Sunday,
December 31, 2006 Vol. III No. 26 |
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Welcome
to the
Over the
Airwaves
aviation journal. This complimentary bi-weekly e-mailing
is being sent to pilots and aviation enthusiasts around the
world. Its aim
is to promote
flight safety, encourage students and new pilots, and to build
enthusiasm for aviation in general.
Dear Pilots and Aviation Enthusiasts:
Resolved! We've all done it before. We've resolved to lose weight, save money, get that promotion, finish school, earn that next pilot rating . . . . whatever. Like you, I've resolved to do great things in each coming year. Now, many decades later, I look back and wonder just how many them did I really accomplish? The bathroom scales do not lie. Weight gain seems to be a part of my inner fabric. My bank account, though in the black, is nothing to write home about. So, as far as resolutions go, I guess I'm about average. But there is one big exception! My family and I flew from Buffalo to New York City this past weekend to do some Christmas shopping and to see a Broadway show. On the way back we encountered unpredicted deteriorating weather. A warm, moist air mass unexpectedly rolled in off of Lake Erie over the still warm ground creating a thick blanket of advection fog. The resultant IFR conditions the northern portions of Western NY took weather forecasters completely by surprise. I descended in the muck with the intention of using the GPS approach to the Akron (NY) Airport Runway 25. The published minimums would permit me to fly down to a minimum descent altitude of 460' AGL with 1 mile visibility. Listening to the nearby Buffalo/Niagara International Airport ATIS, I knew the likelihood of getting into Akron would be minimal. KBUF was calling for broken clouds at 300' and an 1,800' RVR (runway visual range). My hope was that Akron's weather would be marginally better.
Glancing to my right, I saw my wife, Jo, looking pensively at the foreboding weather outside. She is a trooper who has flown with me for hundreds of hours. Still, I could tell she was apprehensive about the weather. I counted the feet remaining before reaching the 400' MDA. 500' to go; 400' to go; 300' to go; 200' to go; 100' to go . . . still nothing out the window. 50' to go. I reached the MDA with 1 mile to go and there was nothing but dark clag outside. The airport was nowhere in sight. Okay . . . Akron is my home airport. I know the approach and landing environment like the back of my hand. If I could get down just another 100 feet, I was confident that I could pick up the runway end identifier lights (REILs). Just another 100 feet and 1/2 mile were all that I needed to bring this weekend trip to a happy ending. Again, my thoughts turned to my precious passengers. Erica, with her whole life ahead of her, and Jo, who placed her complete trust in my judgment, are the two most important people in my life. After 45 minutes of convoluted routings out of the busy New York City airspace and another hour or so beating a turbulent 45 knot headwind flowing over upstate NY, we were all anxious to get on the ground. I didn't want to disappoint them. We were rapidly slithering down through the fog to the missed approach point (MAP) with no airport in sight. All I needed was another 100 lousy feet lower and we would be safely on the ground. What to do???? Sacred Resolution fulfilled! Okay, so I am not very good at keeping my New Year's resolutions. But I am perfectly committed to keeping my flying resolutions. And one of those resolutions is to NEVER, EVER, NO NEVER descend below published minimums on an instrument approach without having either the approach lighting system or the runway environment (per FAR 91.175) in sight. As such, upon reaching the MAP, it really was a no brainer decision for me to push the prop to full RPM, advance the throttle, retract the gear, and pitch up to the horizontal command bar on the flight director. As I did so, N4720Y responded in predictable fashion. I called Buffalo Approach, announced that I was on the missed and requested vectors for the ILS approach into KBUF.
We landed safely at Buffalo just 10 minutes later. Erica and Jo exited the airplane. They walked ahead of me into the FBO. I said to myself, "Good job, Bob. We'll all live to fly another day." And so for you . . . As the new year descends upon you, I trust that whatever resolutions you make and break, you will KEEP your flying resolutions - all of them. Whether it's never descending below minimums or vowing to complete that next pilot rating, regard these resolutions as sacred promises to yourself, to your family, and to the passengers you carry.
Bob Miller, ATP, CFII Winter Flight Increases Risk of Carbon Monoxide in the Cockpit!
A tiny crack in the exhaust system anywhere around the heat exchanger is all it takes to render even the most proficient pilot suddenly incapacitated. The sad news is that carbon monoxide is an odorless gas that defies human detection. Equally sad is the fact that those little CO detector patches we stick on the panel seldom work . . . particularly if they are over 30 days old. And when they do work, we may never notice the subtle color change in time to save the day. Pilot learns this with fatal consequences!
The weather was perfect VFR. Radar data from nearby Portland International Airport revealed that airplane veered off course. Shortly thereafter, it completed several meandering 360 degree turns. The final radar return showed that the airplane at 100 feet, very near to where the wreckage was found. Medical examiner's findings . . . The medical examiner determined that the the cause of death was carbon monoxide toxicity (hypemic hypoxia) and positional asphyxia. The pilot's blood and urine were tested for cyanide, volatiles (ethanol), and drugs with negative results; however, his blood contained 50 percent carbon monoxide. Now the rest of the story. . . Post-impact examination of the engine's muffler revealed a crack around the entire circumference just aft of its forward flange. The airplane's last annual inspection had been completed just three months prior to the crash. Given the propensity for aircraft exhaust system cracks, FAR Part 43 provides guidelines for an airplane's annual inspection. Section (d) (8) specifically addresses exhaust stack cracks, defects, and improper attachment. The
airplane's manufacturer also provides a checklist for an
annual inspection in the aircraft's Service Manual.
The engine compartment section addresses exhaust system
leaks, cracks, and burned-out spots.
In Summary . . . If
ever there was a good reason to choose your maintenance shop
carefully, this is one. Hairline cracks in the exhaust
system can be difficult to see with the naked eye. The
best ways to see them is by pressurizing the exhaust
This accident also demonstrates the importance of having an electronic carbon monoxide warning system located somewhere in the cabin. Even trace amounts of carbon monoxide will trigger an attention-getting audible alarm. Good units can be purchased for about $50.
Should that alarm go off in flight, close the heater and
ventilate the cockpit by opening all the windows, then land
immediately. Fuel sampling . . . could save your life!
Astonishingly, pilots have been known to skip over this critical part of any pre-flight check! They assume that no water or other contaminants have made their way into the fuel tanks. Such may or may not have been the case recently with the pilot of a Piper PA-28-180 as she made ready to depart the New Garden Airport (N57) in Toughkenamon, PA. The NTSB Report does not offer us a clue in this regard. Witnesses reported that "the airplane climbed to about 200 feet when the engine began to sputter." The airplane then turned to the right, while maintaining a climb attitude. The engine subsequently lost total power and the airplane then appeared to stall. It descended towards the ground out of the witnesses' view. The pilot died in the crash. There were no passengers. The wreckage site . . .
Investigators removed fuel samples from the carburetor bowl, the accelerator pump, and the carburetor screen. Each of the samples had a slight blue layer of liquid, which was similar in color and smell to aviation gasoline. When the samples were drained onto a coupon smeared with water finding paste, the paste turned to a pink color, indicating the presence of water. According to a
local fire fighter, the surrounding area of Avondale had
received about 8 to 10 inches of rain during the proceeding
two days prior to the accident. Typically, the tank sumping process yields no water or, perhaps, several water bubbles at the bottom of the testing tube. We seldom consider the possibility that the ENTIRE testing sample is water! Yep . . . heavy rains pouring down on an aircraft in an outside tie-down can find their way into fuel tanks through leaky fuel caps. It doesn't take long before several gallons of water contaminates the fuel. The blue color dye in the fuel can cause this water to turn blue as well. Similarly, the pungent smell of av gas can also find its way to the water!
Good question. The first step, of course, is to insure that your fuel caps have fresh, properly fitting gaskets to prevent rain water from entering the tanks. Next, ALWAYs sump your fuel tanks. If you suspect that water has entered your tanks, you might consider using water finding paste to insure that all of it has been removed prior to flight. You can order water finding paste HERE. More on keeping those patterns tight!
By doing so, following traffic is forced to remain in trail, thereby producing an ever-increasingly larger traffic pattern. Within minutes, the traffic pattern is so large that nobody can see other traffic! Unfortunately, the FAR/AIM is remarkably silent on the subject of proper traffic pattern techniques. We are left to our own devices when maneuvering around the pattern. When to turn on base . . . Conventional wisdom suggests that the best time to turn on to the base leg is just as soon as we see the runway end over our left shoulder (or right shoulder when a right-hand pattern). In fact, we could actually begin our base turn immediately upon passing by the runway end while on the downwind leg. The idea is to keep the pattern tight enough that we could theoretically make the runway should our engine fail anywhere in the pattern. Apply this test to your traffic pattern and you'll be fine . . . as long as you can "dead stick" it into a safe landing on a runway! Residual Ice Can Kill!*
Here's the typical scenario. It is a cold night and you are descending through several stratus layers in preparation for landing. All of your anti-ice protection is up and running. Satisfied that everything is working properly and the protected areas of your airplane remain free of contaminating ice, you continue your descent in blissful confidence. ATC begins to vector you for the approach. As you reconfigure your airplane for the instrument approach, you fail to notice a subtle reduction in indicated airspeed. A long vector keeps you in light icing conditions. A quick check out the windows reveals sparkling clean leading edges. Your defensive icing equipment is doing its job. An awaiting surprise! Icing conditions worsen. You again activate your anti-ice/de-ice system. Unknown to you, several inches of jagged rime ice have insidiously wrapped around your antenna, landing gear struts, prop spinner, and the unprotected portions of your wing roots and tips, horizontal and vertical stabilizer. As you slither down the final approach course at your normal pitch attitude and power setting, you fail to notice a less than normal airspeed. Dropping below your intended glidepath, you pitch up slightly and add a smidge of power. As you make the necessary power and pitch changes, the margin between your increasing pitch attitude and your wings' critical angle of attack narrows precipitously. More power is added to remain on glidepath. As you approach the decision height, the runway comes into view. Your descent rate is too fast. Maximum power is added as you pitch up aggressively to arrest the descent. The frozen stall horn remains silent. The wings begin to buffet. The nose suddenly drops as a combination of wing stall and loss of the downward lift of stabilizer creates a simultaneous tailplane stall. The uneven load of residual ice on the unprotected areas of the airplane produces a dangerous yaw. Coupled with the torque, slipstream, gyroscopic effect, and P-factor of the suddenly powered-up engine, the left wing falls out from under the airplane. Residual ice on non de-iced airplanes as well!
He had been flying in good VFR near Madison, Wisconsin during the winter. Entering the clouds and encountering light icing conditions, he requested higher, but due to the proximity to his destination, ATC lowered him further into the cold clouds. The pilot received radar vectors to the final approach course to runway 36 at the Tri-County Regional Airport (LNR), Lone Rock, Wisconsin. Upon reaching the missed approach point in a somewhat unstabilized fashion and with ice on the leading edge of his wings, the pilot executed a missed approach and requested vectors for another try. On his second attempt, the pilot was able to make visual contact with the airport and cancelled his IFR clearance. He continued along his approach in VFR conditions. On subsequent interview, the pilot said that the aircraft was configured with 25 degrees flaps and that he crossed the runway threshold at just below 85 miles per hour (mph). Here is the rest of the pilot's statement:
How this pilot made it out alive is anybody's guess. Clearly, he did all of the wrong things on this approach. Known ice certification or not . . . residual ice makes us test pilots
In one particular case, a Bombardier Regional Jet landing at night descended through a 400' thick layer of fog. Reaching the decision height, the captain decided that he was not in a position to land. He added power and pitched up for the go-around. The airplane stalled at an angle of attack 4.5 degrees lower than would be expected for a natural stall. This occurred just 33' above the runway. The captain and eight passengers were seriously injured. Loss of Indicated Airspeed . . . the first signal of residual ice!
In level flight, at known power settings, and at specific altitudes, proficient pilots know precisely what their indicated airspeed should be. Any reduction below this known indicated airspeed should sound an alarm in the pilot's brain that something is amiss. If in freezing conditions, the first suspect would be residual ice. At this point, an immediate escape plan must be executed. Power should be added (if available) to restore the lost airspeed. If additional power is not available, under no conditions should the indicated airspeed be permitted to drop below the Vy for your airplane. Descend, if necessary, to maintain an indicated airspeed greater than Vy. Coordination with ATC is obviously required, but don't delay waiting for a clearance. Inability to maintain Vy speed or greater with full power in level flight is a genuine emergency. Use your emergency authority to pitch down to increase your indicated airspeed. Descent and landing with residual ice Carrying residual ice on the descent and landing triggers the need to depart from our normal pitch, power, and flap settings. While specific configurations will vary by airplane, important things to remember are: (1) maintain the greatest pitch down (minimal angle of attack) attitude possible without building excessive airspeed; (2) carry extra power until just seconds above the runway; and (3) do not use flaps as this alters the shape of the airframe and disrupts air flow over the stabilizer.
Clearly, control of the airplane must be maintained throughout the landing sequence which includes, of course, slowing to the required touch down speed. Rather than flaring and floating down the last 20' to 30' of altitude or so, fly the airplane right down to the runway! In summary . . . As was noted in a recent report titled, Aircraft Icing Problems - After 50 Years, "Most, if not all of the recent accidents on record having icing as the probable cause could have been prevented if the flight crews understood the serious nature of the situation and had applied appropriate corrective action." It is incumbent upon all of us who operate in winter IFR conditions to know and understand the dangers of residual ice. Believing we can always remain clear of sub-freezing visible moisture during winter IFR flight is not only unrealistic, it is also downright dangerous if we are inexperienced and unprepared to deal with such encounters properly. * Source: "Residual Ice: It's Dangerously Overlooked," Business & Commercial Aviation, November, 2006. Thanks to Gary Stevens, Prior Aviation, Buffalo, NY for sharing this article with us. WWII German Luftwaffe Gun Camera Videos
Click HERE to view some remarkable still photos of just how badly some of these B-17s were damaged and still flew home! Click HERE to view the American's response . . . from a P-47 perspective!!! Crosswind Nightmares!
The causes are all the same! The number one cause of all crosswind landing mishaps is the pilot's failure to keep the upwind wing down and the nose aligned with the runway throughout the landing sequence. This failure to keep the upwind wing down in a crosswind landing is illustrated in the upper graphic. Here we can see how the crosswind gets under and lifts the upwind wing. This causes the tires to literally "skid" sideways on the runway. This problem is exacerbated by the crosswind's force on the vertical stabilizer (tail), which serves to push the nose into the wind. By this time, the airplane is out of control and is likely to roll to the upwind edge of the runway - taking runway lights with it. If the tail lifts in the process, a prop strike is likely to result. The Solution . . .
As we cross the runway numbers, we bank into the wind and apply opposite rudder to maintain proper runway alignment until firmly on the runway. In fact, we actually land on the upwind main gear first. By doing this, we prevent the crosswind from getting under the upwind wing and upsetting the airplane. We continue to apply aileron against the crosswind until coming to a complete stop and exiting the runway. This is called the "follow through." Proper Training and Practice . . .
Using the proper crosswind landing technique, we can land a Cessna 150 in a 30 knot direct crosswind! I'm not suggesting that you go out and try this right away, but once you perfect crosswind skills 30 knot crosswind landings will be like a walk in the park! Computing the Crosswind Component
Wind, in fact, is arguably the most common reason why low time pilots cancel flights. Sure, low ceilings, poor visibility and thunderstorms cause flight cancellations, but not nearly as frequently as winds. How much wind is too much? Pilots employ different standards when setting their personal wind tolerances. Some set an arbitrary wind velocity, regardless of direction. Others peg it at the demonstrated crosswind capability of their airplane. Whatever standard is used, every pilot should know and strictly adhere to his or her personal wind tolerance. Wind speed vs. wind direction While wind speed is important, the ultimate test of "fly-ability" is wind direction relative to the departure runway. A 30 knot wind right down the runway is far easier to deal with than, say, an 18 knot wind blowing directly across the runway. In fact, a 30 knot wind right down the runway has a zero crosswind component. High winds, however, do become a challenge when taxiing. As with all high wind operations, quality training and frequent practice are required to keep us proficient. Brain Teaser
The answer is found at the bottom of this page. Slipping Turn to Final
We overshoot the final approach segment. We apply excessive left rudder (assuming a left hand traffic pattern) to help us get around the turn. We counteract the steepening left bank angle with right aileron. The airplane is now cross-controlled. Finding ourselves low and slow on the approach, we pitch up into a classic accelerated stall. The inside wing drops suddenly and we find ourselves rolling instantly into a spin. This tragic scenario continues to occur once a week in the United States. They are nearly always fatal. Fighter Combat International (FCI) put together a brief video that dramatically illustrates how quickly this happens. A camera is mounted on top of the vertical stabilizer (tail) of an Extra 300 in flight. It was shot at a safe altitude, but you'll get the idea. Note that it required 700' of altitude to recover!!! Click HERE to view this dramatic video. Watch it repeatedly until you see exactly what is happening. Solution/Prevention . . . Stall/spins are easily prevented by doing two things:
Thanks to OTA collaborator, Thom Riddle, of Buffalo, NY for passing this video on to us.Selecting Off-Route Altitudes
WRONG! As our traditional Flight Service Station (FSS) world gives way to privatization, we can expect to encounter flight service specialists with less and less familiarity with areas where we fly. The day will surely come when a FSS briefer accepts a filed IFR direct routing over the Continental Divide at 1,500' MSL instead of 15,000' MSL. That once familiar "check and balance" in the system will no longer be with us. If its meant to be, it's up to me! Yep . . . instead of imposing technology to help prevent mistakes, we instrument pilots will find ourselves back in the low altitude enroute charts to keep us clear of obstacles . . . particularly when on off-airway, direct routes. Thus, the first place on the chart we should be looking is the minimum safe altitudes or OROCAs (Off Route Obstacle Clearance Altitudes). Examples of these altitudes are highlighted in the graphic below:
These minimum safe altitudes are not to be confused with MEAs (minimum enroute altitudes) or MOCAs (minimum obstruction clearance altitudes) that are associated with published Victor airways. Nor should they be confused with MVAs (minimum vectoring altitudes). Minimum safe altitudes or OROCAs simply provide pilots with a 1000' clearance over any obstacles in non-mountainous areas or 2,000' clearance in mountainous areas. So which areas of the United States are non-mountainous versus mountainous areas? You can find the answer in the FAR/AIM or you can refer to the map below.
Complying with published minimum safe altitudes (OROCAs) is critically important whenever filing RNAV direct routings. You may, of course, fly below these altitudes when on Victor airways or if you are receiving radar vectors. Remember, YOU are the PIC. YOU are ultimately responsible for the safe operation of your airplane, regardless of ATC clearances. When Can We Descend on the Approach?
You brief the approach plate and note that published altitude from the IAF to the FAF (final approach fix) segment is 2,500' MSL. When can you descend to 2,500?
Take a look at the graphic below before considering your answer.
Answer: Choice "c" and "d" are both correct. The important fact to remember is that we cannot descend below the last assigned altitude unless instructed to do so by ATC or when established on a published segment of the IAP (instrument approach procedure) and then only if cleared for the approach. The annals of aviation history are filled with fatal accidents where pilots descended below the last assigned altitude enroute to their destinations.
I am sitting with the orginal letter in hand from the FAA, dated June 6, 2006, wherein Loretta E. Alkalay, Northeast Regional Counsel set forth a new definition of known icing. Whether by deliberate intent or by off-handed remark, Ms. Alkalay set in motion a chain reaction of events that will surely lead to a dramatic increase in fatal icing accidents.For those of us in the flight training community who understand the idiocy of this letter, it effectively converts the responsible teaching of winter IFR operations into clandestine "don't ask, don't tell" exercises. It eliminates the issuance of essential but potentially self-incriminating icing PIREPs. Ultimately, it leads to the preparation of a future generation of IFR pilots who are neither trained nor experienced to deal realistically with the risks of wintertime flight. FAA edicts based upon ignorance
Whether hikers or pilots, the only responsible action participants can take is to recognize and to understand the risks of mud and ice and then to acquire the skills necessary to deal with them. IFR pilots require specific training to recognize and avoid areas of genuine icing risk, to understand the physics of icing, and to design and implement specific icing escape strategies. The process is no different than developing thunderstorm awareness and avoidance skills. Instead of issuing blanket edicts based upon aeronautical ignorance, it is time that the FAA and the NTSB join together in crafting a reasonable definition of "known ice." Rather than just being told "no," we GA pilots require useful guidance on dealing with the risks of wintertime flight. Further, we need to encourage the further development, dissemination, and use of newer anti-icing technologies such as TKS, E-Vade hot wings, and related mechanisms that reduce the risk of ice accretions before such risks are manifested. Heated Pitot tubes and inflatable boots have been with us for 70 years. Let's look to the future!
If we pilots do something stupid with regard to wintertime flight . . . like penetrating clouds known by forecast or PIREP to contain moderate to severe risk of icing and then create an emergency as a result, then FAR 91.13 (careless and reckless) works just fine to admonish us. If we allow ourselves to turn into an aerial popsicle, then land in a farmer's field . . . again, FAR 91.13 works just fine. If we pilots are to be held responsible for our actions (which we should), then we must have the means to acquire a reasonable level of wintertime flight training. Similarly, we must be free to issue and receive icing PIREPs without fear of self-incrimination. Denying us these tools will most assuredly lead to an increase in fatal icing accidents! Should I have asked the question in the first place?
Perhaps I sinned by asking the question, but the question needed to be asked. Obviously, the answer I received proves that that the FAA, itself, is confused on the matter. Given the risks of airframe icing, confusion is not what we need here! The risks of icing in wintertime flight are just as real as the risks of embedded thunderstorms during the summertime flight. We pilots require both understandable and workable rules and regulations to work within. No
more guessing, no more hangar debates, no more Internet
police turning CFIs into the FAA and NAFI for writing
web-based accounts of responsible winter training, no more
legalists versus pragmatists. Give us something that
contributes to making winter flight safer all around.
Give us something that works!
Bob
Miller, ATP, CFII
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Past Issues of Click
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to open any previous issue(s) of Over
the Airwaves and to search for any past articles. Technical Assistance I would like to thank the following technical assistance contributors for their valuable help in producing OTA every two weeks: Barry McCollom, Kerrville, TX; Thom Riddle, Buffalo, NY; and Jay Rolls, Macon, GA.
Answer to the inclinometer question:
Answer: It depends upon which side of the instrument panel the inclinometer is installed! If the inclinometer is installed on the left side of the panel, the ball will swing to the left, regardless of the direction of the spin. If it is installed on the right side of the panel, the ball will swing to the right, again regardless of the direction of the spin! Why? A spinning airplane revolves around its vertical axis. The vertical axis runs up and down through the CENTER of the cockpit. Any revolution around the vertical axis, regardless of direction, will cause the ball to spin to the outside of the turn. Pose this question at your next hangar flying session. You are sure to win a beer on the answer! More importantly, the correct answer this question reveals WHY always "stepping on the ball" is not the correct solution to every unusual attitude scenario!
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Having been
cleared for Akron's Runway 25 GPS approach, I turned
and looked at my 16 year old daughter, Erica (photo
right),
sleeping peacefully in the rear seat of my Cessna
210. With one of the middle row seats removed,
she was able to extend her legs over a soft-sided
suitcase. 
STOP! Before you pull that
cabin heater
knob out, think about the risks!
Examination
of the accident site revealed that the wreckage path was
about 140 feet in length. The first tree strike area was
located about 130 feet prior to the main fuselage.
Along the wreckage path were sections of the outer right
wing. The main wreckage came to rest on its left side, in a
nose down attitude, resting on a large hardwood tree. The
empennage section remained attached to the fuselage.
So
what do we do?
Few
things are more infuriating than to see a pilot turn a
conventional non-towered airport traffic pattern into
something suitable for a B-747. Here, the hapless,
poorly trained pilot extends his or her downwind leg into
the next county before turning on base leg!
Whether
you have pneumatic boots, TKS "weeping wing," the E-Vade hot
leading edge, or even bleed air from turbine engines, the
ice left behind after activating your anti-ice or de-ice
system can cut your margin of safety to a whisker!
Such
may have been the case with a brand new instrument rated PA-28R-200
(Arrow) pilot with less than three hours of actual
in-the-clouds
experience. 
This
scenario happens to jet aircraft as well. The Flight
Safety Foundation's 2004 report on business jet accidents
noted eight approach and landing loss of control accidents
involving ice. Three of these occurred while on the
ILS where decaying airspeed caused a loss of control during
the flare.*
Whenever
icing is encountered, the primary instrument of safe escape
is the airspeed indicator. 
Have
you ever wondered just how vulnerable our B-17s were to
enemy aircraft?
Crosswind
landings produce more mishaps than any other phase of
flight. These mishaps include everything from prop
strikes, to ground loops, to flattened tires, to collapsed
landing gears, to runway excursions.
With
all due respect to our Asian brethren, the proper crosswind
landing technique is often referred to as the "won wing
low" approach (see the bottom portion of the graphic).
This
all will make little sense until you actually get out and
practice it in a genuine crosswind . . . with a CFI, if
necessary.
Old
Ben Franklin made us aware of the inevitability of death and taxes. We aviators can add another
factor that will always be with us. This, of course,
is wind! 
We've
talked a great deal about low level stall/spin scenarios in
In
this world of widespread radar coverage, many of us do not
give much thought to selecting our altitudes when preparing
and filing our flight plans. After all, ATC is not
about to approve an inappropriate altitude, right? 
Here's
the scenario. You are cruising at 8,000' MSL on an IFR
flight plan. ATC issues you descent instructions to
4,000 along with vectors to the IAF (initial approach fix)
for the GPS approach to your home airport.
Making
it illegal for non-known ice certified aircraft to enter all
areas of sub-freezing visible moisture and high humidity is
akin to making it illegal for Appalachian Trail hikers to
get their feet wet or to step in mud. Wet and mud go
with hiking just as sub-freezing haze and clouds are a part
of nearly every winter IFR flight.
As
with all in-flight behavior, responsibility for safe
wintertime flight falls directly upon the pilot in command .
. . just as it does when he or she penetrates reported areas
for turbulence, thunderstorms, or poor visibility and/or
mountain obscuration.
Did
I do a bad thing by asking the FAA to define "known ice?"
I've been told by several readers that I should have let sleeping dogs lay
so that we can continue
operating below the radar screen. These
reader observations make nice metaphors but they bear little
semblance to the real world.
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