Sunday,
January 14, 2007 Vol. IV No.
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Welcome
to the
Over the
Airwaves
aviation journal. This complimentary bi-weekly e-mailing
is being sent to pilots and aviation enthusiasts around the
world. Its aim
is to promote
flight safety, encourage students and new pilots, and to build
enthusiasm for aviation in general.
Dear Pilots and Aviation Enthusiasts:
Arriving Alive! This is the time when many of us ponder the coming year. As pilots, we think about the ever-increasing cost of flight. We wonder if we will be able to keep up. Younger pilots wonder about job opportunities in aviation. Our more mature pilots wonder about getting through the next medical. On a broader level, we wonder about what the FAA is up to. User fees, air space restrictions, and airport security issues hang over our heads like temperature inversions over valley airports. We worry about our declining pilot population and what to do about it. Each of these issues is important. Each affects us in differing ways. But there is one issue that nobody likes to talk about. Curiously, it is this one issue that takes precedence over absolutely everything else we do in aviation. It is the issue of reaching our destination . . . alive. Again, our dirty little secret! Contrary to what some of our big GA membership organizations are telling us, we GA pilots are not doing a very good job at the issue of arriving alive. Nearly every day (over 320 times a year), one of our GA pilot brethren manages to get killed in a light airplane. Four out of five of these fatal wrecks are due to pilot error. Sadly, most of these hapless pilots take innocent friends and/or family members with them.
Here is the ultimate irony. If we look at the fatal accident rate over the past six years, the problem of arriving alive is getting worse, though we will not find anybody in the GA establishment talking about this sad fact. Instead, we hear AOPA president Phil Boyer proudly claiming our fatal accident numbers are down. Sure they're down, but we have fewer airplanes in the air than ever before. We need to look at accident RATES, not numbers! Year after year, AOPA and its Air Safety Foundation tell us that voluntary educational programs work better than regulatory reform. While nice in theory and we all wish it were true, our worsening fatal accident rate since entering the 21st century is not bearing this out. Here is a sad fact. With more and more low time pilots stepping up into less forgiving glass composite, high performance piston aircraft and very light jets (VLJs), our fatal accident rate is likely to increase even further. We don't hear anybody in the GA establishment addressing this troubling fact either! Why is this happening?
Here's why. Fearing that ANY proposed regulatory change will create burdens on their member pilots, the big GA membership organizations crank up letter writing campaigns opposing such change. As a result, positive regulatory improvement gets stifled in a pile of constituency paper. The FAA eventually gives up. This is not to suggest that we should ignore the occasionally heavy and sometimes arbitrary hand of the FAA, but there needs to be less blanket opposition to change from our GA leaders and more collaboration on those regulatory safety matters that will, in fact, reduce our fatal accident rate. Second, the people who claim to represent GA pilots are not about to stand up and admonish our negligent behavior. Their goal is to increase membership numbers rather than offending non-proficient pilot members! Thus, they will continue issuing positive messages to all who will listen. They will continue doing this even if it means offering false encouragement to the non-proficient pilot who, as a result, goes out and does something truly stupid in an airplane. What are WE to do about it?
Any pilot who takes command of an airplane while experiencing a single skill, attitude, or judgment deficiency places that flight in grave danger. Such behavior is akin to allowing a three-year-old toddler to walk unaccompanied across a busy highway intersection. Luck may prevail but the probability of making repeated safe crossings eventually dwindle to zero. The accident data confirm this sad fact. Second, we and every other pilot we know must recognize that piloting skills, attitudes, and judgment are more perishable than strawberries. Instrument skills are, perhaps, the most perishable of all. If these skills are not exercised at least once weekly, they deteriorate. Left unexercised for more than a month, they diminish to a dangerous level. The accident data confirm this sad fact. Third, we and every pilot we know must actively engage in recurrent training at least twice annually if not more frequently. This is the hard part . . . Now here comes the hard part. If we are not prepared to engage in recurrent training twice annually due to other time priorities or finances, we need to do ourselves, our family, and the GA industry a great big favor. Stop flying! Sell the airplane! Play golf or tennis instead. At least we'll be there to bounce our grandchildren on our knee! Taking this ponderous step, alone, could reduce our fatal accident rate by 75 percent or more, in my opinion. You won't hear this message coming from from AOPA, the Air Safety Foundation, or EAA, but this is what is required to stop our worsening fatal accident rate.
There is one immutable fact that we pilots can take to the bank. That fact is, those of us who engage in twice annual recurrent training will likely arrive alive. Those who do not WILL continue contributing to our worsening fatal accident rate. Solving our fatal accident problem rather than recruiting new student pilots should be our number-one concern for 2007. Solve this problem and there will not be enough new airplanes, headsets, flight schools and instructors, or AOPA membership applications to satisfy the demands of new student pilots entering the system!
Bob Miller, ATP, CFII Emergency Landing Options Morbid it might sound, the proficient pilot is ALWAYS scouting out suitable emergency landing areas should the unspeakable happen to the engine. This, of course, begs the question . . . . "Are trees better than water?" Unfortunately, there is no clear cut answer to this question. The variables are far too many and varied. We can, however, offer several basic things to consider should you find yourself gliding slowly out of the sky. Retractable Gear vs. Fixed Gear
Thus, if equipped with a retractable gear, keeping it retracted for any off-airport landing on other than a smooth field or roadway could be a safer way to go. Lighted Areas vs. Dark Areas? Engine failure at night presents its own set of challenges for obvious reasons. One aviation pundant suggested that just before impact that we turn our landing light on. If we don't like what we see, turn it off!
Dark areas, of course, hide obstacles. Fortunately, in most night environments there is some measure of moonlight. Selecting dark areas with the assistance of moonlight may be a better choice than well lit areas. Water vs. Trees?
There are lots of variables here. Is it winter or summer? Life expectancy in freezing water is measured in minutes. We might survive the landing and die from hypothermia. Fixed gear landings in water nearly always result in the airplane flipping over on initial impact. Retracts, with gear up, typically do fair better in water landings. Landing in the trees, on the other hand, can be survivable depending upon the type of trees. Evergreen trees are more resilient or flexible than hardwoods. Thus, if you have a choice, go for the evergreens.
Note that the cockpit is still intact. The student pilot walked away without injury. Land near possible help! Regardless of emergency landing site choices, always consider the challenges you create for search and rescue personnel. When flying over remote or mountainous areas, remain as close as possible to roads or highways. When flying over open bodies of water, consider the wisdom of flying from boat to boat. Mayday calls should include lat/long coordinates Anybody who pilots an airplane today, particularly on cross-country trips, without at least a hand-held GPS up and running is doing himself and search and rescue people a grave disservice. And remember, when announcing your intentions to make an emergency off-airport landing, always be sure to include your latitude/longitude coordinates. Biggest Risk Factor - Poor Judgment
The pilot radioed the airport UNICOM and asked if the runway lights were on. The airport manager answered saying that the lights were on, but recommended to the pilot that he continue to Baltimore-Washington International Airport (BWI) for landing, because the "visibility was only 1/2 mile in heavy snow." The ceiling, according to witnesses "was down to tree-top level."
On his first try, the pilot descended
200' to 300' below the 700' published minimums for this
approach. Witnesses said he flew the length of
the runway at low altitude. At the north end of the
runway, the airplane turned west away from the airport, then
circled to the right in a "dramatic" and
"nose-high attitude" back towards the runway. Who but an inexperienced instrument pilot attempt this approach . . . twice?? Reading accounts like this, we expect to find a 200 hour instrument pilot with little or no real IMC experience. Curiously, this guy was anything but inexperienced. He held both an airline pilot certificate and a flight instructor certificate with ratings for airplane single engine land, multi-engine land, and instrument airplane! His trip had begun earlier in the morning from Warrenton, Virginia, with two persons on board and 5 hours of fuel. He was flying a 2001 Cessna Sky Hawk. Interpolation of the manufacturer's weight and balance charts was conducted by the NTSB after examination of aircraft records, fuel records, flight times, and the weights of the 3 persons on board the aircraft. This revealed that at takeoff, the airplane weighed 2,604 pounds. This was 147 pounds above the manufacturer's maximum allowable gross weight of 2,457 pounds. Calculating the estimated fuel burn along his planned route of flight, he was still 69 pounds over the maximum allowable gross weight when he crashed. His plan, according to those familiar with this event was to pick up a passenger at Freeway Airport, and continue to Atlantic City, New Jersey. That passenger weighed approximately 175 pounds. Does a few excess pounds REALLY matter? Truth be told, some of us may have, from to time, launched a bit on the heavy side. Each time we've done this, we likely experienced no difficulty reaching cruise altitude. So does a few excess pounds really matter? Answer: Given enough runway and the absence of departure obstacles, a C-172 could reach cruising altitude with 400 or 500 or 600 pounds of excess weight. Actually, this is just a guess since I've never tried it nor is it published anywhere! The problem of excess weight is not with raw takeoff power and performance. Instead, it manifests itself when maneuvering. A
quick reference to the 172R
Skyhawk Information Manual reveals that at maximum gross
weight, at the most rearward center of gravity, and with a
10-degree flap setting, the airplane will stall at the
following calibrated airspeeds:
Stall speeds are calculated, in part, on the basis of aircraft weight. When weight increases, stall speeds increase. When we bank, the load factor (weight) increases. When we bank to 60 degrees, this load factor doubles. If we take off with 69 pounds of excess weight, this translates 138 pounds of excess weight (69 x 2Gs). This 138 pounds of excess weight increases the stall speed BEYOND the published 60 degree stall speed of 69 knots. If this 138 pounds puts us outside the loading balance limits, anything can happen. It is here (maneuvering) where we get ourselves into serious trouble when taking off overweight. The weather . . . The
weather reported on the morning of this flight at Andrews
Air Force Base, 9 miles southwest of Freeway Airport,
included scattered clouds at 300 feet, an overcast layer at
500 feet, with 2 miles of visibility in snow and fog. The
wind was from 140 degrees at 3 knots. We can only speculate as to what was going on in the pilot's head. He departed on the first leg of his flight 147 pounds overweight. He planned to pick up another 175 pound person for the last leg of the trip to Atlantic City, NJ. Allowing for his first leg fuel burn of 78 pounds, this meant that he would have departed on his last leg 244 pounds above the maximum allowable gross weight for his aircraft. Now let's consider the weather. It was poor to bad. The Freeway Airport manager at the airport advised the pilot that the visibility was down to 1/2 mile due to heavy snow and suggested he fly on to BWI instead of attempting to land. He apparently ignored this advice. With snow, and cold clouds down to 200' or 300', had this pilot considered the possibility of encountering airframe icing? Did the pilot realize that Runway 36 was only 2,420' long and 40' wide and likely wet, perhaps snow covered, and slick? Deliberately operating overweight and likely in icing conditions, and busting instrument minimums to a short, slippery runway suggests strongly that this pilot could have been judgmentally challenged! Student pilots can fall into this category. Airline transport pilots with CFII certificates, hmm. A word about insurance . . .
Remember, aviation insurance operates differently from automobile insurance. With automobiles, insurance companies MUST pay regardless of the driver's actions. This is NOT so with aviation insurance. In aviation, insurance takes the form of a performance contract between the pilot and the insurance company. For the insurance company to pay, the pilot must uphold his or her end of the bargain. That bargain includes full compliance with all operating limitations published in the POH, including weight and balance limitations. Such was not the case in this fatal flight. We need to keep this in mind the next time we launch even one pound overweight! Analysis . . . Curiously, NTSB accident reports tell us far more about the metallurgy of crash damaged airplanes and the size of the impact holes they make in the ground than they do about influencing pilot factors. This NTSB report doesn't tell us much about the pilot, or about his past flying behavior or attitudes. It doesn't tell us how he obtained his pilot certificates and ratings and from whom. It doesn't tell how much actual IFR experience he had logged and whether or not he had much experience in cold weather operations. Had this flight operated under Part 121 (air carrier operations), we would have known every detail of the pilot's life . . . but such is not the case with Part 91 operations. Thus, there's not much we can learn from this accident other than the NTSB's terse probable cause finding as shown below:
Pilot judgment contains only a cursory reference in the FAA's Practical Test Standards for any pilot certificate or rating. Thus, most flight schools and independent CFIs seldom spend much time talking about it. Poor pilot judgment, tragically, plays a significant role in nearly all of the 82 percent of fatal accidents that are attributed to pilot error! Light Sport Questions?
If not, click HERE. OTA reader, Bill Czygan of Detroit, MI put together this website initially to assist ultralight pilots to make the transition to light sport. Reading through it, you'll find it helpful to anybody interested in light sport aviation. Affordability is one of the major benefits of light sport aviation. When you team up with other partners, owning a light sport aircraft can be remarkably affordable. OTA contributor, Thom Riddle of Buffalo, NY authored a wonderful article in the January, 2007 issue of EAA's Sport Pilot Magazine titled "More Airplane, Less Money." This article spells out the process of setting up and operating an aircraft partnership.Tracking the Runway vs. Fly Runway Heading?
As private pilots, we all learned the importance of maintaining our track over the runway as we takeoff. Designated Pilot Examiners (DPEs) find great delight in gigging us for our failure to maintain this runway alignment after we rotate and begin our climb. So we all become adept at compensating for wind drift as the runway slips away DIRECTLY below us. Then we become instrument pilots and the rules seemingly change. Our ATC issued clearance instructs us to "fly runway heading." In executing our ATC clearance, do we factor in wind drift to remain aligned along the extended centerline of the runway, or do we simply point the airplane on a heading that matches the runway number and ignore the wind? This is not a major issue unless, of course, the wind happens to be blowing at 35 knots directly across the runway. There is a difference! While wind drift correction may be required to assure our continued track directly over the runway when taking off, ATC's issued instruction to "maintain runway heading" IGNORES the wind. Remember, in the IMC environment, we cannot see what effect the wind is having on our track across the ground. ATC knows this, too. If ATC observes our radar track sliding too far left or right of its intended track due to wind drift (or anything else), they will issue a correcting heading for us to fly. Keep this in mind whenever taking off! More on Crosswind Landing Blunders!
Since the landing phase of flight produces more airplane mishaps than any other phase of flight, it would do us all well to spend more time learning the aerodynamic forces impacting an airplane as it sets down in a crosswind. Look at the bottom of the graphic on the right. You will note that the landing airplane is drifting left of the centerline just as it begins its landing flare. Without proper control inputs, the airplane in this graphic sets down first on its left main gear. The crosswind simultaneously forces the vertical stabilizer (tail) to the left, thereby causing the nose to veer to the right. This right hand turning moment plus the resistance caused by the left main gear causes the left wing to bank downward and strike the runway.
As we discussed in the previous issue, the key to crosswind landings is to "lean" into the wind throughout the landing flare and roll out. Unofficially called the Chinese landing ("won wing low"), this banking into the wind with opposite rudder inputs serves to keep the airplane over the runway centerline and oriented directly down the runway throughout the entire landing sequence. Akron (NY) "Adventures in Aviation" Class Pictured below are the 12 high school students participating in the Akron, NY "Adventures in Aviation" class. This photo was taken earlier this week during our field trip to the Niagara Aerospace Museum in Niagara Falls, NY. Accompanying them on this trip were airline pilot, Dan Maloney (pictured left) and me (pictured right).
This "Adventures in Aviation" class is not your typical aviation ground school class. Instead, its purpose is to expose young people to career opportunities in aviation. The course includes guest talks by airline pilots, visits to the Buffalo Air Traffic Control facilities, and the Niagara Aerospace Museum. The best part is . . . students are given 30 minutes at the controls of an airplane in flight, plus one hour of in-flight observation. Imagine if each of our nation's over 4,600 public access airports sponsored an "Adventures in Aviation" class once a year. Our new pilot numbers would soar! 23 Seconds to Live
Such was the case when this 1,011 hour, non-instrument rated pilot with two passengers took off from the Mount Gilead, Ohio Airport in a Cessna 172N. According to several witnesses, the weather was initially VFR, but it deteriorated "rapidly" as the pilot taxied to the runway. Once airborne, the airplane entered an overcast cloud layer at approximately 300' AGL, and then was heard circling back towards the airport. The airplane then descended out of the overcast at a high rate of speed, in a nose low attitude, and impacted the ground. All three were were killed. NTSB Report An all too typical scenario . . .
We ponder our mission, the eager wishes of our passengers to launch, and all of the arrangements we made to fly that day. Dozens of factors enter into our decision to fly or to taxi back to the ramp. Maybe we just want to take a quick pattern flight or a quick trip to a nearby airport.
Whatever . . . so we advance the throttle, clinch our teeth, and cross our fingers. Little do we know that within moments they will be scraping our remains out of a smoking hole. "The 23 second rule" "The 23 second rule" reveals that there is an enormous difference between poor visibility and no visibility. Most VFR-only pilots can tough it out in poor visibility for hours. Occasional glimpses of the ground or horizon are all that they require to keep the wings level. But allow just 23 seconds to pass between these glimpses and attitude-correcting control inputs, the airplane will roll into a subtle bank and a gentle descent with a corresponding increase in airspeed. Changing sensations in our inner ear coupled with increasing slip stream and engine noises send alert notices to our brain. Instant mental confusion sets off a "fight/flight" signal throughout our nervous system. Action is demanded!
Every neuron in our brain is demanding that we pull back harder on the yoke to arrest the descent and to slow the airplane. We eagerly comply. By now, we have rolled into a non-recoverable grave yard spin. This was likely the scenario that took the lives of this lady pilot and her two passengers in Mount Gilead, Ohio. This scenario, in fact, is responsible for more weather related fatal accidents than all other in-flight scenarios combined! Solution . . . VFR-only pilots (and non-current instrument pilots) have two choices. We can cast our fate to the ever-changing weather environments within which we fly. Or, we can acquire and maintain sufficient proficiency to extricate ourselves from sudden, unexpected IFR conditions. If we choose the latter approach (which, of course, we should), there is a right and wrong way to go about this.
They do NOT, however, teach us how to keep our wings level in the clag! These devices cannot simulate the sudden strangeness of the REAL IFR environment. The fact that we can whip off the hood or stand up and walk away from the simulator totally nullifies the physiological changes that occur whenever we enter the clouds. This fact has been demonstrated to me on countless occasions when I have taken instrument pilots having little or no actual IMC experience into the clouds. Cold sweat, nervous chatter, and eventual loss of control nearly always happens! The Correct Way!
Marginal VFR is a fact of life for most areas of the world. We all had better become accustomed and capable of safely extricating ourselves from an unexpected IFR penetration. We do this by finding a qualified CFII and spending time with that person in hard IFR. We do not need to enroll in a full-blown instrument training program (which is not a bad idea). Instead, go up, fly in the clouds, get comfortable controlling the airplane solely by reference to the instruments. The important goal is to get comfortable in your new surroundings. Learn not to panic should you get caught there on your own. Learn to keep your wings level, talk with ATC, and steer to the nearest VFR. If we all could do this, the GA fatal accident rate would tumble! In summary . . . beware! There will
be naive' flight instructors who will tell you that the best
way to prevent an IFR emergency is to always remain
This is like saying that the best way to avoid food poisoning is to remain clear of contaminated or spoiled food. Good in theory, but this will cut deeply into your dining out experiences! No . . . VFR-only pilots should not be hanging around clouds or operating in marginal VFR conditions. Remember, however, stuff happens and it is best to be prepared. Best Airport Cafe!!
Any self-respecting pilot is always on the lookout for a good airport cafe. In fact, he or she has been known to fly 200 miles out of their way to find good food, good service, and a friendly waitress all within walking distance from the transient parking area! Caroline's Airport Restaurant, located at the Oswego County Airport, Fulton, NY (FZY) (about 15 miles northwest of Syracuse) is just such an airport cafe.Open seven days a week from sunrise to 2pm, Caroline (pictured in white shirt) and her wonderful staff serve up the finest breakfasts and lunches north of Times Square and 42nd Street. The food is home cooked, served in huge proportions, and well . . . delicious. Mark Weissman, MD (pictured right) of Buffalo, NY decided that the only worthwhile place to bring his out-of-town guests (Adam Walker and Sharon Bentkowski) for a New Year's Day breakfast was Caroline's Airport Restaurant. He packed them (and me) into his Beech Bonanza A36 and we all flew from Buffalo to Oswego for a bountiful breakfast!Thanks, Caroline, for a providing a wonderful resource for us hungry pilots. Gone West . . . Members of the Western New York aviation community were deeply saddened earlier this week by the death of Monsignor Antoine Attea, pastor of Our Lady of Victory Parish in Frewsburg and St. James Parish in Jamestown, NY. Affectionately known to all as Father Tony, he was killed earlier this week while taking off from the Jamestown, NY Airport in his Piper Aerostar. Tony, who was a personal friend of mine, was an avid pilot who flew his Aerostar all over North and Central America on fishing trips and visits to churches. Tony will be greatly missed. Ice, Confusion, Oversight All Lead to Disaster
The pilot, with a nurse onboard, departed the Morgantown, WV Airport just a couple of weeks ago (December 26). Their planned destination was the Teterboro Airport, NJ to pick up a patient. Enroute they encountered icing conditions. Below are extracts from the preliminary NTSB report.
The picture provided by the preliminary NTSB report is clear. The pilot had encountered icing conditions and had decided to make an enroute precautionary landing at the Johnstown, PA Airport. The report does not reveal the severity of this icing, nor can we tell if she had considered climbing to a higher altitude to escape these conditions.
The NTSB report suggests that all was going normally as the C-414 intercepted and proceeded down the ILS final approach course. It was not until she broke out at about 300' AGL that controllers observed that something was amiss. See the report extract below:
Both the pilot and the nurse died in the crash. What went wrong? The controllers observed that the pilot arrived at the decision height (DH) somewhat right of the runway. She apparently tried to re-align herself for landing. Here's where things get a bit unclear. FAR 91.175 requires that we must be in a position from which a normal descent and landing can be made in order to descend below the decision height on an ILS. If not, as this case indicated, she should have executed a missed approach. The presence of airframe icing, however, often mitigates against a missed approach. The pilot may have decided in her mind that she had one and only one shot at landing and she was going to take it, regardless. In the midst of making this decision,
there is evidence to suggest that she had failed to lower
the gear in preparation for landing. The controllers
observed her landing hard on the runway, then becoming
airborne for a brief period before crashing nose down
adjacent to the runway.
The plot thickens . . . The presence of large amounts of ice pieces, some the size of baseballs for 1000' along the debris path suggests that the airplane was heavily loaded with airframe and wing ice as it descended down along the instrument approach. Did this explain the pilot's difficulty in tracking the localizer/glideslope to the runway? Could this have caused momentary confusion and oversight on the part of the pilot? You bet it could! Lessons to be learned Several important lessons can be learned from this fatal accident. The first is, of course, the importance of a comprehensive pre-flight weather briefing before commencing any flight, particularly IFR flight in the winter. Second, should icing conditions be encountered, whether or not in a known-ice certified airplane, IMMEDIATE steps must be initiated to escape those conditions. Waiting for airframe ice to accumulate to any degree before executing "Plan B" adds considerably to the risk. Third, whenever carrying ice on an instrument approach, the pilot's concentration must not be diverted from the localizer/glideslope needles. He or she may have only one shot at the approach. A missed approach may NOT be an option. It must be done right the first time, period! Again, my apologies for taking liberties in discussing this fatal accident prior to the issuance of the NTSB probable cause report. But this matter of icing is upon us this time of year. We must take every opportunities to learn. Attacking the Runway
One of the key elements of the stabilized approach is speed control while keeping the nose pointed down at the runway until reaching the flare point. We call this "attacking the runway." Note the sight picture in the illustration above. The approach end of the runway is clearly visible from the cockpit throughout the descent. Without proper airspeed control, there is a tendency to descend with a pitch up attitude. This "falling leaf" or parachute-type of approach creates possible control problems, particularly when gusty crosswinds are present. The graphic below illustrates the nose-down pitch attitude that should continue until directly over the runway.
Again, proper power, flap/gear configuration, and pitch angle are required to produce the desired airspeed to make this all work properly. NTSB Reports 12 Fatal GA Accidents During 12 Day Holiday Period
These accidents resulted in a total of 31 fatalities. A summary of these 12 fatal accidents is available at HERE. You can register to receive free NTSB news releases regarding their latest accident investigations by clicking HERE.
I have one of these works, titled "McKinley and the Whale" proudly hanging in my office. It is a dramatic image of a Northwest Airlines B-747 flying by Alaska's Mt. McKinley. Dan captains an NWA B-747-400 back and forth to the Orient a couple of times each month. If you like aviation art, check out his website by clicking HERE. Why We Lose Control in the Clouds . . . The accident scenario is all too familiar. Witnesses report seeing an airplane falling nose down out of the clouds. What happened? Likely what happened is the pilot experienced a bit of disorientation and unknowingly allowed the airplane to enter a shallow bank. Several more minutes go by and the bank reaches 60 degrees.
What catches the hapless pilot off guard, however, is the effect of a 2G load factor on the stall speed of the airplane. Relationship between load factor and stall speed If every pilot recognized that stall speed increases with bank angle, we could experience a dramatic reduction of stall/spin accidents! Specifically, as bank angle increases, so does the load factor (see above chart). Here is the important part. Stall speed increases in proportion to the square root of the load factor. In a 60 degree bank, the load factor is 2. The square root of 2 is 1.41. Therefore a normal stall speed of 45 knots increases to 63 knots in a 60 degree bank (1.41 x 45 = 63 knots).
Now imagine inadvertently permitting his bank angle to increase momentarily to, say, 80 degrees. Reference to the Load Factor Chart shows that an 80 degree bank produces 6Gs. Recalling that stall speed increases in proportion to the square root of load factor, his airplane's stall speed is now is a whopping 110 knots! Now comes the tragic partAnybody who has ever flown steep turns knows that the vertical component of lift decreases when in turns. As our hapless pilot's airplane bank steepens. He begins to roll wings level and pitches up to maintain altitude. The airplane slows. Upon reaching its increased stall speed (created by the G loading in the bank), it stalls. If his stall recovery is incorrect (uncoordinated), the inside wing drops and the airplane enters a spin. Spinning in the clouds is not a good place to be. In summary, the essence of safe flight in IFR conditions is to NEVER allow our bank angle to exceed a standard rate turn. Yep . . . 15 to 20 degrees of bank angle is sufficient to meet any maneuvering requirement in the clouds. Exceeding standard rate turns in IMC is inviting disaster!
Herein lies a tragic irony. David Wall has decided to sell one of the finest engineered general aviation aircraft on the market today. Others have probably considered doing likewise.
But like the Lancair and the Columbia 400, they are terribly unforgiving of pilots who step into their cockpits with less than optimal proficiency. To Mr. Wall's credit, he recognized this fact before he and/or his son, too, became a victim of the demands of this high performance, glass composite aircraft. A more reasonable course of action would have been for Mr. Wall, his son, and all Cirrus pilots to become optimally proficient in this make and model aircraft. Let them learn from the tragic mistakes of others. Let them design and implement a rigorous recurrent training program to keep themselves safe in these wonderful airplanes. A rigorous recurrent training program includes weekly (not monthly) flight. It requires a semi-annual in-flight workout with a Cirrus-proficient flight instructor that includes high altitude operations, icing recognition and escape strategies, and yes . . . unusual attitude, slow flight, and stall awareness and recovery techniques. It also includes ongoing ground study of Cirrus systems and principles of aerodynamics. Joining and participating in training programs offered by the Cirrus Owners and Pilots Association (COPA) goes without saying. These programs work!
Understandably, there are many reasons why the required
flight proficiency cannot be obtained and maintained.
When this happens, selling the plane is the only reasonable
option.
Now for the tragedy part . . .
There
is nothing inherently wrong with the Cirrus SR22 . . . nor
the Cessna 210, nor any of the Mooney models. Instead,
the problem is us! We are not prepared to ante up the
time, money, or commitment to become and remain proficient
in these sophisticated airplanes. And when we don't,
the odds of reaching our destination diminish accordingly.
Mr. Wall and his son did the right thing. As
mentioned above, unless they were able to maintain the
requirements of a rigorous recurrent training program, their
only reasonable course was to sell their airplane.
Whose fault is this?
Much of the problem lies at the feet of our GA leadership
organizations. These organization all work very hard to
build and maintain their membership numbers.
On the surface, increasing membership
numbers is good for general aviation. When used
properly, these large memberships provide us with the
political clout to prevent the FAA from unjustly usurping GA
pilot rights. User fees, airspace lockouts, and
menacing airworthy directives (ADs) based upon little fact
or evidence are classic examples of abusive FAA actions.
Regrettably, these same GA leadership organizations also
use their member-driven political clout to lobby against,
via the NPRM process, many meaningful changes in the FARs that
could possibly create a burden upon their membership. Examples of
this include raising the standards to qualify as a flight
instructor, enhancing the private pilot training syllabus,
and increasing the recurrent training requirements for
instrument pilots. Challenging change,
particularly when proposed by the FAA, is not bad.
This is the essence of the "checks and balances"
process that makes our form of government so effective.
But what is bad is our GA membership
organizations' blatant opposition to change solely because
such change may burden us members, or because such proposed
changes cannot be, de-facto, proven to work as intended.
Such behavior is the classic "head in the sand" kind
of thinking that contributes to our chronic fatal accident
rate.
In defense of their actions, GA
organization leaders have said to me, "Well, Bob, do you
want us to be like Europe where oppressive regulations have
squeezed out much of general aviation."
My response is, of course not. We do not need
"oppressive" regulations. But we do need to
re-examine pilot qualification and recurrent training rules
that have been on the books, unchanged, for over 60 years.
Back to Mr. Wall . . .
Mr. Wall and many other fine people have been stepping up
to high performance aircraft often without the requisite
skills and commitment to recurrent training required to
remain safe aloft. They did this because nobody told
them any differently. Not the aircraft manufacturers,
not the GA membership organizations, and certainly nothing
in the regulations suggested anything different.
Sure, they fulfilled all of the safety and training
requirements published in the current edition of the
FAR/AIM. But this is far short of what is required to
remain safe. The 84% pilot error rate is evidence of
this fact. Sadly, our membership
organizations are working hard to make it too easy for us to
kill ourselves in GA airplanes. The recent addition of
the light sport pilot certificate makes it even easier!
No FAA medical, 20 hours of instruction and you, too, can
fly a friend high and fast over populated areas. And
here's your AOPA and EAA membership cards!
Again, these same organizations argue boldly in their own
defense saying that it is far better to affect improvements
in safety through voluntary pilot education programs than it
is to impose burdensome regulations. This is wonderful
in theory, but our fatal safety record over the past six
years provides clear evidence that voluntary pilot education
alone is
not working. Please do not
misunderstand me. Pilot education is important,
otherwise I would not spend time each week preparing
So what can WE do? For starters, we can do just what Mr. Wall and his son did. If we're not prepared to acquire and maintain the pilot proficiency necessary to remain safe aloft, regardless of aircraft make or model, then we need to STOP flying! If we own a Cirrus SR22, Columbia 400, a Cessna 210, a Beech Bonanza or any other high performance/complex aircraft and we're not flying it every week, put it up for sale OR commit to the required recurrent training. By taking either choice, we'll be doing ourselves a lifesaving favor, we'll prevent indescribable family grief, and general aviation will be better served. Lastly, send a message to the GA membership organizations to which you belong. Tell them that flight safety, not membership numbers, is your highest priority. If they do not act on your message, invest your next year's membership dues on a dinner out with your favorite friend. If enough of us do this, they WILL get the message!
Bob
Miller, ATP, CFII
|
Regrettably,
each smoking hole attracts enough media attention to
turn hundreds, if not thousands, of non-aviators off
to the wonders of flight. This fact, alone, is
largely responsible for the 59 percent annual drop
in new student pilot starts over the past 30 years.
Why
is this happening? First, the people entrusted
with our safety are either unwilling or unable to do
anything about our worsening fatal accident rate.
To their credit, the FAA has periodically introduced
regulatory changes to improve pilot safety.
Curiously, few of these changes ever get enacted.
First,
we and every other pilot we know must recognize one
single fact. That fact is, for the
non-proficient pilot, flying is a very risky
endeavor. 
Twice
annual recurrent training must involve, as a
minimum, unusual attitude recoveries, slow flight, stalls and
incipient spin training, crosswind landings and
takeoffs, instrument flight in actual IFR conditions
along with ground training in weather factors, icing
and thunderstorm awareness, ATC procedures, and
aeronautical decision-making and risk management
assessment.
In
most cases, a fixed landing gear complicates off-airport
landings. The extended wheels act like giant hooks
that grab upon surface obstacles that serve to flip the
airplane over on its back. The smooth underbelly
of an airplane, with its landing gear retracted, provides a
slick surface to skid along the surface.
Seriously,
we typically have the choice of going for well lit areas or
going into areas of darkness. While the lighted areas
are tempting, remember, they are lit by electricity.
Taking out power lines or utility poles is not a good
option. 
Tree
landings also depend upon impact speed. The
photo (right) is of a Cessna 152 flown by a student pilot on
his first solo. Tough break! 
It
was a cold, wintry morning last February at the Freeway
Airport in Mitchellville, Maryland. The pilot, with
two passengers aboard a Cessna 172, tried not once, but
twice to get in on the GPS Runway 36 Approach.
He
then flew south over the runway, then turned west away from
the airport. The airplane then entered a steep left
bank back towards the airport for his second attempt.
The airplane "nose-dived" out of view. Seconds later,
the sounds of impact were heard. 
Unfortunately,
NTSB reports never include the legal ramifications of our
misdeeds in airplanes. But from the facts of this
case, the pilot's estate will likely be defending itself
against multiple law suits that could leave his family
penniless.
While we can find no hard data to
confirm this observation, there is enough anecdotal evidence
around to suggest that a VFR-only pilot has about 23 seconds
to live after making an inadvertent entry into instrument
meteorological conditions.
We've all been there at one time or
another. Armed with weather briefing confirming
VFR conditions, we taxi into position for takeoff.
Glancing down the runway, we become concerned about lowering
ceilings and declining visibility. Looking to the
west, however, we see glimmers of blue skies.
Perhaps we need to get back to our home
airport before dark. Maybe we've been stuck on a trip
and have grown impatient for the weather to clear.
This could be "our window" for a quick escape.
We look to the instrument panel for information. Observing our loss of altitude, we
instinctively apply back pressure on the yoke or stick.
This action, of course, serves to further tighten our
increasing bank angle. Our attention shifts to
the airspeed indicator. We are approaching redline
speed. This is confirmed by the increasing slip stream
noise and the sound of a racing engine. 
Every
pilot from entry level primary student to ATP candidate
needs to have real time training and experience in REAL
instrument conditions. 
clear
of IFR weather. 
Generally
According
to the tower supervisor, who was then using
binoculars, he saw the airplane break out of the
clouds about 300 feet above the ground, right of
course, approximately over Bravo taxiway.
Proficient
pilots recognize that the key to a good landing is a
stabilized approach. The proper power setting,
flap/gear configuration, and pitch angle produces the
desired airspeed for the final approach segment.
National
Transportation Safety Board Chairman Mark V. Rosenker said
recently that, during the recent 12-day holiday period
between December 22, 2006 and January 2, 2007, he dispatched
regional air safety investigators to 12 fatal general
aviation accidents. 
Awesome
Aviation Art ! !
As
seen in the Load Factor Chart, a 60 degree bank produces a
load factor of 2 Gs. This, alone, presents little or
no difficulty to the pilot and his airplane.
The truth is, the
Cirrus SR20 and SR22 are wonderful airplanes. In the
hands of proficient pilots, they are as safe as any GA
aircraft on the market today.
The ultimate tragedy of Mr. Wall's
decision is not that he elected to sell his Cirrus SR22.
Instead, the ultimate tragedy lies in the fact that 26 Cirrus
aircraft have suffered fatal crashes since April, 2001.
Equally tragic, there have been 59 fatal Cessna 210 crashes
during the same period. Mooney's? Yep, during
this same six year period there have been 49 fatal crashes
of these fine airplanes as well.
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