too
common . . . yet CFI's in search of realism continue to
make the same mistake.
CFIs
. . . rather than simulating a power-off emergency landings to
random, unfamiliar terrain, why not surreptitiously position the
airplane over a charted airport before simulating the engine
failure? The training effect is precisely the same
but the margins of safety are greatly enhanced!
white
inscription. These signs denote an entrance to a
runway, a critical area, or a prohibited area.
and
a yellow border and do not have arrows. They are
used to identify a taxiway or runway location, to
identify the boundary of the runway, or identify an
instrument landing system (ILS) critical area.
inscription.
The inscription identifies the designation of the
intersecting taxiway(s) leading out of an
intersection.
inscription
and also contain arrows. These signs provide
information on locating things, such as runways,
terminals, cargo areas, and civil aviation areas.
inscription.
These signs are used to provide the pilot with
information on such things as areas that cannot be
seen from the control tower, applicable radio
frequencies, and noise abatement procedures. The
airport operator determines the need, size, and
location of these signs.
black
background with white numbers. The numbers indicate
the distance of the remaining runway in thousands of
feet.
How
many fatal stall/spin wrecks must we endure before the flight
training community stands up and takes note? Currently,
the number stands at one per week!
The
second is, the required three hours of flight instruction must
be intensively delivered by an experienced flight instructor.
No la-la-la training provided by a weak-kneed, inexperienced CFI
who would rather be doing ground instruction or playing with a
simulator than out in the real world.
Note
carefully the wording of these training requirements. They
talk about "mastery" of the airplane; they talk of stalls,
crosswind landings, and instrument training. If you look
at these requirements, they address the most common underlying
reasons behind most GA accidents.
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