Sunday,
October 22, 2006
Vol. III No. 21 |
Sunday,
October 22, 2006
Vol. III No. 21 |
Welcome
to the
Over the
Airwaves
aviation journal. This complimentary bi-weekly e-mailing
is being sent to pilots and aviation enthusiasts around the
world. Its aim
is to promote
flight safety, encourage students and new pilots, and to build
enthusiasm for aviation in general.
Dear Pilots and Aviation Enthusiasts:
There is something terribly unforgiving about airplanes that many pilots learn too late. This immutable lesson is demonstrated nearly every time we rush through a pre-flight inspection, skip a weather briefing, overlook a published departure procedure (DP), or depart into declining weather without an instrument clearance. Regrettably, that lesson is - we rush, we die. It matters little whether we are student pilots on a cross-country solo or airline pilots preparing for take-off with 150 passengers or more in the back. Mix speed and altitude together, any incapacity, oversight, or neglect in the piloting process can instantly lead to tragedy.
What steps did they skip? The first step they skipped was a pilot weather briefing despite prevailing IFR conditions. Okay, so they could see it was IFR. The second skipped step was the filing of an instrument flight plan. Climbing into clouds, whether in controlled or uncontrolled airspace without an instrument clearance is not only dangerous, it is also illegal per FAR 91.173 and FAR 91.13 (see Administrator v. Murphy) As they climbed out through rising terrain, the right seat ATP rated passenger gave the pilot an ultimatum. He told him to either obtain an IFR clearance or return immediately to the airport. The pilot responded by saying that he had done this departure several times in similar weather conditions. Eventually yielding to the demands of his passenger, the pilot initiated a climbing left turn. As he did, the airplane collided with terrain. The pilot died. Remarkably, the passenger walked away with no injuries! Other tragic examples . . . We all remember Comair's tragic crash in Kentucky last August. A couple of airline pilots shattered the airlines' near perfect safety record when they lined up on the wrong runway for departure. Too busy to glance at their heading indicator to confirm the proper runway choice? Remember, you rush, you die . . . except in this case 49 people died.
This near-tragedy occurred when the Gulfstream was given instructions to cross the outer runway but to hold short of the inner runway. The pilot read back the instructions. Curiously, the Gulfstream did not stop short of the inner runway as instructed. The departing Skywest aircraft, carrying 39 passengers and crew, had to slam on its brakes to avoid the collision.
The Gulfstream
pilot told officials he was certain the controller
had cleared him to cross both runways, even though
he twice read back the "hold short" instructions
correctly. "We had three layers of
redundancy," said an FAA official.
"This is just a clear and clean pilot mistake."
Was anybody looking at the airport diagram? Being in a rush is the only reason for not double or triple checking systems and procedures in airplanes. Schedule pressure or simple impatience are among the root causes of haste. In fact, if we look far enough back up the accident chain, we will often find the link where somebody was in a hurry. In summary, unless we are avoiding an imminent collision, are on fire, or are in freezing rain or similar emergency, the proficient pilot always acts in a slow, methodical fashion. If he rushes, he dies . . . .
Looking at the surface depiction chart below, pick out the worst section of the nation to be flying. Sure . . . it would be the north central states. The position of the low pressure area over Minnesota signals the likelihood of tricky flying weather. What about the low over the U.S. southwest? Hmmm . . . That low likely posses no significant weather threat. Why the difference?
Just how bad will that weather be? Just how
bad that weather will be depends upon three factors: (1)
temperature gradients; (2) moisture; and (3) atmospheric
stability. For example, if the
Take a look at the drawing (right). Note the presence of a warm front at the 4 o'clock position moving northeasterly around the center of the low. This warm front could be carrying moisture-laden air from the Gulf of Mexico. As the counter-clockwise flow of air around the low pushes up northward, it rises above the cool air below. A temperature inversion results (warm air above cooler air below).
As the warm front begins to cool, its moisture precipitates out in the form of rain.
Is the picture different in the U.S. Southwest? Remember (1) temperature gradient; (2) moisture; and (3) atmospheric stability? The low situated over the southwest is different than in the low over the north central states. The temperatures are all likely above freezing. The counter-clockwise moving air coming up from Mexico is likely dry. The absence of fronts and the widely spread isobars indicates stable air. Thus, this low pressure area likely posses no threat to flight. Where is the low? Whenever obtaining a weather briefing or looking at the
weather depictions on the charts, always ask, "Where are the
lows?" "Will I encounter a low pressure area
along my route of flight." If the answer to the latter
question is yes, beware!
We GA pilots, on the other hand, have a brief checklist and, if we look carefully, several performance guidelines in the pilot's operating handbook (POH). One such performance guideline is the Cruise Power Settings (see chart below.) Assuming trimmed, straight and level flight, power settings are the only flight parameter variable that we have we can positively control. Add power, we climb; decrease power, we descend.
A dedicated study of your POH, particularly its performance section, is one of the most enlightening activities the proficient pilot can do. Know, for example, what a given power setting will give you in terms of true airspeed (TAS) and fuel burn. Look specifically at the various altitudes in your performance charts. Note, for example, which altitudes provide you the best overall performance. It is all too easy to climb in our airplanes, mash the throttle to the wall, tinker with the propeller setting, and make a couple quick adjustments to mixture. This form of random power management is for the non-proficient pilot who cares little about his or airplane's performance. For the rest of us, the closer we get to employing systematic procedures like our air carrier brethren, the safer we will become. Let's begin with proper power management.
As improbable as it sounds, there have been pilots who have forgotten to lower the gear before landing! Equally improbable, there have been pilots who reached over to raise the flaps on the landing roll-out and, instead, raised the gear! Either way, failing to lower the gear or retracting it while on the ground produces a horrible sound. It is the sound of more than a ton of metal slamming down and sliding along concrete. Fortunately, such errors seldom produce injuries (other than to the ego). But they do play havoc with insurance rates. For the perpetuator, his or her rates will always go up. For the rest of us . . . yep, our rates go up as well. The Solution . . . pre-landing checklists A simple GUMPS check (gas, undercarriage, mixture, pump, prop, seatbelts, lights, etc.) is generally all that is necessary to prevent an inadvertent gear-up landing. Similarly, holding one's hand on the gear handle throughout the enter gear lowering process . . . until those green lights come on, will help to insure that the gear is ACTUALLY down before landing. Lastly, avoid the temptation to raise the flaps after landing until you have cleared the runway and have come to a full stop. Yes, Virginia, it can happen to you!
A special warning is warranted for us veteran pilots who have reached those "forgetful" years! While we like to believe that we have just as many quick-acting brain cells as we did when passing through puberty, the simple truth is . . . we don't! There simply is no getting around the value of checklists.
The above post was copied from AOPA's Forum, Cloud Busters section (New Instructor Again). It speaks of an all-too-common problem besetting student pilots. It is also a major reason why less than 50 percent of all student pilot starts ever complete and receive their private pilot certificates. Consumer abuse
While there clearly are some exceptions, this practice of becoming a CFI solely to build hours for that airline job can easily be viewed as an abuse of public trust. First, it often subjects the fledgling student pilot to a less than enthusiastic instructor. Second, it perpetuates the problem shown in the above online forum post. Namely, the CFI will bolt from the teaching process just as soon as he or she is offered a "real" piloting job. Like pulling the slats out of the floor, this sudden departure leaves his or her students without a teacher. Sadly, their "replacement" CFI will likely also bolt just as soon as another flying job opens up. This abusive cycle of revolving door CFIs adds enormous costs to the training process. Third and most hideous, this revolving door of CFIs leaves students with dangerous gaps in their training and oftentimes grossly unprepared for the flying world that awaits them. No wonder why Johnny can't read! Be a wise consumer
This is NOT to suggest that all career-minded CFIs abuse their students. Some of these youthful CFIs are in a position to remain with their students throughout their entire course of training. If so, however, they should be able to provide that assurance . . . in writing. In fact, they should be willing to return to the student whatever training fees they received should they bail prior to the completion of their students' training! Sound too bold? Perhaps, but such written assurances would effectively reduce the number of flight students abandoned by their CFIs career goals. The System will not change, but you can! If you are emerging professional pilot building hours for that "real" flying job, become a CFI only if you really enjoy flight instruction and are prepared to do the job well. Better yet, work yourself up the aviation "food chain" by engaging other kinds of flying jobs. These entry level piloting jobs include flying charters and/or freight, aerial traffic watch, aerial photography, scenic flights, crop dusting, and pipeline patrol. If your are a flight school chief pilot, resist the temptation to hire inexperienced CFIs who work cheap (or for food) just to build logbook hours. Pay another $10 or $15 an hour and hire a professional flight instructor. Most enlightened consumers, whether student pilots or parachute purchasers, will happily pay a premium for a quality product. If you are a student pilot training at a school where all of the CFIs are climbing the aviation food chain, beware! Get a commitment from your CFI that he or she will see you through to your desired rating. If he or she cannot do that, begin shopping around!
I clicked over to the aviation weather forecast page on my computer. What I observed on the computer screen was pretty scary! A deepening low pressure area over Lake Erie was pumping boat loads of moisture into a colliding cold front rapidly sliding southeastward from central Canada. I could see that we were in store for a very serious weather situation long before the television meteorologists began reporting weather trouble for the drive home. Then the lights went out! A record-setting 22 inches of heavy wet snow fell on leaf-laden trees. Buffalo, NY, arguably the snow capital of the world, had never experienced an October snowfall of this magnitude! Local municipalities were caught totally unprepared. Think . . . they were still cutting grass as snowplow blades remained neatly stacked in highway department garages. Over 250,000 homes, all area schools, and the entire business community were suddenly without power. By the next morning (Friday the 13th), we were in serious trouble. Fallen tree limbs over roadways, dangling power lines, and snow too deep to walk through paralyzed our city. The governor issued an immediate "State of Emergency." Driving bans covered the region. Despite the enormity of this disaster, I managed to rig up a generator and continued to plug away. Then we lost our connection to the Internet. No more email, no more website connections, no more anything. The only thing for certain were flooded basements. Today, over seven days after the start of the storm, over 150,000 area homes are still without power!
Primacy of learning is a powerful principle of education. Basically, this principle suggests that what we learn first lasts longest. In short, what we learn as primary flight students tends to remain with us throughout our entire flying career. This principle places enormous responsibility on any pilots' primary and instrument instructors. Whatever we learned at those training stages will influence how we fly . . . forever! Who was this guy's primary instructor?
There, in just a couple of minutes, this pilot made enough serious mistakes to make you wonder if his primary flight instructor had ever instilled in him any notions of proper pre-flight planning. Equally perplexing, had any instructor ever cautioned him about the enormous hazards of emergency, engine-out turn backs to the airport? How any pilot take off without first looking inside his fuel tanks, particularly in a low wing airplane like an RV-8, boggles the mind. This borders on aeronautical insanity. Crash scene investigators found his fuel selector switch in the left position. The left tank was dry and the right tank had about one inch of fuel in it. As for the emergency turn back to the airport It is a simple fact of aerodynamics that a wing will stall at the moment its angle of attack exceeds its critical angle of attack. Further, if one wing is stalled more than the other (when the airplane is yawed), it will enter a spin. So . . . how do we get a dead-stick airplane turned around without exceeding its critical angle of attack and in a coordinated fashion? A maneuver of this kind takes careful instruction and consummate practice - neither of which this pilot apparently had. Again, who was his primary flight instructor? Unfortunately, no crash investigation protocol traces back far enough to examine the victim pilot's primary training experience. But if it did, I'd place my money on the fact that, whatever the accident circumstances, we could find serious weaknesses or gaps in his or her training. The principle of primacy of learning is too strong to be ignored by pilots. Had this pilot's primary instructor had demonstrated the importance of careful preflight inspections, the likelihood that our man would take off with essentially empty fuel tanks is highly remote. Similarly, had this pilot been taught the risks of an emergency turn back to the airport, he likely would have attempted a straight ahead emergency landing. There is another principle of learning that should be emblazoned on every flight school wall. That principle is shown in the box below:
Please hold the disagreeing mail. I know that we cannot blame the instructor for the misdeeds of his students forever. Some people are pre-wired to do something stupid in airplanes . . . or in life itself. If only . . . . if only we could screen these people out BEFORE they obtain their pilot certificates!
Instead of heading off for breakfast some morning, why not try something that could actually improve your skills. Construct your very own stall chart. Sure, you might find some of this information in your Pilots' Operating Handbook (POH), but the process of creating your own stall chart for YOUR airplane from scratch can actually be fun . . . and useful.
Begin with a safety pilot Naturally, this exercise requires two pilots. One pilot is needed to fly the airplane while the other keeps a close traffic watch while also recording the data. Next, call upon a couple of friends to serve as ballast as you load your airplane to maximum gross weight. Be sure, of course, to distribute the load in strict compliance with the loading chart. Go out and fly Climb to a safe altitude, e.g., >3,000' AGL. Configure your airplane into a clean, wings level attitude (gear/flaps up). Then slow the airplane to a pre-take off airspeed, then gently pitch up while adding full power. Note the speed where the full stall occurs. Don't be fooled by an imminent stall. Don't be fooled by the sounding of the stall horn. Instead, wait for the stall break where the nose actually drops through the horizon. Record the speed where that stall break actually occurs. Next, roll into a 30 degree bank and repeat each of these steps. Record the airspeed where the full stall occurs. Then repeat this process while in a 45 and 60 degree bank respectively. Change your flight configurations Repeat this process for each flight configuration illustrated in the chart above. When you finish, you will have a new understanding and appreciation of how stall speed increases dramatically with bank angle. Your friends will also become impressed with your flying skills. Most importantly, will you become a better pilot.
This "revolving wheel" kind of activity is singularly responsible for inefficient and costly learning. Learning to fly is an accumulative endeavor that requires timely reinforcement to transform skills taught into learned behavior. For example, developing effective landing skills requires an understanding of the precise relationship between pitch and airspeed. Mastering this relationship begins with instruction, then demonstration, then attempts, then practice, then perfection. This all occurs in close order . . . within days, not weeks. For the instrument student . . .
Fragile instrument skills require repetitive practice to make them permanent. Learning these skills without this subsequent practice allows them to simply fade away. It takes both time and money to re-learn them. Unless money is not a
factor in your training, do not let more than a week go by
between lessons. Otherwise, you are wasting your training
dollars!
Perhaps it is because many of today's pilots learn to fly at big airports with 150' x 8,000' runways. Lacking the threat of quickly approaching runway ends and/or obstacles, they seldom have opportunity to realistically perform maximum performance take-offs. Then reality sets in . . . The day then comes when the graduated pilot finds himself on a for-real short runway with a heavily loaded airplane. He advances the power and begins the take-off roll. Looking down the runway, he feels his stomach tighten as the runway end rapidly approaches.
P-210 pilot tries and fails
Witnesses observed the airplane departing on a 2,000 foot grass airstrip. One witness said that the airplane was "wallowing back and forth, trying to stall out." He further stated that the "motor sounded like a boat cavitating" and "the nose of the airplane was pointed up." The witness watched the airplane as it veered left and impacted the ground tail first. The airplane's nose then "slammed into the ground," and the airplane nosed over and came to rest inverted. The witness stated that a fire erupted, which destroyed the fuselage and the inboard sections of the wings. The accident site was about 1/4 mile from the end of the runway, offset to the left of the runway centerline, and approximately the same elevation as the runway. Examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of any abnormalities that would have prevented normal operation. An estimated weight and balance placed the airplane's takeoff weight at 3,729.4 pounds, which was below the maximum gross weight of 4,000 pounds. The estimated center of gravity was 48.57 inches, which was within, but near, the aft limit of 49 inches. The short field landing performance chart for this airplane indicated that the takeoff ground roll would be 1,581 feet and the total distance to clear a 50 foot obstacle would be 2,461 feet. A pilot, who had experience flying the accident airplane, stated the following with respect to its performance: "Weight and balance is very, very critical. With weight aft, you really need to hold the nose down and gain airspeed on takeoff."
Airspeed doubles . . . lifts quadruples! Let's not forget the fact that lift increases in proportion to the square of airspeed. As airspeed doubles, lift increases four times. Thus, airspeed is a necessary precursor to lift. If we want more lift, we have to increase airspeed. There . . . we said it in FOUR different ways! This simple little principle of flight is ignored by far too many pilots when attempting to take off from a short runway or when attempting to clear obstacles. Had our P-210 pilot held his airplane on the ground until
Vx speed, his chances of a successful take off would have been
greatly improved.
All of this is excellent fodder for hangar debates and on-line chat forums, but what about the real world? Is there any reasonable chance I can safely (and legally) operate a non known-ice certified airplane in the clouds during the winter in the northern climates? What if I have a certified TKS "weeping wing" or Columbia Aircraft Company's eVade "hot wing" anti-ice system? Do these newer and highly effective preventive ice systems make it both safe and legal to operate in sub-freezing clouds? Here is the "mother" of all icing questions: "For known icing to exist, must it either be reported for forecast?" "Or, does ANY visible moisture at or below 32d F. constitute known ice?" Academics vs. the Real World Academically, the FAA has ruled that any visible moisture at or below 32d F. constitutes known ice. Forecast or reporting icing conditions do NOT have to be present for known ice to exist. This is all well and good academic knowledge for any pilot sitting on the ground in a non known-icing aircraft to heed.
The first sign of difficulty emerged with appearance of a wispy, semi-transparent layer emerging below him. He still has excellent ground contact. He motors on as the sun begins to set. This wispy layer begins to build as the outside air temperature (OAT) drops several more degrees. The lights of the city begin to twinkle intermittently through the thickening cloud layer below. Our man calls "flight watch" (122.0) for an update of the weather at his destination. The briefer is cautiously optimistic, indicating that clouds are beginning to overlay his route of flight, but his destination remains in the clear. He motors on . . . Taking comfort in the serene VFR conditions surrounding him, the pilot motors on to his destination oblivious to the fact that the wispy cloud layer below him has turned into solid undercast. The OAT is now 22d F. Another check with "flight watch" informs him of the bad news. The earlier forecast wasn't holding up. A stalled cold front had picked up some speed and was now beginning to overlay his entire route of flight with thickening clouds. The pilot calls ATC and requests higher to remain in VFR conditions. He motors on for another hour as he prepares for his approach and descent into his destination airport. Those academic arguments regarding sub-freezing clouds begin to ring in his ear. "I can't remain up here forever and I cannot legally descend into those cold clouds. What do I do? What do I do? Okay, academics aside. This is the real world. He got seduced into conditions that, had he been on the ground, he would have never launched into. He trusted the forecast but the forecast didn't hold up. What should he do?
Ideally, you'll be able to descend into either clear or warmer air below before significant icing accretes to your airframe. What if I cannot get below the icy clouds? Answer: Request a destination change and remain in VFR conditions above the clouds until you are cleared for an instrument approach. This will enable you to quickly descend right down to the ground. In summary, the savvy instrument pilot NEVER allows himself or herself to get caught in sub-freezing clouds without an escape plan or backdoor that can be instantly activated. To stooge around in icing conditions without such a plan is not only bad form, it could be fatal. The critical thing is that you do not delay. If you're accumulating ice and ATC won't budge, explain again your situation. That should do the trick. If not, don't be dumb. Declare an emergency and bolt! The best solution, of course, is to avoid sub-freezing clouds. This is the politically correct thing to do. But anybody with more than a handful of wintertime instrument flight hours in the north understands that the real world acts differently than what the forecasts might say. It certainly acts differently than what the academic "experts" might have to say!
So how does is work? The three main components of the pitot-static system are: (1) pitot tube (name after the French engineer, Henri Pitot); (2) static port; and (3) air tubes. Pitot Tube: The pitot tube's sole function is to connect the airspeed indicator to the outside air flow. The faster we fly, the greater the air pressure, the higher the airspeed indicator reads. If the pitot tube opening becomes plugged or blocked (by ice or debris), the airspeed indicator will read either zero or something below our actual air speed. Static Port Talk about simple! The static port is a tiny hole in the side of the airplane. Sometimes there are two different holes, one on each side of the fuselage. Occasionally, on some aircraft like the Piper models, we find this hole located behind the pitot tube. Air Tubes The air tubes are generally white plastic air lines about 3/8th inch in diameter. One air tube connects the pitot tube to the airspeed indicator. Three other air tubes connect the static port(s) with each of the following instruments: (1) airspeed indicator; (2) vertical speed indicator; and (3) altimeter. If you would like to dig deeper into the inner workings of the pitot-static system, click HERE.
If there is one single exercise that proficient pilots have mastered, it is crosswind take-offs and landings. The non-proficient pilot, on the other hand, either contributes to our abhorrent accident rate or he leaves his airplane tied-down until the winds calm. If you want to get better at something, practice that which you do not like to do!
Sure, playing golf and flying airplanes, from a safety perspective, are not comparable. But from a proficiency standpoint, we pilots can learn a great deal from this comparison. If we wish to become proficient pilots, we must master crosswinds. Begin with crosswind component chart . . . Looking out the window and assessing the winds without regard to runway direction is an exercise in futility. Instead, a careful review of the crosswind component chart (below) is the way proficient pilots approach wind assessment.
The crosswind component chart is elegant in its simplicity. Simply measure the distance between the reported wind direction and the runway heading. If it is 30 degrees (as shown in the chart above), follow that line down to the wind speed arc. The chart above illustrates a 25 knot wind. Then drop straight down to the wind speed shown on the "X" axis of the chart. You see, a 25 knot wind translates to just a 12 knot crosswind component. Any proficient pilot should be able to handle this with ease!
The smoke and fire were still spewing from the building when aviation experts and non-experts were offering opinion on the possible cause(s) and results of the October 11 tragic accident in New York City. A hungry media was clamoring for information from anybody who would talk with them.
Within minutes of the crash our large GA membership organizations like AOPA were knee deep in damage control. They were doing their very best to instill reason on an otherwise chaotic affair. Whether or not Phil Boyer got any sleep that week is pure speculation. So what really did happen?
Some suggested a crazy act of death by airplane (suicide). Perhaps, but not likely, given what we knew about the pilots. Was it just an accident? Did both pilots aboard this ill-fated airplane do something wrong? Did they succumb to lowering ceilings and declining visibility? Did they get boxed in by an increasingly narrow VFR corridor? Did either possibility cause them to botch an attempted 180 degree turn back to where they came from? Could it have possibly been a mechanical failure? If so, did the pilots execute proper emergency procedures? They were only blocks from the wide open spaces of New York City's Central Park. Could they have pulled the ballistic recovery chute and floated down safely on the East River? No . . . we still do not know for sure what actually happened, but we can reasonably conclude that whatever corrective steps were attempted did not have the desired effect. And because of this, two precious souls were lost, families and friends are grieving, and general aviation took its greatest public relations hit since the death in of John F. Kennedy, Jr. But let's put this tragic accident in perspective. As grievous as this tragedy was, we suffer the same fatal general aviation crash every day, on average, somewhere in the United States. No, they are not as spectacular, but souls are lost and families grieve just the same. Most of these fatal crashes do not attract national attention. They do, however, make the 6 and 11 O'clock news on every television station within 100 miles, blotting the reputation of our already fragile GA industry. So what is the solution If we discount terrorism and death by airplane (suicide), every fatal GA accident is caused by either mechanical problem(s) or pilot error(s). The data shows that mechanical problems account for about 10 percent of the accidents. Another 10 percent are caused by factors that could not be determined. The remaining 80 percent are caused by pilot error(s). The greatest threat to the future of general aviation is NOT the imposition of user fees, or additional airspace restrictions, or burdensome regulation, or declining pilot numbers. Yes, these are possible results, but they are not the threats. The greatest threat to general aviation is our failure to reduce pilot errors. Remember, pilot errors lead to airspace incursions and fatal crashes. Fatal crashes, such as the one in NYC, will be our eventual undoing. The solution is not more safety seminars and nifty DVDs. Thus far, our voluntary pilot education programs have not produced a reduction in our annual fatal accident rate for the past seven years. Why? We are producing new pilots the very same way we produced them for the past 40 years. We follow the same recurrent training requirements as we have for the past 40 years. FAR Parts 61 and 91 have not been altered to reflect fast-paced changes in our cockpit technology and national airspace system that were not even dreamed of in 1970. What about you . . . what about me? Certainly nothing I write here or even the tragic events of this past couple weeks are going to change any of this. The vested interests in the GA status quo are too deeply entrenched to ever allow meaningful change in the way we train and insure the proficiency of GA pilots. Regrettably, the hammer of public sentiment, swung by vote-hungry politicians, will one day have their way with these defenders of the status quo. When this occurs, general aviation, other than corporate and Part 135 operations, will be restricted to IFR flight outside of Class B and C airspace. And like taxes on cigarettes, user fees will price what remains out of the skies. Try to imagine that. But there is a better way. That way is you and me. If we can manage to influence enough pilots to recognize that the next fatal accident could be us, we might be able to make a difference. The next fatal accident, if it involves a big city building, could be the end for all of us. Once we begin to realize and understand the REAL risks of flight, we will begin to pro-actively engage in our own recurrent training. The more of us who do this, the fewer fatal accidents we will have, period. The threat to GA will thus be diminished.
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Over the Airwaves
is not intended to be your typical training,
official news, or club-type social journal.
Instead, its intent is to stimulate thought,
enhance aviation critical thinking skills, to
encourage the strong pilot, and to disturb the
weaker pilot. With this breadth of scope,
Over the Airwaves will evoke a number of
reactions. Please feel free to share these
reactions with me by clicking
HERE.
Past Issues of Click
HERE
to open any previous issue(s) of Over
the Airwaves and to search for any past articles.
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For
example, take
the case this past March in Mena, Arkansas where two
pilots, one a 1,000 hour instrument rated pilot and
the other a 2,000 hour multi-engine, airline
transport pilot were so anxious to launch that they
skipped several steps.
They were flying a Beech C23 Sundowner, a
four-seat aircraft.
Just
a couple of weeks ago, a Skywest regional jet departing from
LAX reached 100 knots before aborting takeoff to
avoid a Gulfstream business jet taxiing across the
active runway. The planes missed by less than
100 feet!
temperature
gradients span freezing temperatures, the moisture level is
high, and there is instability in the air, watch out!
Get
the picture? Warm rain from above descends down through
sub-freezing air. Right . . . super-cooled water drops
begin to form. Now, let's imagine ourselves flying
northward from Oshkosh, WI to Minneapolis, MN. As we
pass through the warm front situated over northern Wisconsin, we
begin to encounter freezing rain!
If
there is one thing that characterizes airline operations that is
noticeably missing from general aviation, it is standardized
procedures. Air carriers have carefully prescribed
procedures for every phase of flight, for every flight
condition, and for every possible emergency.
Lest
anybody think they are immune from inadvertent gear-up landings
or accidental gear retractions while on the ground, we have all
been victims of an occasional oversight. 
It
has been a fact of professional pilot life since the early dark days of aviation that one of the best
ways of building hours for that airline job is to become a
flight instructor. After all, what better way is there to
build hours than to have some schmuck student pay me to fly?
Unfortunately,
the fledgling flight student is unaware of this "consumerism
gone wrong" approach to flight instruction. But
YOU . . . the wise pilot can help prevent this behavior by
steering prospective flight students to solid, respected flight
instructional resources. You can help them to identify and
steer clear of these time-building CFIs who are likely to
abandon them when that real flying job comes along.
The first
snowflakes of the season began to fall outside my office window
here in Buffalo, NY this past Thursday, October 12.
"Hmmm, this is a bit early," I said to myself.
Last
August, an RV-8 pilot took off from Ft Collins, CO
with almost no gas in his tanks. He lost his
engine on the climb out, then attempted an emergency
turn back to the airport. In the turn, the
airplane stalled, then spun to the ground killing
him and seriously injuring his passenger.
There
is one sure-fire way to increase the cost of flight instruction.
That way is, skip a lesson. When we allow more than one
week to pass between flight lessons, we spend the next
subsequent lesson reviewing the stuff we forgot in the previous
lesson.
He instinctively applies back
pressure on the yoke to force his airplane into the air.
With his attention focused on the runway end rather
than upon his airspeed gauge, he feels his airplane wallow off
the runway. His right hand mashes the throttle against the
panel in a vain hope to eek out more power as he continues to
pull back hard on the yoke.
It is safe to say that few aviation
topics evoke more misunderstanding, fear, and unyielding pilot
opinions than the matter of icing. Heck, the FAA itself is
in a quandary about what constitutes an enforceable icing
violation!
But what
about the guy in
the air who never expected to encounter sub-freezing clouds, but
did? He launched into cold VFR conditions and counted on
the forecast of severe clear all the way to his destination . .
. but the forecast didn't hold up?
Assuming
your only choice is to descend down through cold clouds, plan to
do so aggressively. Your objective is transcend any
possible icing layers as quickly as possible.
Confess your concerns frankly with ATC and don't worry about
incriminating yourself on the air. Nobody is going to get
excited about your possible icing encounter (unless you have to
declare an emergency).
Professional
golfers do this all of the time. If they're
having trouble with their short game, they get out
an practice chip shots. They might enjoy
blasting balls off the tee, but they will not
improve their game until they spend several practice
days swinging the club within 50 yards of the green.
What
happened was . . . . an airplane accident occurred. It
wasn't a taxi, or bus, or even a train. It was an
airplane. And when airplanes crash into buildings, it
automatically becomes a national security issue. Everybody
from the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) to local
police departments activate anti-terrorist plans. It is a
BIG deal!
What could
possibly cause an airplane to hit a high rise building in the
heart of NYC? The first thought was terrorism, but New
York's Mayor Bloomberg effectively discounted that possibility
in a press briefing hours following the crash.
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