The best way to avoid flight risks at night is to become night proficient.  Get out and fly often at night.  If several months or more have lapsed since your last night flight, call a night current pilot buddy or, better yet . . . engage an experienced CFII and get night current.

The NTSB Report for this accident can be found HERE.

Departure Procedures - Don't leave home without checking!

With the resurgence new aircraft sales, increasing numbers of inexperienced pilots are traveling to distant factories locations like Wichita, KS, Duluth, MN, and Bend, OR to pick up their new bird.  Much of this travel involves flight over unfamiliar territory.

Similarly, higher performing airplanes mean longer cross-country flights, again over unfamiliar portions of the country.  It also means more low weather and night departures.

When people take-off from unfamiliar airports, particularly at night or in IFR conditions, they run the very real risk of running into something.  Regrettably, this happens all to frequently!

There is only ONE way to avoid this catastrophe.  We MUST check for departure procedures.

Understanding and complying with departure procedures and take-off minimums is critical to safe flight.  We pilots, including VFR-only pilots, should be aware of published departure procedures for any airport we operate out of.   Check them before departing!!!

The First Word in Every Missed Approach Instruction is CLIMB!

The weather at Pikeville, KY on the afternoon of October 7, 2005 was drifting above and below ILS minimums as this 500 hour Bonanza A36 pilot and two passengers were making the approach to Runway 27.  The published decision altitude (DA) for the ILS Runway 27 is 1,664' MSL (200' AGL).  Required visibility is 3/4 mile.

The radar track indicated the airplane was at 2,300 feet msl, about one mile from Runway 27 threshold. The four subsequent radar targets indicated that the airplane traveled left of course.

What witnesses observed . . .

Wreckage information

The aircraft impacted terrain one mile south of the airport at an elevation of 1,520' MSL.  

The debris path consisted of severed trees, and extended about 100 feet to the main wreckage.  The trees were severed about the same height, oriented about a 270-degree heading to the main wreckage.  Fragments from the right wingtip were located on the right side of the debris path, and fragments from the left wingtip were located on the left side of the debris path. A majority of the main wreckage, including the cockpit and cabin, was consumed by a post-crash fire.  The pilot and both passengers perished in the crash.

What happened?

The pilot had reported himself established on the final approach course.  The radar track showed nothing unusual about his descent until reaching about 900'AGL, just one mile short to the runway.   The next four radar hits showed him turning left of the localizer.

We can only surmise what was going on in the pilot's head at this point.  Given his proximity to the runway before turning left off of the localizer, it appears that he did not have the required visibility and thus commenced his missed approach.

The fatal missed approach mistake!

Nearly every published missed approach instruction begins with the word CLIMB.  All others begin with the word IMMEDIATELY climb.  The missed approach instruction for Pikeville requires a climb on the runway heading to 3,000' before making a required left turn . . .  

This pilot struck tree tops one mile south of the runway just 50' higher than the airport elevation!   The fact that the debris path was oriented 270 degrees (in line with the runway heading) complicates our analysis of what happened. 

Had the pilot merely drifted left of the localizer and drop below the DA, or did he actually commence the missed, then corrected his required missed approach heading?  We will never know the answer to this question.

One thing is for certain, however.  He had passed the published missed approach point and did not commence the required climb.  This was his ultimate undoing.

The term "Decision Height" or "Decision Altitude" has specific meaning to the instrument pilot.  Reach this point, he or she instantly LANDS or CLIMBS, per FAR 91.175. 

No wiggle room allowed here.  No hesitation allowed.  Make the decision and do it!  A couple second delay in making this decision can be fatal, as this pilot and his two passengers discovered.

Know Your Airway Structure

In a world where "direct to" is becoming the rule rather than the exception, the traditional Victor airway is going the way of the old steam gauges.   This, however, does not exempt us from knowing their structure.

The illustration below depicts a standard airway design.  Note that the primary area of the airway is eight miles wide (four miles each side of centerline).  A two mile wide secondary area borders each side of the primary area. 

The reverse "Z" symbol in the the middle depicts a COP (change over point).  The idea is that you navigate FROM one VOR until reaching the COP, then you begin navigating TO the next VOR.

A three dimensional view of an airway route segment including a turn around a fix is shown below.  Note the size and depth of the secondary area. 

Airways provide both lateral and vertical course guidance.  The illustration below shows how an MCA (minimum crossing altitude) directs the pilot to climb to avoid obstacles.

Thanks to B-747 captain, Dan Maloney of Clarence, NY for sharing this with us.

The #1 Cause of All Fatal Accidents . . . Yet we still do not learn!!

This 1,090 hour VFR-only pilot took off from Billings, Montana this past January 2 in his Beech 35-A33 (Debonair).  His planned destination was Spanish Fork, Utah, about 3.5 hours away.

The pilot told the FSS briefer that his planned route would take him "through the basin down to Lander...then west to Fort Bridger...Heber City, then through the Provo canyon."

Weather along the route . . .

The briefer began the briefing by stating "for western Wyoming and the rest of the route airmet for occasional mountain obscuration, precipitation, clouds, mist and fog. VFR not recommended into that area."

Not deterred by the briefer's precautionary weather statements, the pilot launched on his VFR flight.   Shortly after take-off, the controller working the flight advised the pilot that there was a storm system in the Salt Lake valley and to the south. The pilot acknowledged receiving the information.

About 45 minutes later the pilot was again advised of deteriorating weather conditions along his route of flight.  Again, the pilot acknowledged receiving the information.

NTSB Probable Cause Finding:

We can only surmise that this pilot was determined to complete this flight despite repeated warnings of worsening weather.  His intent was likely to fly low and follow the roadways through the valleys between the mountains.

What he didn't count on was visibility-blinding snow.  Once encountered, he had no backdoors, no place to go.

Scud-running kills!!

IFR pilots have far more backdoors than VFR pilots.  They can go up, through, around, or down.  VFR-only pilot options are limited to one . . . fly lower, and lower, and lower, under the clouds.  This is called "scud-running." 

As this VFR-only pilot discovered, once down to 300' AGL, he had no place else to go.  He died.

The NTSB accident report can be found HERE

T-38 Near Miss!

Fantasy vs. real views when dealing with icing conditions!

There are two basic views the IFR pilot can take when considering in-flight icing conditions.  One view is naive'.  It is based solely upon legal definitions of known icing conditions.  I call this the fantasy view.

The other is the real world view.  This view recognizes that nature seldom cooperates with the instrument pilot.  Despite the best weather forecasts, sub-freezing clouds (visible moisture and areas of high humidity*) are where you find them.  Sometimes they are there, sometimes they are not.

Let's look at each view of the world of icing conditions. 

The Fantasy View:

The fantasy view is short and simple.  It means never taking your non-known ice certified airplane into clouds (visible moisture or areas of high humidity) when the outside air temperature (OAT) is near or below freezing. 

If you can fly on IFR flight plans in the winter and make this view point work for you, let me know!

The Real World View:

The other view is far more realistic.  This view recognizes that aircraft on instrument flight plans will encounter sub-freezing clouds (visible moisture and areas of high humidity) whether they want to or not. 

This will more likely occur in the enroute or destination phase of flights where sufficient time has elapsed so that the actual weather is likely to differ from the forecast weather.  In other words, you didn't expect to encounter visible moisture or areas of high humidity, but you did!  In short, welcome to the REAL world of wintertime IFR flight!

The Scenario . . .

A classic example of this might occur on a late afternoon flight in your Cirrus SR22 from Cleveland to Philadelphia.  The month is January.  The forecast calls for broken layers from 8,000' to 15,000'.  You plan is to cruise at 7,000.  Once aloft, you encounter scattered clouds only, so you request and get re-cleared up to 9,000 and motor happily in clear skies on your way to Philly.  

To sit smugly in a hangar discussion or in an online chat forum and defend the fantasy view of icing is not only naive', it is downright dangerous.  In short, it leaves the instrument pilot operationally unprepared for nature's cruelest hoax.  This hoax is, nature is NEVER predictable.   Icing conditions happen even when you never expect them!

As for the descent into Philadelphia . . .

Descending into sub-freezing clouds in any airplane, whether certified for known ice or not, requires several things.  First, a solid gold backdoor must exist.  This means that we need to be assured of either clear air or above freezing temperatures above the minimum vectoring altitude (MVA) below. 

If this backdoor cannot be assured (and we have no other backdoors), we need to remain above the clouds until ATC can vector us to and clear us for the approach.   Once on the approach, we must initiate a quick, flaps up, descent so as to minimize the wings' angle of attack.  Airspeed is critical here.  Maintain the fastest safe airspeed possible on the descent. All anti/de-ice equipment is turned on well before commencing this descent. 

Critical point . . . disconnect the autopilot.  Do not, repeat, do not fly in icing conditions with the autopilot turned on.  If you do, you will be unaware of subtle pitch changes being made by the autopilot to maintain your desired flight attitude as ice accumulates on your wings and airframe.

Some might call this an "emergency" scenario.  Regardless . . . we need to get down safely.  The key is that we do not delay in the clouds. 

Mastering the needles . . . Get started correctly with your instrument training!

Training for the instrument rating can be conveniently divided into three phases.  The first is aircraft control;  the second is instrument procedures (rules of the road); and the third is instrument weather. 

Mastery of all three phases is required before the instrument pilot can operate safely in the IFR environment.

Of the three phases, aircraft control is the foundation upon which all other instrument learning builds.  Master aircraft control (solely by reference to the gauges) and the rest will conveniently fall into place. 

Fail to master aircraft control (again, solely by reference to the gauges), the rest of the instrument work will turn into a nightmare.  Nail the aircraft control thing and the rest of the instrument training is a walk in the park.

Fly no hands . . .

I have an unusual approach to teaching aircraft control to instrument students.  It begins by having the student trim the airplane for straight and level flight at a low cruise power setting. 

Once trimmed, I give the student a series of turns, climbs and descent instruction which he or she executes with rudder and throttle only.  Their hands remain firmly on their laps.  Slight toe pressures on the left or right rudder produce the desired standard rate turns.  The addition or reduction of 300 RPM (or 3" of manifold pressure) produces a comfortable 500 foot per minute climb or descent.

One may criticize this technique by saying that rudder turns result in uncoordinated flight.  Once you try it, you will see that the slight toe pressures on the rudders necessary to produce a standard rate turn do NOT result in uncoordinated flight.  The ball stays firmly in the center of the inclinometer.

After several hours of no-hands flying, the instrument student develops consummate control of the airplane.  He or she can hold headings +/- 5 degrees and altitudes +/- 40 feet with ease.   In time, this becomes second nature to the instrument pilot.

We do not begin the second phase (instrument procedures) until the student has mastered the aircraft control phase using rudder and throttle only. 

Then when they begin shoot instrument approaches, the entire matter of "needle chasing" never materializes.  They are able to set their heading and descent rate with sufficient precision to keep the needles centered!

Flying Memories of Arthur Godfrey!!

Mark Mekker of Buffalo, NY recently pointed me to a web link to one of Arthur Godfrey's most shameless self-promotions ever televised.  Here, you will see Godfrey with the legendary flying ace, Eddie Rickenbacher, then president of Eastern Airlines.  He is at the controls of a Super Constellation on a flight from New York's Idlewild Airport (now JFK) to Miami. 

One of the highlights of this 20 minute video occurs when Godfrey opens a pack of Chesterfield cigarettes and offers them to the crew.  Then he lights up!  (Godfrey later died of lung cancer.)

Deliberately Botched Landings!!

I love it when my students botch their landings.  In fact, once they begin making good landings, I deliberately upset things just as they are touching down by giving a surreptitious tug on the yoke and a push on the rudder.

Why, you ask?  Why would we deliberately upset our students' landings?

Answer:  I want to be sure they know the proper recovery technique.  I want them to be spring-loaded with the instant proper power and control inputs whenever the landing goes wrong.

Improper primary training results in accident

It was a nice morning this past August in Crystal River, Florida.  A flight student was practicing landings in a Cessna 150.  Things were going well until a sudden wind gust caused his airplane to balloon into a nose high attitude just prior to touchdown.

Caught by surprised and not prepared to deal with the unexpected upset, the pilot allowed the airplane to settle back down hard on the runway.  This produced a series of worsening bounces.  After the third bounce, the airplane veered off the edge of the runway.  The landing gear collapsed and the propeller impacted the ground.

What was the pilot doing?

One wonders what this student pilot was doing throughout this botched landing.  My guess is that he was struggling with the control yoke in a vain effort to regain control of the airplane.   Had a cockpit recorder been running, we would have captured what he was likely saying aloud after the second bounce.  "Oh . . . Sh*t!"  (those are typically the last words out every pilots' mouth just before the crash!)

What should he have been doing?

Had this pilot had his hand on the throttle when the sudden gust upset his airplane, he would have simply added power.  By adding power, he causes the landing airplane to start flying again. 

Once flying and stabilized over the runway, he could elect to "go-around" for another try or, if he had enough remaining runway, we could allow it to again settle back to the runway in a controlled fashion.

The only way to master this recovery technique is to practice it often with an instructor aboard.  Have the instructor deliberately upset the airplane just as it is touching down.  A sharp tug on the yoke and a kick on the rudder easily simulates the effect of a sudden wind gust or bounced landing.  Learn how to make proper recoveries.  Do this BEFORE you solo! 

NTSB Report

New Online Icing Product

The National Weather Services' Aviation Weather Center recently posted a new graphical view of the icing severity by altitude.

Called the CIP (Current Icing Product), this webpage is updated hourly and provides current information on icing severity.

It is important to note that all CIP products are not forecasts, but presentations of current conditions at the time of the analysis. CIP is not to be used as a forecast for icing conditions.

NOTE: Pilots of aircraft that are not certified for flight into known or forecast icing conditions should be especially cautious of areas displaying any type of icing severity, regardless of the probability indicated on CIP graphics.

To open this page, click HERE.  For an explanation of this page, click HERE.

We've heard it here before.  Our total pilot numbers have been on a steady decline since their peak in 1979.  We're down 29 percent.  The number of people signing up for flight lessons in 2005 is less than one-half the number who signed up in 1980! 

This downward trend has been going on too long for anybody to call this a statistical aberration.

The most serious trend!

Troubling as these numbers are, the real tragedy is that our fatal accident rate is increasing.  As illustrated in the linear regression chart below, the GA safety record is NOT getting better.  It's not remaining the same.   Instead, it's worsening at an alarming rate.

While our OTA readers may grow weary hearing this same sky is falling message, we will NOT see a reversal of this destructive trend until the GA industry gets real with the safety messages they are espousing and the interventions they are promoting.

All of the colorful websites, online courses, and safety seminars being put in place to improve GA flight safety are not turning things around.  Pursuing a course of voluntary pilot education is simply not reaching the non-proficient pilot.  Preaching to the choir does not stop the unsaved pilot from his or her own aeronautical ineptness.

In fact, sending out false messages of encouragement saying that we are "good and getting better" gives aid and comfort to those hapless pilots who feel no need to engage in anything more than biennial recurrent training.

Sure, we OTA readers are growing tired of hearing this message.  But we are also growing weary of paying higher insurance premiums. 

We are growing weary of losing our precious airports because they cannot make an economic go of it.  We are growing weary of seeing flight schools and FBOs going out of business.

We are growing weary of hearing of the all too frequent crashes of wonderfully designed, perfectly capable high performance aircraft operated by pilots lacking the necessary judgment and skills to fly them safely.

We are growing weary of the unaffordably high prices of new airplanes because not enough of them can be sold to achieve the economies of scale to make them affordable.  The same holds true with replacement airplane engines, component parts, and avionics.

With your help, OTA will eventually reach into the heads and hearts of all GA pilots . . . including those who are less than proficient, whose skills need honing, and who do not avail themselves of today's training opportunities.

As more pilots sign on, our GA leaders will be persuaded that it is time for meaningful change in our declining industry.  No more status quo, no more misleading safety hype, no more heads in the sand. 

It is time that we come together as an industry.  We need to objectively examine why our accident rate is worsening.  We need to take a painful look at FAR Part 61 governing pilot initial qualifications and recurrent training.  It is time we stop deferring to our insurance industry to set the training standards to operate today's airplanes.

Or, we can all keep our heads in the sand.  OTA can stop talking about this problem and, instead, focus solely upon training tips for the proficient pilot.  We can replicate the lessons covered in AOPA PILOT, Flying Magazine, and IFR Magazine.  We can continue along in a business as usual fashion.  We can delude ourselves into believing we're "good and getting better." 

If this is all we do, GA has maybe another decade or two of dwindling life remaining before it succumbs to the heavy hands of federal, state, and local government regulators who will squeeze the last remaining life out of us.  

Nameless lawyers in the bowels of the FAA will write ever more restrictive Letters of Interpretation that will eventually suffocate all of us.  The only remaining GA activity will be corporate jets and charter service. 

The recreational pilot and his or her Cessna 172 or RV6 will become a thing of an earlier era.  And when we're gone, the spawning ground for tomorrow's corporate and airline pilots will go with it.

In summary, I wish we could ignore our 35 year decline in GA activity and our past six year worsening fatal accident rate.  I wish we could believe our GA leaders' flag waving hype and falsely encouraging safety record.  I cannot and, hopefully, you cannot either.   When enough of us recognize what is happening, positive change will finally be achieved.

Fly safe,

Bob Miller, ATP, CFII
Buffalo, NY
rjma@rjma.com
716-864-8100