Sunday,
August 27, 2006
Vol. III No. 17 |
Welcome
to the
Over the
Airwaves
aviation journal. This complimentary bi-weekly e-mailing
is being sent to pilots and aviation enthusiasts around the
world. Its aim
is to promote
flight safety, encourage students and new pilots, and to build
enthusiasm for aviation in general.
Dear Pilots and Aviation Enthusiasts:
We all hoped that enhanced cockpit technology, new aircraft designs, and improved training programs would be making general aviation safer. The sad truth is, our dismal fatal accident rate is showing no signs of improvement. According to the NTSB's recently released U.S. General Aviation Accident Data, the 2005 GA fatal accident rate tipped the scales at 1.31 fatal accidents per 100,000 hours flown. With the exception of years 2003 and 2004, 2005 recorded GA's highest fatal accident rate since 1998. While there are various ways of defining general aviation accident data, e.g., fixed vs. rotary wing/aircraft weight, the last seven year (1999 - 2005) fatal accident rate trend remains essentially unchanged. No better, no worse. From these data, some might conclude that voluntary efforts to improve GA flight safety including safety seminars, online courses, videos, tapes, and multiple new publications aimed at inoculating pilots against serious mistakes have not been working.
We continue to see nearly one fatal GA accident a day in the U.S. This number rose to 321 in 2005, up from 314 fatal accidents in the previous year despite a reduction in total GA flying hours over the same period, according to FAA estimates. We GA pilots continue to blunder According to the ASF 2005 Nall Report, nearly 80% of all fatal GA accidents are attributable to pilot factors. These pilots made mistakes that contributed directly to their demise. Included are things like blundering into worsening weather, poor aircraft control leading to stall/spin crashes, poor fuel management practices, and massive numbers of landing mishaps. Many of these mistakes fall under the heading of faulty aeronautical decision making and poor risk management decisions. Others are simply jug head blunders that defy logic or explanation.
One of these differences is pilot training. Airline pilots undergo several days of mandatory recurrent training every 6 to 12 months. We GA pilots must log just one hour every two years. And, regrettably, some of that training is questionably delivered. AOPA, to its credit, has blanketed the GA pilot community with safety seminars, workshops, colorful online courses, glitzy magazines, brochures, and every other known educational media ever developed. Even pilots in the federal witness protection program have likely been uncovered by the AOPA marketing department! Is it working? Look at the seven year (1999 -2005) accident data and draw your own conclusions. Why it's not working
While it is important to keep a positive face on general aviation, some of these industry organization messages are doing us more harm than good. They are saying, for example, that it is so safe to fly that only 20 hours of instruction are needed to be licensed to fly light sport aviation aircraft . . . with a friend aboard at 100 knots over big cities. This is absurd, but the big GA organizations supported it. These same organizations defend their performance record and the "apparent" safety of general aviation by spinning the accident data in industry flattering ways. This is not to suggest a deliberate intent to mislead the public or to cook the numbers. They simply put the accent on the most positive syllables of the overall data message. So as to minimize training burdens on new GA pilots, large GA organizations also resist valid FAA efforts to enhance and expand our 60 year old primary flight training curriculum. This resistance continues despite enormous changes in the complexity of our national airspace system and the vast technological enhancements in our cockpits and our power plants. Worse, these groups continue to support the practice of using minimally trained flight instructors with no measurable experience to prepare equally weak subsequent generations of incompetent instructors to teach the rest of us how to remain safe in the skies. Some of these same groups, including the National Association of Flight Instructors (NAFI), aggressively pressed the FAA to continue publishing the answers to airman knowledge tests, presumably to make them easier to pass. And we wonder why our accident rates are not improving! Nobody likes more regulation, more rules, or more FAA oversight of our flying activities. After all, why should we proficient pilots have to pay a price because other pilots are not paying attention to their training responsibilities? The sad truth is, we are all paying a price because of the acts of a few, whether it be in the sky, on the highway, or while going through security screening before boarding an airliner. Tighter regulation hurts but if that is what it takes to protect us GA pilots from ourselves, then so be it. Otherwise, the public's perception of little airplanes will worsen, our legislators will find ways to keep us hundreds of miles from big city populations, and eventually insurance costs alone will drive GA out of the skies. Remember, each serious GA accident (and we average five per day) bumps our insurance premiums up another notch. The good news! Then there is you and me. We may not be able to fix GA's larger problems, but we can take the steps necessary to guarantee your own flight safety.
Most importantly, we can get out and fly often. The enemy of proficiency is inactivity. We can learn but if we do not apply, our skills deteriorate rapidly. If I am not on the gauges in the scud at least once or twice a month, I get sweaty palms like everybody else. If I haven't tackled a gusty crosswind recently, the next one will be a challenge. Each week of non-flying places me, my family, and others in the air and on the ground at measurably greater risk. It makes no difference whether we are recreational or professional pilots. When we GA pilots train and fly like our airline and corporate pilot brethren, the huge difference in our respective fatal accident rates will lessen dramatically. When that happens, our insurance rates will drop, the public's perception of little airplanes will improve, the legislators will turn their attention elsewhere, and more people will join our pilot ranks! This doesn't happen by putting a positive spin on the accident data or by reducing the training demands on GA pilots. Instead, it happens by all of us simply becoming safer, more proficient pilots.
The pilot had received his pilot certificate just three months earlier from a Florida flight school and had completed 30 hours toward his instrument rating. He was flying a Beech A-36 Bonanza. With the setting of the sun, this VFR pilot suffered an insidious loss of horizon. The dark sea to the east, featureless sugar cane fields to the west, and nearly no moon to help illuminate the darkness of night obscured any semblance of a horizon. The winds were from 170 degrees (true) at 11 knots; visibility 10 statute miles; a few clouds at 4,000 feet; scattered clouds at 25,000 feet; temperature 23 degrees C; dew point 18 degrees C; altimeter 29.87 inches. Was it VFR or IFR???On paper, this fateful evening was pure VFR. It was the best any VFR pilot could hope for. In reality, there was nothing but black outside the windows! And it apparently caught this low time pilot by surprise! This surprise killed him. And it is this surprise thing that kills far too many new pilots. Since most instrument training, particularly in the sunny south, is simulated by either view limiting devices or in desktop simulators, many hapless pilots encounter their first genuine IFR conditions when alone, after the training and checkride. Startled and disoriented, perhaps much the same way John F. Kennedy, Jr. was on his tragic night flight to Martha's Vineyard, any instrument reading skills become masked by sudden fear. The inexperienced, improperly trained pilot freezes at the controls. Panic . . . not lack of skills kills!
One word answer: PANIC!! The insidious loss of an outside horizon leaves the unwary and improperly trained pilot struggling for order. His natural outside visual references are suddenly missing. He's confused and disoriented. A gentle bank quickly turns into a steeper bank and he sees his altimeter unwinding. His vertical speed indicator displays a 1,500 foot per minute descent rate. He pulls back on the yoke believing this is the way to restore lost altitude. Instead, he pulls himself into an ever tightening spiral. All hope for recovery is lost. Whatever training the non-current instrument pilot had becomes masked by panic. His brain shuts down as he falls back upon his body sensations to correct the problem. Solution The ONLY preventative measure for this scenario is proper instrument training in actual IFR conditions, frequent IFR flight, and strict adherence to recurrent training. View limiting devices such has hoods and foggles are a cruel deception perpetrated upon unwary instrument students. They simply cannot replicate actual instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). Similarly, GA flight simulators can play a valuable role in teaching IFR procedures only. They too, however, cannot possibly simulate the challenging reality and resultant anxiety (panic) often associated with down and dirty IFR flight.
In the unlikely event that we have pilots lacking a genuine respect for thunderstorms, below are a couple photos of what happened to BAX Global flight 705BX last week over Alberta, Canada. The B-727 was cruising at 35,000 feet when it encountered tennis ball sized hail. All landing lights were destroyed, as was the radar. The crew was forced to make a "blind" emergency landing. Upon safe return to the ground the first officer and
flight engineer were rumored to have quit the company! It
is expected that the aircraft is a total loss as its structural
integrity has been compromised.
The aviation textbooks recommend that active thunderstorms be given a 25 mile wide margin of safety. These photos provide excellent evidence of what can result from hail being tossed out of a thunderstorm! Thanks to B-747 captain Dan Maloney of
Clarence, NY for sharing these photos with OTA.
Given the fact that we continue to experience one fatal stall/spin accident per week in the United States, it would seem reasonable that a good many of us could benefit from a refresher course on the variability of stalls and resultant spins.
"See, Mary, that was a stall," says the CFI proudly before turning the controls over to the student. Mary then dutifully repeats the exercise all by herself as the CFI observes. She slows the airplane, pitches up until the stall horn sounds, then she pitches the nose over and smiles. "I did it," she says. Her CFI is proud. That's it . . . a couple of anemic incipient stall entries. It is little wonder why we continue to experience fatal stall/spin accidents each week! The truth about stalls
Exceeding the wings critical angle of attack, which results in a stall, can occur at any airspeed. In a high speed dive, for example, a sudden pull up can easily exceed the wing's critical angle of attack. When a sufficiently high angle of attack is imposed, the smooth flow of air over an airfoil breaks up and separates, producing an abrupt change of flight characteristics and a sudden loss of lift, which results in a stall.
This means that an airplane with a normal unaccelerated stalling speed of 50 knots can be stalled at 100 knots by inducing a load factor of 4 G’s. If it were possible for this airplane to withstand a load factor of 9, it could be stalled at a speed of 150 knots. Let's look at another example. If we bank an airplane to just beyond 72° in a steep turn, the resultant load factor is 3. If this turn is made in an airplane with a normal unaccelerated stalling speed of 45 knots, the airspeed must be kept above 75 knots to prevent inducing a stall.
Here is the lethal scenario Later, after receiving her private pilot certificate, Mary finds herself in a steep bank while turning from the left base leg to the final while landing at her home airport. With the resulting doubling of her load factor, her stall speed increases substantially. She is not aware of this! Mary allows her airspeed to drop to 60 knots in the turn as she pitches up to regain lost altitude. Her outboard wing (right wing) experiences more induced drag (from lift) and parasitic drag (from the lowered right aileron). Wham! Her right wing instantly drops out from under her . . . and that's the end of Mary. What happened?
None of this was ever actually demonstrated (at a safe altitude) in Mary's primary training! Hence, Mary, along with some 50 other poorly trained pilots that year lost their lives in stall/spin accidents that chould have been easily avoided. Who is to blame here? Who's to blame?
Is it Mary? Of course not. The culprit in this
scenario is clearly Mary's CFI and the designated pilot examiner
(DPE) who permitted her to slip
What about the rest of us? Do we really understand what is going on here? Have we practiced accelerated, turning, or cross-controlled stalls at a safe altitude with a qualified, experienced flight instructor on board? If not, we could easily become another fatal stall/spin victim.
As every primary student knows, big airplanes throw off wingtip vortices or wake turbulence at sufficient strength to put trailing airplanes into uncommanded 360 degrees rolls. When this happens close to the ground, these events are largely unrecoverable. These vortices can also produce significant airframe and control surface damage as well.
Vortex Generation Lift results from the pressure differential over the wing surface. Low pressure occurs above the upper wing surface and high pressure occurs under the wing. This pressure differential triggers the rollup of the airflow aft of the wing resulting in swirling air masses trailing downstream of the wingtips. After the rollup is completed, the wake consists of two counter-rotating cylindrical vortices. Most of the energy is within a few feet of the center of each vortex but can extend 100 feet or more beyond the vortex core. The strength of these vortices is governed by the weight, speed, and shape of the wing of the generating aircraft. These vortices are also influenced by the extension of flaps or other wing configuration devices as well as by a change in speed. The greatest vortex strength occurs when the generating aircraft is heavy, clean, and slow.
These tests have also shown that the vortices sink at a rate of several hundred feet per minute, slowing their descent and diminishing in strength with time and distance behind the generating aircraft. When the vortices of larger aircraft sink close to the ground (within 100 to 200 feet), they tend to move laterally over the ground at a speed of 2 or 3 knots. A crosswind will decrease the lateral movement of the upwind vortex and increase the movement of the downwind vortex. A tailwind condition can move the vortices of the preceding aircraft forward into the touchdown zone. Wake Turbulence Mantra
Jay is also a special friend of Over the Airwaves, having volunteered invaluable webpage design and technical assistance to this publication.In his other life, Jay is a vice president of engineering at Cox Communications, and along with his wife Terri, are proud parents of five year old twins. Jay set out last year to earn his Private Pilot in 6 to 12 months and achieved that last week with the successful completion of his PP-ASEL checkride. Jay and his instructor Doc, both based out of Peachtree Dekalb Airport (KPDK), Atlanta's busiest GA airport, flew every week at least once and kept the training at a steady pace. Jay made every attempt to go the extra mile, which included a couple of hours of actual IMC, a trip up in an Extra 300L for spin training, and landings at over two dozen airports, several with real 50 foot obstacles. Doc is a seasoned CFII, and has been teaching students for over 30 years! Jay has already moved directly into his instrument training, which he also hopes to complete in 6-12 months. Good going, Jay. And thanks for the OTA help!
Here is another regrettable photo of the fatal Avenger/RV6 mishap at Oshkosh last month. We do not see taxiing B-747s overtaking commuter jets in commercial operations. Why does this stuff happen in the GA world?
Distractions are something we all experience. A passenger asks a question; ATC calls us at the wrong time; we have to scratch our neck (or something else). The end result is a momentary lapse of attention and disaster results. Like our big brother airline crews, we GA pilots should adopt the "sterile cockpit" rule in our operations. From start-up to cruise altitude, then again from initiating the descent to engine shut-down, there should be NO cockpit conversation unrelated to the conduct of the flight. A cautionary word about when ATC calls Unless ATC is giving us an urgent traffic conflict call, our job is to (1) aviate; (2) navigate, then . . . when everything else is done, (3) communicate. Let's NOT let an ATC call interrupt what we are doing. Be certain everything is under control BEFORE you push the transmit button in response to an ATC call. If a controller gets annoyed by your delayed response, tell him you were on the land line!
Few things are more discouraging to us pilots than to come out to the airport and discover that it is "too windy" to fly. We see the windsock fully extended and the reported winds to blowing at 18 knots with gusts up to 25 knots. Close up the hangar doors. Too windy to fly today. Right? Maybe not! It is even more frustrating to primary and instrument flight students who show up for their lesson only to find that the flight school or CFI says it's "too windy" to fly. And off to the classroom or simulator they go. The hapless student loses yet another opportunity to learn and master crosswind operations.
Study the Wind Chart! The first thing to keep in mind is that winds are relative. If they are blowing right down the runway or somewhere close to the runway heading, winds present little, if any, risk to the pilot. Actually, the only challenge such winds pose occur during the taxi phase to the active runway. Having a crosswind component chart handy is a "must" for any pilot operating in high winds. Remember, it is the crosswind component, not the actual winds, that determines the risk of flight on a windy day! Far too many pilots have too little crosswind training and experience. If your CFI or flight school cancels training when the winds kick up a bit, discuss your concerns with them. If they will not prepare you for crosswind operations, who will?
For Kelly Brannen of Williamsville, NY, it was mission, mission, mission. Like all wise aircraft shoppers, Kelly first decided WHAT he wanted his planned airplane to do. For him, it was a combination of business and personal cross-country travel throughout the northeast, much of it during the rugged winter months. Six seats were too many, two seats were too few. He required turbocharging to get above the weather, a TKS anti-icing package to get down through the ice (just in case), a full glass cockpit (Garmin G1000), with traffic and terrain avoidance, uplinked weather and XM music (for those long, lonely flights home). Kelly is also a low time pilot in the midst of his instrument training. He wisely realized that a high performance, glass composite airplane was more than he can handle at this time. Kelly stands well over six feet tall (pictured left below, with me, right in front of his new T-182). So cabin size, particularly hip, shoulder and leg room, was a major consideration.
Kelly spent months looking at new and used airplanes, studying the strengths and weaknesses of each. Price (both new and re-sale), operating costs, and insurance were major factors in Kelly's decision-making process. Ultimately, he decided upon a new Cessna Turbo 182. For him, the T-182 made the most sense. Once he made up his mind, Kelly cut a deal with Louie Nalbone, owner of Dunkirk Aircraft Sales and Service in Dunkirk, NY. Louie took Kelly's Piper Archer in trade and fast-tracked delivery of the new C-182 in first class fashion. Selecting and purchasing the right airplane for you requires that you first decide on its primary mission. Once that's completed, then do your homework!
Take an otherwise highly maneuverable airplane like a 1973 Bellanca 7GCBC and stand it on its tail just a few hundred feet above the ground. The results are predictable! This day started out as a demonstration of bush flying by a 127 hour pilot during a family outing. The demonstration included short field takeoffs and landings along a river. It ended in a fatal tragedy! According to witnesses, the accident airplane was observed
flying level about 600-800 feet above the trees, when it started
an abrupt, near vertical climb, and then spiraled straight down,
impacting in trees beyond the river's edge.
What went wrong here? One need not be a senior NTSB accident investigator to conclude what happened here. A low time pilot pushes the operational envelope limits of his airplane close to the ground. In this case, the observed vertical climb resulted in a stall some 600 to 800 feet above the trees. So far, no real problem. The problem that resulted in the pilot's death was likely an improper stall recovery. Rather than keeping his wings level with rudder, the pilot allowed the airplane to yaw which, in turn, resulted in a predictable spin. When such spins occur close to the ground, there is not enough time or altitude to safely recover. Stall recoveries with ailerons!
Regardless, far too many hapless pilots find themselves in a nasty and often fatal spin following an unsuccessful attempt to recover from a stall. Steeply banked, they aggressively swing the yoke or stick in the opposite direction in a futile attempt to level the wings. In the process, they forget that each wing is stalled, thus little or no air is flowing over either it or the ailerons. Turning the yoke or stick does nothing but cause the ailerons to waggle in the nearly still breeze. Not surprisingly, one wing drops and the stalled airplane begins its predictable turn around its vertical axis. The windscreen fills with images of the circling earth below. Frantically trying to regain lost altitude, this same hapless pilot yanks back on the yoke or stick, thus exacerbating the problem. Moments later, the airplane becomes a yard dart stuck nose down in a smoking hole. There is a solution! Ever since 1949 when spin training was removed from the private pilot practical test standards, the FAA and others have promoted the notion that the best way to reduce fatal spin accidents is to teach pilots to avoid uncoordinated stalls. They reinforced this in the Private Pilot Practical Test Standards (PTS) by requiring pilots to recover from a stall within +/- 10 degrees of heading change.
This 1949 solution is akin to teaching people how to prevent drowning by instructing them to avoid ever going into the water. Effective? Certainly. Realistic? Of course not. In summary, the above described fatal stall/spin crash is just one of 50 or so that occur every year in the United States. Very sad. Very preventable.
Remember the early days when desktop computers first emerged on the scene. We struggled with factory prepared manuals, authored by technicians instead of end-users like you and me? Fortunately, much has improved in the computer industry and our avionics factories are doing a much better job of teaching us how to operate their products. We still do it better! Like many of you, I have struggled through nearly every new cockpit technology in the past 30 years. And I am still convinced that we end-users do a better job at writing the training manuals than the factory. Take Garmin's new G1000 glass cockpit, for example. This is the most sophisticated, most powerful suite of avionics ever designed for the GA airplane. When it works . . . it is magnificent. Fortunately, it works 99.9% of the time. But what happens when a glitch occurs, at the worst possible time? A frozen screen as we pass over the outer marker inbound in the clag - that's when we wish we were G1000 power users. That's when we wished we had read Max Trescott's G1000 Glass Cockpit Handbook! I've read it . . . and it's worth every penny. If you are flying a G1000 equipped aircraft, you need to read this book. You can order it HERE. And if you are interested in taking an online course, click HERE.
Every primary student has heard about maneuvering speed or Va speed. We know it is the indicated airspeed that we reduce to whenever penetrating rough or turbulent air or when initiating any performance maneuvers. But what is it, really? What does it really mean? In the most simplistic terms, Va is the maximum speed at which sudden control movements and/or turbulent bumbs will cause the airplane to stall before doing any structural damage to the airframe or control surfaces. Take a look at the Vg (velocity vs. g loads) diagram below. The lines of maximum lift capability (curved red lines) are the first items of importance on the Vg diagram. Vg Diagram
The subject airplane in the illustration is capable of developing no more than one positive “g” at 62m.p.h., the wing level stall speed of the airplane. Since the maximum load factor varies with the square of the airspeed, the maximum positive lift capability of this airplane is 2 “g” at 92 m.p.h., 3 “g” at 112 m.p.h., 4.4 “g” at 137 m.p.h., and so forth. Any load factor above this line is unavailable aerodynamically; i.e., the subject airplane cannot fly above the line of maximum lift capability. It will stall. Essentially the same situation exists for negative lift flight with the exception that the speed necessary to produce a given negative load factor is higher than that to produce the same positive load factor.
As mentioned above, maneuvering speed or Va is the maximum speed that an airplane can fly where sudden control inputs or turbulent air are able to produce a G loading greater than the load limit shown in the table above.
This excess weight, when placed anywhere other than directly over the CG (center of gravity) of the airplane has a compounding effect (excess weight x 3.8) on weight and balance considerations. Thus, if you are tempted to overload your aircraft (which, of course, you should NEVER do), keep you CG as close to the center of your loading diagram as possible. In summary, maneuvering speed or Va is a very important number, particularly when conducting performance maneuvers or when flying in turbulent air.
Learning to fly is difficult and for high achievers like eye surgeon, Dan Schaefer, MD from Buffalo, NY (standing right in the photo below), it can be very intimidating! But Dan persisted and passed his private pilot checkride this past week.
The Buffalo Chophouse is owned by another of my former students, Mark Croce (standing center), a Cirrus SR22 and Robinson R44 helicopter owner. After a delicious dinner, we partied over at the Buckin' Buffalo Saloon, also owned by Mark Croce. Celebrating the a new pilot certificate, rating, or aircraft purchase has become standard practice here in Buffalo, NY. Great going, Dan. We pilots love a party!
Rather than cancel instrument training when the weather is CAVU (clear and visibility unlimited), CFII's have had no choice but to simulate nature's ugly side. We use various shapes of view limiting devices that do a very poor job of limiting the view. One peek at the wet compass (to align the DG . . . hmmmm) and the whole outside world is exposed to the hapless student. Or we sit this same student down in front of a desk top computer with the simulated images of the panel. He or she is told to believe that this table, chair, and computer screen is REALLY what it is like to be descending down through dark, turbulent skies to just 200 feet above the ground. But if that is all we have to work with on sunny days, let's use it. A warm front passes - the ceiling is down to 500' AGL and it's raining.
When my instrument student and I took off that day I expected the local instrument approach procedures to be busy with students and IFR pilots practicing approaches. I was wrong. The training aircraft in one local flight school remained nested securely in their hangars. The school's flight simulator, however, was just as busy at it was on sunny days! I thought to myself, "There is something definitely wrong with this picture!" Has all instrument training been reduced to simulator and hood work? Has the flight training community been convinced that the vagaries of nature can really be simulated . . . and that's the only way instrument flight can be safely taught? Nature had blessed Buffalo with a tremendous IFR learning opportunity this past week and my instructor colleagues remained planted in their flight simulators! Yes . . . there was something terribly wrong with this picture. I wondered about the rest of my GA pilot friends. Over 1/2 of them have instrument ratings. One would have expected to hear at least a few of them on the radio shooting instrument approaches. I logged over 5.5 hours of flight training that day. With few exceptions, the radio chatter I heard between Buffalo and Rochester was from the airline and corporate guys. The good, bad, and dangerous weather There are three types of weather. The first type is GOOD weather. Clear skies, unlimited visibility, and light winds. The second type is bad weather. The ceiling is down to 200'AGL, visibility is 1/2 mile, and the winds are blowing at 15 knots with gusts to 23 with no associated thunderstorms or below freezing temperatures. The third type is dangerous weather. This is the weather that posses a serious risk to all aircraft. Thunderstorms, icing, freezing rain, and extreme turbulence are the main players in the dangerous weather category. When people pay good money to earn an instrument rating, they quite reasonably expect to be taught to become proficient in good and bad weather (as defined above). They also quite reasonably expect NOT to fly in dangerous weather (again, as defined above). The sad truth . . .
In short, bad weather training in airplanes does not appear to be happening very often, leastwise here in Western New York. Curiously, the number ONE contributing factor in most fatal GA accidents is bad weather. Connect the dots. If we are instrument rated and have either not been trained in bad weather (as defined above) or we have not flown recently in bad weather (again as defined above), we would be well advised to RETIRE our instrument ticket until we receive proper weather training. NOTE: Proper weather training does NOT incorporate view limiting devices and GA flight simulators! Believing or promoting otherwise is a serious self-deception.
IF there is one factor other than training that explains why the general aviation fatal accident rate is 100 times greater than the airlines, it is the level of GA pilot currency. A typical airline pilot is aloft between 900 and 1,000 hours a year. The average GA pilot, according to some estimates (Plane and Pilot Magazine, September, 2006), is aloft only 35 hours a year!! Sure . . . much of that airline guy's time is spent watching the other guy and the autopilot work, reading a crumpled newspaper, and (gasp!) catching a wink or two. Nevertheless, he or she is in system three, four, or five times a week. 35 hours per year . . . yikes! Imagine, 35 hours per year. That's equivalent to about 40 minutes a week! If some of those 35 hours are spent in a couple of four or five hour round trip cross-country flights and fair weather summertime flying only, literally months could go by between flights! And we have big GA organizations telling us that general aviation is getting safer year after year. Go figure! While big gaps in VFR flying can be problematic, similar big gaps in IFR flight can be deadly! There is nothing in this world as fragile as instrument flying skills! Two weeks between flying on the gauges can leave a low-time instrument pilot dangerously behind the aircraft. What a busy flight instructor sees!
Whether it is an aircraft checkout, a biennial flight review (BFR), instrument proficiency check (IPC), or simply a returning flight student, I get to see first hand what the passage of time does to a pilot's airman skills. For the most part, it is pretty scary! My experience suggests that serious VFR proficiency gaps become evident any time more than 60 days pass between flights. Dangerous IFR skill gaps are often observed with the passage of just a couple of weeks between gauge-only flights, particularly for low time instrument pilots. Examples of these skill gaps for IFR rated pilots include momentary confusion in negotiating assigned holds, inability to maintain simultaneous heading and altitude, failure to stabilize the localizer/glideslope needles inside the final approach fix, and descending below the decision height (DH) or minimum descent altitude (MDA). They are killer items! How do we define the proficient pilot?
IFR pilots . . . if you think you would have difficulty passing the instrument pilot oral and checkride, you are not only non-proficient, you're dangerous to both you and to others in the sky!! Each of the rating orals and checkrides are the minimum standard of proficiency. If you were still in high school, consider them as achieving a "D" or "65%". You passed, but that's it. If you couldn't achieve a passing score on your private or instrument checkride today, beware! But . . . But if you can only give 35 hours a year to flying, here's what Plane and Pilot Magazine (September, 2006) suggests you do:
Other than recurrent training, the one single thing we can do to minimize our risks aloft is to fly often. The more often, the better. Sure, fuel prices are hurting us badly. The more these prices keep us on the ground, the greater risks we incur when we fly. The bottom line is . . . . fly often, or consider folding your wings. The price of non-proficiency is quite often death. No sugar coating, positive spin here.
There is something about the term "pilot-in-command" that is becoming lost in the shuffle of our emerging cockpit technology. There is also a growing perception by many aircraft designers and manufactures that the pilot is the weak link in the airframe/powerplant system. Regrettably, this perception is slipping over into our flight schools who boast having the latest and the greatest in cockpit technology.
Somewhere in all of this, understanding of the rudder got lost. Replaced by dependence upon the autopilot, our emerging new pilots are quickly becoming talented system managers who operate in a world filled with annunciator lights, synthesized female voices, and cockpit chimes. The ultimate cockpit advancement is the ballistic chute recovery system to save the day when the technology fails us. Reach up, pull the handle, and float painlessly to the ground. Yes, Virginia, there IS something wrong with this picture!
If we GA pilots are stepping up to new glass composite airplanes and we lack a rudimentary understanding of coordinated flight and how to achieve and maintain it, we're setting ourselves up for disaster when the autopilot fails or the primary flight display tanks. Stuff happens, despite assurances given us by the factory. Some in our industry say that the best way to improve GA flight safety is to engineer ways to reduce pilot workload, to remind him when he is about to run out of gas, and to awaken him when it is time to land. Sure, some of these cockpit aids are good. I've had a number of these installed in my T-210. I'm human, I forget, I do dumb things. But when the day comes that I cannot recover from a fully developed stall at a safe altitude, or that I cannot touch down on the runway centerline in a 23 knot direct crosswind, or when I require flashing lights to warn of low fuel, or when I cannot keep the needles in the donut, by hand, right down to minimums . . . that's when I am going to fold my wings and do something else. I owe this much to my family. Several months ago I reported about a training flight in a new high performance, glass composite aircraft. My student was a "master of the glass panel." His fingers danced across the cockpit as skillfully as a surgeon in the operating room. His standard practice was to switch on the autopilot when clearing the trees and keeping it on until short final just as his factory instructor had taught him. I had marveled at how proficient he had become with this technology in the intervening months since I had last flown with him. His performance was admirable until I surreptitiously switched off his autopilot 500 feet before reaching his assigned cruise altitude. What happened next should have been an effortless transition to hand flying. It turned into a horrifying experience as we suddenly rolled 60 degrees and completed the second turn of a nose down, spiral dive before I could recover the airplane! Had this pilot been alone when his autopilot failed . . . AND had his airplane been equipped with a ballistic chute, a quick pull of the handle may have saved his life. Sure, a half-million dollar insurance check would have replaced his airplane and the local TV stations would have been thrilled.But his airplane was not so equipped. What would he have done? Would he have pulled back on the stick to regain lost altitude and thereby tightened his spiral? Sadly, this stuff happens to nonproficient GA pilots about once a week in the United States. Solution . . . let's build more reliable autopilot systems! No, the solution is not more reliable autopilot systems. Instead, we must develop and master our stick and rudder skills BEFORE moving up from our training fleet. Let's turn off our bells, whistles, and autopilots one hour for every three hours we are aloft. If we can afford a ballistic chute recovery system, get one . . . but let's not depend upon them to compensate for our aviating weaknesses. Let's think like the Boeing 777 test pilot (quote above) and become secure in the knowledge that we, the pilots, are always the ultimate authority of control in our airplanes. The technology is there to serve us, not the other way around.
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