December, 2007 Vol. IV No.
22 |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Welcome
to the
Over the
Airwaves
aviation journal. This complimentary e-publication
is prepared monthly for pilots and aviation enthusiasts around the
world. Its aim
is to promote
flight safety, encourage students and new pilots, and to build
enthusiasm for aviation in general.
Dear Pilots and Aviation Enthusiasts:
When to Say NO? If we assembled 30 of the wisest pilots in the world in a conference room and asked them to agree on the single most important safety-related question in aviation, what would that question be? After all of the fussing and feuding, the agreed upon question would likely be, "When should a pilot say NO?" This question rises above all others when it comes to flight safety, yet we will not find it asked on any of the pilot rating knowledge tests from private pilot to ATP. It's not included in any of the Practical Test Standards used for measuring pilot performance at any rating level. A careful reading of FAR 61.105, that prescribes the required aeronautical knowledge for the Private Pilot certificate, makes no mention of this question!
Travel back in time to 1912. One must wonder if Captain Smith asked this question prior to setting the course of the Titanic through the North Atlantic that fateful night in April. Failure to ask this question is arguably responsible for more aviation mishaps since the dawn of flight than any other single factor. In each such instance, the pilot simply made the wrong call on this question. Again, you will find not one single "go/no go" decision-related question on any FAA knowledge test! What is the answer to this question?
Similarly, FAR 91.9 requires that we comply with all flight manual marking and placard requirements of the airplane before flight. This is the closest rule we have that prohibits flight into "known" icing conditions in non-known ice certified airplanes. Anybody care to define the term "known ice?" There are clearly times when we should say "no," but don't, with tragic outcomes. Even the simple act of taking off is ripe with potential pitfalls. A departure stall, particularly at night, is a classic example. Instead of saying "no" to excessive pitch-up flight attitudes on takeoff, we permit the airplane to stall. Without adequate rudder input at the point of stall, the nose suddenly lurches left and the airplane rolls into a spin, often with fatal consequences. How about the infamous turn-back to the airport when the engine fails on takeoff? Do we know when to say "no" to this extremely risky maneuver?
Okay . . . so how do we learn when to say NO? Learning to say NO should begin on day one in the primary flight training process. Here, properly trained CFIs do not tell fledgling pilots to rely exclusively on a book of rules to answer the question for them. As we saw above, the rule book (FAR/AIM) does not provide this information. Instead, experienced flight instructors take their primary students into the real world of winds, limited visibility, turbulent skies, low ceilings, and cold temperatures. Rather than spending all of their time in warm classrooms and cozy flight simulators with rule books and procedures, flight students should be systematically exposed to the various challenges of flight. By so doing, new pilots are given first-hand opportunity to develop effective go/no go decisions. In short, they learn through practical experience when to say "no!" How about the rest of us? How do experienced pilots learn to say "no?" We learn, first, by flying frequently. Every logged hour provides one more notch in our rifle of aeronautical decision making ability.
Back to us instrument pilots. We spend a few more hours each month operating in actual instrument conditions. If necessary, we bring along a more experienced instrument pilot or CFII and begin flying approaches with steadily decreasing minimums. Knowing when to say "no" suddenly takes on new meaning. It is no longer an academic question. Instead, we learn to say "no" at both the intellectual and at the visceral level based upon our actual REAL experiences with an experienced CFII at our side. Learning to say "no" on the ground AND in the air! Learning to say "no" before taking off is one thing. How about learning to say "no" when aloft? What do we do when our visibility begins to drop or the ceiling lowers? Do we turn around, go around, or go through? Sometimes the answer is not as clear as we might think sitting here in front of a computer screen reading about it.
Within 15 or 20 minutes the above-freezing cloud temperature suddenly drops to minus 2dC and he begins to accumulate ice. This temperature drop was not in the forecast; there were no icing PIREPs. Is he now illegal? Does he know what to do? You see, the rules tell us one thing. The real world tells us another. The rules tell us that we cannot takeoff with known inoperative systems. What happens if they become inoperative in the air? Are we then illegal? A sudden, unforecast drop in temperature inside the clouds is no more preventable than say a failed alternator. Are we then illegal? Where is the rule book now? In summary, nobody is suggesting that the rules be ignored. They are there for a purpose and they must be adhered to. But rules cannot tell us when to say "no" anymore than the rules can tell us that it is safe to fly. Stuff happens aloft. Our job as proficient pilots is to know, both intellectually and viscerally, when to call it quits, when not to launch, and when to turn back. In short, if we all knew when to say "no," our fatal accident rate would drop dramatically!
The Matter of Stalls & Spins
It is becoming especially disconcerting when instructing in high performance, glass composite aircraft such as the Cirrus and the Columbia 400 simply because the margin for error is arguably much smaller than it is in more conventional training airplanes. We continue to experience one fatal stall/spin accident every week. This sad fact confirms that we are not doing a very good job in providing effective stall and spin awareness training to today's pilots. What do the rules have to say about stall and spin awareness training? FAR 61.105(b)(11) requires that private pilot candidates be provided ground instruction in "stall awareness, spin entry, spins, and spin recovery techniques for the airplane and glider category ratings." FAR 61.107(b)(viii) requires that these candidates receive actual flight instruction in "slow flight and stalls." Jumping over to the Private Pilot Practical Test Standards (FAA-S-8081-14A), we note the section titled Special Emphasis Areas. It is here where we are told that "examiners shall place special emphasis upon areas of aircraft operations considered critical to flight safety." Prominently included among the items of special interest is #3. stall/spin awareness. Moving on to specific performance maneuver tasks included in the PTS, we note the item shown below:
Lastly, let's take a look at AC 61-67C titled: STALL AND SPIN AWARENESS TRAINING. Here, we are provided detailed information regarding the several different types of stalls including accelerated stalls, how they are executed, and the distinction between spins and spirals.
It is little wonder why we continue to experience one fatal stall/spin accident per week. Could it be that much of what we do in the name of stall and spin awareness training is little more than timid, incipient, coordinated stalls followed by recovery just as the stall horn begins to chirp. How bad is today's spin awareness training?
The simple truth is that most of today's flight instructors seldom bring their students beyond the incipient stall entry, e.g., the first chirp of the stall horn, before initiating stall recovery procedures. The airplane never reaches a full stall break. Equally distressing, many of today's CFI's insist that their students maintain a wings-level flight attitude throughout the stall entry and recovery exercise. Thus, their students never experience an accelerated stall. Lastly, students are taught to maintain coordinated flight, e.g., ball centered, throughout the stall entry and recovery period. Thus their students never experience a cross-controlled stall until it takes them by surprise . . . at which time it could be too late. Realistic Spin Awareness Training Demonstrating accelerated and cross-control stalls is an effective way to build spin awareness to student pilots without putting the aircraft into an actual spin. The visceral sensations are nearly identical and the recovery technique from these stall exercises are the same as with a spin without actually putting the airplane into a spin. This exercise should include, of course, a detailed explanation of the aerodynamics of a spin. Excluding full accelerated and/or cross-controlled stalls from the training syllabus leaves pilots dangerously under-prepared to deal with stall/spin scenarios. Disagree? Look at the fatal stall/spin accident data! Winter Winds are Blowing - Don't blow the checkride! One of the quickest predictors of private pilot checkride outcomes can be observed by the examiner the moment the hapless candidate begins his or her taxi from the ramp! One simply needs to observe where the controls are placed during a quartering tailwind on taxi!
For example, if we're taxiing with quartering tailwind from our right rear, push the yoke or stick down and to the left. Conversely, with a left quartering tailwind, put the yoke or stick down and to the right. If the tailwind is coming directly from our back, simply push the stick or yoke forward. It's as simple as that! "Atta-Boy" Award to Piper Malibu Pilot OTA readers will recall the recent series of articles we did that address unhealthy pilots' dependence on autopilots.
Take the case of a Piper turbine-powered Malibu pilot flying from Columbia, SC to Reading, PA. He was on the autopilot in solid IMC at 3,000' MSL while receiving vectors to the final approach course. At the same time, he was briefing the instrument approach plate. Have a hint as to what happened next? Yep . . . the autopilot surreptitiously quit without an audible warning. The pilot was unaware of the failed autopilot until he glanced up at the attitude indicator. What he observed IMMEDIATELY caught his attention! He was in a 90 degree, steep spiraling descent in IMC at just a couple thousand feet above the ground! His first action was to stop the spiral with opposite aileron and rudder, followed by forward pressure on the yoke to minimize overstressing the wings. He then applied full power to climb above the obstacles below and return to a safe altitude. Pilot at fault? Okay, it's easy to fault this pilot for not keeping a closer eye on his autopilot, but that's what "autopilot-dependence" can do to us. We grow complacent; we trust it too much. We forget our instrument scan. But let's not forget the rest of the story. This pilot had sufficient instrument proficiency to instantly observe, interpret, and react to what the gauges were telling him. He didn't panic (though a change in clothing was likely in order) as he carefully restored his aircraft to controlled flight. As such, this pilot deserves this month's OTA "Atta-Boy" Award! Below is this pilot's description of the events as reported in his submitted ASRS (NASA) form:
The lesson here is simple. We must be sure of what the autopilot is doing at all times. In most autopilot setups, an audio annunciator should sound whenever the autopilot is deactivated. Be sure this device works in your airplane. But should we discover too late that our autopilot has failed, as in this pilot's case, we should be sufficiently skilled in unusual attitude recovery procedures when in IMC to save the day! FAA Production Facilities Broadcasting "Live" and Recorded Safety Programs
Headed up by Obie S. Young, FAASTeam production manager, and operated in cooperation with the FAA Safety Team National Resource Center, this facility is pumping out safety related programming at lightning speed! As such, OTA readers should get tuned in NOW!Click HERE to view a sample of current videos on demand. Click HERE to view upcoming schedule of "LIVE" safety broadcasts that can be accessed via high speed Internet connections. Preflight Carefully . . . it WILL save your life!
We're not talking about chipped or faded paint or even an occasional dimple in the skin here and there. Goodness knows, there are thousands of airworthy aircraft that will not win any "best of show" contests. Instead, we're talking about blatant, unresolved maintenance issues that may have a direct effect on flight safety. It could be an under-inflated nose wheel strut, leaking fuel tanks, hairline propeller cracks, thread-bare tires, loose oil lines, damaged seat-tracks, inoperative or unreliable avionics. The list is endless.
Preflight like your life depended upon it! It makes no difference whether it is a rental aircraft or our pride and joy. Airplanes deteriorate with age, just like people. What may have been okay last month may not be okay this month. Do like my good friend and former EAA Chapter 46 president, Jim Cavanaugh, does. He pre-flights every airplane he flies as if he was conducting a pre-purchase inspection! Let's not forget that 1 out of every 10 fatal accidents is officially attributed to mechanical problems with the airplane. Nearly all precautionary off-field landings are attributable to mechanical problems that could have been caught prior to takeoff. The idea is to anticipate mechanical problems rather than to be surprised by them. Know that they will occur just as our friend "Mr. Murphy" tells us in any of his famous laws! AOPA's Air Safety Foundation Launches Web-based Safety Oriented Videos
Called SafetyCasts, this web-based programming brings the power of safety seminars directly to our computer screens at no cost. Click HERE to for a directory of these SafetyCasts.
Slow, High Angle of Attack Landings Can Kill!
Strong, gusty crosswinds can take a perfectly stabilized landing and turn it into a nightmare in less than a second or two. The first thing that happens is a serious "yaw" created by crosswinds applying pressure to the vertical stabilizer (tail). The pressure on the tail causes the nose to swing in the direction of the crosswind like a weathervane. When this happens, the hapless pilot instinctively (but incorrectly) turns the yoke or stick in the opposite direction to re-align the nose with the runway. This, of course, causes the upwind wing to lift high into the air. The pilot then swings the yoke or stick back into the opposite direction to level the wings and then applies full power to "go around" for another try. The airplane is now at a very high angle of attack and on the edge of a power-on stall with all four left turning forces exacerbating the "yaw" forces created by the crosswind. The badly yawed and stalled airplane suddenly rolls completely over before hitting the ground inverted! Can this REALLY happen? Sure it can happen and it likely happens far more than many of us believe. In most cases, the pilot manages to get the nose back down before the stall/roll action is completed, but not without considerable damage to the airplane. Occasionally, however, the combined forces of wind and improper control inputs can produce fatal results.
Reported winds on the surface were 17 knots with gusts to 25 knots across the runway. The pilot was making his second attempt at landing when the accident occurred. According to various reports, the aircraft impacted the grass, inverted, on the downwind side of the runway. All four occupants were killed [see adjacent photo of crash scene]. How can this scenario be prevented? Before discussing prevention, we need to understand what causes botched crosswind landings. The answer here, as always, is . . . poor training. At the great risk of sounding like a broken record, many flight schools and independent CFIs do not provide serious crosswind training. In fact, many shut the hangar doors anytime the crosswinds exceed 12 to 14 knots. So where does the hapless pilot receive effective crosswind training? He doesn't! As for the fatal part, the cause is the same . . . . little or no serious power-on stall training. While many flight students can adequately demonstrate power-on stalls, they've seldom performed cross-controlled power-on stall. As such, they never experienced the attention-getting effect of a power-on, yawed stall! So how can we guarantee the safe outcome of every gusty, crosswind landing? We can do this by altering our landing technique from that used in calm winds. Instead of landing slow with a high nose-up pitch attitude and flaps fully extended as the main gear touches the ground, we quite literally fly the airplane to the runway with minimal flap extension while reducing power to idle just as we cross the runway threshold.
Important note: Runway length becomes a more important factor when making gusty, crosswind landings. With approach speeds slightly higher than normal and the use of minimal flaps, the landing roll-out is substantially increased. Be sure to monitor remaining runway length when using this technique. When in doubt, go around! There is no substitute for competent instruction. If your training experience exhibits serious gaps in gusty, crosswind landing experience, go out and hire an experienced CFI. Third Round of Akron High School "Adventures in Aviation" Launching
The Akron (NY) High School "Adventures in Aviation" is a model program sponsored by the Christian Airmen Educational Foundation. It began three years ago as an in-school academic course where participating high school students meet one day each week with me serving as their volunteer flight instructor. I am backed up by a group of professional pilots who come in and share their flying career experiences with the students. Highlights of this 15 week program include field trips to the Buffalo Air Traffic Control facilities (tower and radar room), the Niagara Aerospace Museum, and the National Weather Service. Each student also receives 30 minutes of left seat flight time in a Garmin G1000-equipped, glass panel Cessna 172! The cost of this unique program is $99/student. This fee covers books and other materials, field trip expenses, and actual flight training. Imagine if the owner/operators of the nation's over 5,000 airports each conducted their own "Adventures in Aviation" class in a neighboring high school. Our number of new pilot starts would literally soar!!!! Sloping Runways - Which way do we take off??
A 3,200 hour commercially rated pilot flying a Kitfox faced this question and elected to follow the typical downhill departure practice. Unfortunately, he did so with a tailwind gusting up to 30 knots! The airplane cleared the trees, then stalled, banked hard right, and struck the ground in a near vertical attitude. This sad event took place last year at the Eagles Nest Airport, New London, New Hampshire. This airport has one runway (14/32), where Runway 14 slopes down hill (see photo below right). It's length is 2,800 feet.
The NTSB probable cause finding said: "The pilot's failure to maintain airspeed, which resulted in an inadvertent stall/spin. A factor in the accident was the tail wind condition." NTSB ReportWhich way to go? Do we take off down hill with a tailwind or do we take off uphill with a headwind? Like everything else in aviation, it depends. The first consideration might be the degree of slope in the runway. If the slope is slight, taking off into the wind is always the preferred way to go.
The second consideration are the winds. Tailwind departures, regardless of runway slope, are wrought with risks. A quick reference to the performance tables of most POHs reveal a heavy takeoff distance penalty when taking off down wind. Unfortunately, there is no right answer for sloping runway operations because of the many different factors involved. As in all such situations, refer to your POH performance tables, avoid tailwind takeoffs, and takeoff downhill whenever winds permit! Aero-News.Net Features OTA in Podcasts
"Emergency GPS Descents is the latest in a series of podcasts I have been doing with Aero-News.Net's Paul Plack. You can hear, or download for later listening, these 15 minute interviews and any of the previously conducted podcasts by clicking on the titles below:
By the way, Aero-News.Net is a FREE daily online publication that is packed with aviation related news. It is the first thing I read every morning. You can log on to Aero-News.Net and subscribe for your free subscription by clicking HERE. Managing Angle of Attack for Perfect Landings!
Contrary to popular opinion, landings are a state of mind. Yet many of us try our best to complicate the process by pushing and pulling on the yoke or stick, by frequent throttle adjustments, and by less-than-precise flap management practices. The net effect is an unpredictable landing!
When approached from a "state of mind" perspective, landing is simply a power reduction to idle followed immediately by a smooth series of tiny pitch changes. When performed properly, the tires "kiss" the runway just a few knots above stall.
How to practice perfect non-crosswind landings
The best place to practice perfect landings is at an altitude above 3,000' AGL. Begin, say, at 3,500'. Slowly retard the throttle to idle, then pitch the aircraft to produce a 500 foot per minute (f/m) descent rate. Imagine the airport elevation to be at 3,000'. As you descend to 3,100', adjust your pitch angle to produce a 100f/m descent rate. Then stop the descent at 3,040'. Allow the airplane to settle gently to 3,000'.
Voila', you've just "kissed" the imaginary runway!
After becoming proficient with these imaginary landings, go out an practice real landings on solid concrete or blacktop. You'll be amazed with the results!
When a Missed Approach Procedure is NOT a Missed Approach Procedure! You are snaking down the final approach course on the gauges. Upon reaching the missed approach point (MAP), you have the runway in sight. You continue descending, then suddenly you lose the airport! What do you do? Fly the published missed approach course? Better think again! Remember, the published missed approach procedure assures you safe obstacle clearance provided, however, you commence the missed at the DH or MAP. All bets are off if you delay executing the missed approach procedure AFTER passing by the DH or MAP! See AIM 5-4-21: Missed Approach (below):
So what do you do? This interesting dilemma was described by Scott C. Dennstaedt in an article titled Try the Other Missed that appeared in the December, 2007 issue of IFR Magazine. If the published missed approach procedure no longer applies, what terrain avoidance guidance do we have in the above described scenario? Answer: The Take-off Minimums and (Obstacle) Departure Procedures! When initiating a missed approach after passing by the DH or MAP, the pilot should refer to any published departure procedures for that runway rather than the published missed approach procedure. This will guarantee obstacle clearance throughout the procedure. So who briefs obstacle departure procedures (ODPs) as part of their instrument approach briefing?? If you are on an instrument approach to Eagle, Colorado or similar airport, you had better be doing this! Help Spread the OTA Word!Please tell every pilot you know about Over the Airwaves! What they read just might prevent a nasty mishap. At a minimum, a better pilot will result.Click on the button below to forward the OTA link up to 10 pilot friends.
Click HERE to sign up for free weekly reminders of each upcoming OTA issue.Altimeters . . . the Unsung Heroes of All Instrument Approaches One would assume that an 18,000 hour veteran of thousands of instrument approaches would feel right at home when slithering down the final approach course in the clag. The fact that this fellow didn't survive his last attempt should give us all reason for pause! The weather was typical IFR stuff with a reported 500 foot ceiling and one mile visibility. Witnesses, however, reported the presence of heavy fog in the area.
The pilot executed a missed approach on the first try. His second attempt ended badly. According to accident investigators, his aircraft struck the left parallel taxiway while in a left hand turn. Unfortunately, there is not much more in the NTSB Report that can help us to determine what went wrong. Examination of the engine did not reveal any pre-impact mechanical anomalies that would have prevented normal engine operation. Flight control continuity was established. Speculation?????? It is bad form to speculate as to the "real" cause of accidents beyond that which is contained in the NTSB probable cause report. However, any such accident can serve as a vivid reminder to all of us when in comes to the safe operation of our airplanes.
Without discounting the importance of keeping a centered course deviation indicator (CDI), the altimeter must reign supreme in the instrument pilot's scan. He or she must know precisely how many feet remain between the airplane and the published minimum descent altitude (MDA) or the decision height (DH). He should, in fact, be counting down the final remaining 1,000 feet in 100 foot intervals.
If you found Over the Airwaves helpful to you personally and/or beneficial to general aviation and would like to support its continued publication, please consider making a donation to the effort. Simply click on the button below to access a secure link through which PayPal, credit card, and personal check donations can be made.
Personal Checks: If you prefer to send a personal check, you can do so by making it payable to "Over the Airwaves" and mail it to: Bob Miller 124 Delaware Street Tonawanda, NY 14150
Your
donations are used exclusively in the preparation,
advancement, and promotion of
Over the
Airwaves to
and for pilots all over the globe. Stump the Chump
Note: Stump the Chump is reserved for the most unique or challenging aviation-related questions whose answers are not readily apparent to the otherwise astute pilot or industry observer. John's question and answer are shown
below:
If you have a perplexing question for which you cannot find an answer, send it to the folks at Stump the Chump. If we use it in Stump the Chump, you will receive a complimentary OTA coffee mug!Specialized Flight Training Options: There are a variety of specialized and advanced training opportunities available for the proficient general aviation pilot. Two such opportunities that I offer are described below: Glass Cockpit/G1000 Training:
Round dial airspeed indicators and altimeters have been replaced with vertical moving tapes. Moving maps overlay engine instruments; uplink weather and traffic collision alerting systems add colorful graphics to what has traditionally been gray metal or plastic cockpit panels. Western New York students, pilots, and flight instructors - come train in 2005 Cessna 172s equipped with G1000 cockpits. These aircraft are based at the Lancaster (BQR) Airport, located just a few minutes east of the Buffalo/Niagara (NY) International Airport (BUF). Garmin G1000 equipped Cessna 172s are also available for training and rental at the Dunkirk (NY) Airport (DKK). These new aircraft come equipped with uplink weather, traffic and terrain alert, XM music, leather seats, and autopilots! This is an excellent opportunity to step up into the 21st century of aviation. You can learn to fly or advance your skills in the same class of equipment used in the corporate and airline world! NYC Class B/High Density Airspace Training:
Your day long training adventure will bring you, first, to the White Plains/Westchester Airport just northeast of Manhattan. From there, you will fly over to LaGuardia Airport for lunch. Then it's over to John F. Kennedy (JFK) for a quick break and pre-brief for your flight up the Hudson River VFR corridor. After a low level run up the Hudson River and a couple turns just 500 feet over the Statue of Liberty, you'll be cleared for landing at the Newark Airport (EWR). Your final stop will bring you into Teterboro, the busiest corporate jet airport in the world. Instructional fee: $799 (in your aircraft) Part 91 - No Prescribed Takeoff Minimums!
Perhaps that is why a Mooney M20K pilot attempted to do so last week at the Greater Binghamton Airport in New York in these very same conditions? Tragically, that's the last takeoff this pilot will ever make. Here is a sad example of where the FARs provide little specific guidance to pilots and, instead, leave matters such as this up to personal judgment and sound aeronautical decision making of the pilot. While there is no specific prohibition against such takeoffs in Part 91, there is another regulation that clearly applies. This regulation appears in Part 91. 13 which says: "No person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another."FAR Part 121 and Part 135 applies While the "legalists" may staunchly disagree, the same FARS that apply to commercial and airline operations (Parts 121 and 135) do (or should) apply to pilots operating under Part 91. In other words, if it makes sense from a safety perspective to establish takeoff minimums for commercial and airline operators, it should make sense for the rest of us as well! As one learned administrative law judge once said, there is no way to promulgate regulations that protect us from all possible dumb pilot tricks! Helpful Sponsors
OTA would like to thank the authors of these two books for helping to underwrite the costs of this publication! Please click on each of these book covers to learn more about them.
Winter Flying with No Backdoors . . . a formula for disaster! Given the weather forecast for his planned route of flight, this Bonanza A36 pilot with three passengers should have said "no" instead of attempting IFR flight from Louisville, Kentucky, to Aurora, Illinois this cold night in March. Before departing, the pilot did receive an FSS pre-flight briefing as shown in the inset below:
Without going into the lengthy details of what subsequently ensued, the pilot did encounter icing conditions along his route of flight. He eventually did request a lower altitude from ATC but was denied due to the minimum vectoring altitude in that area.
He was given vectors for the VOR/DME-A approach into Sullivan County Airport, Sullivan, Indiana but it proved to be too late. His last recorded words to ATC were, "Heck, we're all over the place right now for One Two Alpha." All four people perished in the accident just a few miles short of the airport. Flying in the real world . . . While it is easy for us "Monday morning quarterbacks" to second guess this pilot's aeronautical decision making (ADM) prowess, the fact remains that weather conditions similar to this exist throughout much of the northern portions of the United States from November through April. If the outside temperature is below freezing and there are clouds around, icing conditions are likely not far away.
Yet we don't see GA flying coming to a stop during the winter months! So what is the proficient instrument pilot to do? Sure . . . it's easy to say, "Don't fly." But experienced instrument pilots know that this isn't always the only option. Instead, the pilot begins some serious "back door" analyses beginning with an in-depth look at the temperatures from the minimum vectoring altitude (MVA) upward. If these temperatures are all below freezing, as they were in this accident pilot's case, a major icing "back door" has closed. Next, the proficient IFR pilot looks at the cloud conditions. If the cloud bases are below the MVA and the cloud tops are out of the performance reach of his airplane, again as they were in this accident pilot's case, another major icing "back door" has closed. Lastly, the proficient pilot studies the surface analysis chart very carefully. If his route of flight will take him through a front and/or near a low pressure area with outside temperatures below freezing, the likelihood of icing is nearly 100 percent. Should this situation occur and the pilot has no "back doors" as described above, the flight risks become gravely high! In summary, icing go/no-go decisions are among the most difficult choices we GA pilots have to make. The variables influencing these decisions are numerous. A "one size fits all" rule just does not apply!
The single greatest challenge to most most pilots today can be described in a single word. This word is "change!" Change comes in many forms, often beginning with cockpit technology, followed by external changes such as airspace classification, ATC procedures, aircraft design and powerplant systems, and FAR changes.
Glass cockpit technology is an excellent example of this. I lifted off recently into hard IFR when the Avidyne primary flight display (PFD) suddenly went blank. Sitting here in front of a computer screen, the thought of a PFD failure in the scud may not strike any of us as serious matter (because we have backup steam gauges), but when it happens for real, one's brain momentarily turns to mush. Imagine the added loss of the multi-function display (MFD) at the same time. Remember, the backup steam gauges, other than a wet compass, do not provide navigational information! Can't happen, you say. Let me introduce you to Mr. Murphy. Autopilots are another wonderful labor saving device, but when they kick off just as we are pre-occupied with other chores, especially when alone, the event can trigger a momentary sense of confusion. We all know what happened just after September 11, 2001. The term "TFR" suddenly took on new meaning and another term named "intercept procedures" instantly became a part of the pilot lexicon. Other terms like "flow control," which were once known only to airline pilots, instantly apply to us GA pilots when operating into and out of the New York TRACON. Today, many new airplanes are coming equipped with TKS anti-icing systems that mentally empower us to climb up into sub-freezing clouds that can quickly turn the non-ice savvy pilot into a giant popsicle. These are but a few examples of the hundreds of changes that have occurred in just the past couple years. Add those to what lies just around the corner (think: ADS-B) and our world of flight might just become so easy that when the whole thing suddenly fails, we could all fall out of the sky like hail in a Texas-size thunderstorm!
So old Ernie Gann could be right. We do play this business for keeps. In the real world, there is no throwing off the foggles or walking away from the flight simulator. Partial panel skills that we developed when flying on the round gauges no longer apply to glass panel set ups. Miss a call in airspace saturated with whales and sharks could render us little guys into morsels of food for the big FAA enforcement machine to chew like candy. Going aloft and practicing the same old stuff each time does little to keep us sharp in this brave new world we fly in. So, instead of your typical biennial flight review (BFR) or instrument proficiency check (IPC), or periodic sim session, go up in the real world and get some specialized training! 
Podcasts of Over the Airwaves now available!!Responding to popular demand, the December, 2007 OTA issue is now available in a podcast audio format. Simply click on the link below to listen online or to download to your favorite digital device for later listening! Note: This is a 9mb file and may require several minutes with a high speed connection to download. Podcast OTA Vol 4, No 22 December, 2007
Past Issues of Click
HERE
to open any previous issue(s) of Technical Assistance
I would like to thank the following technical assistance
contributors for their valuable help in producing OTA every two
weeks: Cameron Dunlop, Corning, NY;
Dan Maloney, Clarence, NY; Barry McCollom, Kerrville, TX; Thom
Riddle, Buffalo, NY; and
[Disclaimer: Material contained in this
e-newsletter is for informational purposes only.
It should not be construed as directive,
doctrinal, or instructive. Readers should
consult with their flight schools, certificated
flight instructors, Flight Standards District
Office (FSDO) and/or appropriate FAA
publications including the Federal Aviation
Regulations (FARs), the Aeronautical Information
Manual (AIM), and applicable FAA Advisory
Circulars (ACs) for specific guidance relative
to any information or before employing any
recommendations contained in this e-publication.
Further, nothing in this e-publication is
intended to be inconsistent with or contrary to
any official FAA rule or regulation, nor should
such material be interpreted or construed as
such. Over the Airwaves is intended
exclusively for the purpose of promoting and
enhancing heightened reader awareness of flight
safety issues. This website is not a substitute
for competent flight instruction.
All information in
this site is provided "as is," with no guarantee of
completeness, accuracy, adequacy, timeliness of the
information contained in, or linked to, or of the
results obtained from the use of this information,
and without warranty of any kind, express or
implied, including, but not limited to warranties of
performance, merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose. In no event will the authors,
publishers their related partnerships or
corporations, or the partners, agents or employees
thereof be liable to you or anyone else for any
decision made or action taken in reliance on the
information in this page or for any consequential,
special or similar damages, even if advised of the
possibility of such damages. Certain links in this
page connect to other Web sites maintained by third
parties over whom the authors have no control. The
authors make no representations as to the accuracy
or any other aspect of information contained in
other Web sites. ©2004-2007 Over the Airwaves [TM], Buffalo, New York, USA.
ISSN 1937-3848. Over the Airwaves is a registered
trademark. Any use of this name , image, or reproduction,
duplication, or replication of this electronic publication
and/or prior issues in whole or in part without the express
written permission is strictly prohibited. Forwarding,
dissemination, distribution, and/or circulation of the Over
the Airwaves Uniform Resource Locator (URL) is permitted
under the terms of this trademark and copyright. |
To
illustrate the magnitude of this question, the single
greatest tragedy in the U.S. space program, the loss of the
Challenger space shuttle in 1986, occurred because those in
mission control failed to answer this question correctly.
How
do we pilots becomes more adept at knowing when to say "no?"
Do we learn it by reading a book of rules? We
know, for example, that FAR 91.103 says that we cannot
launch unless we have ALL available information concerning
that flight. Here, the word "all" can be a bit
too all-encompassing from a practical perspective.
Here's
another example. Let's look at published procedures
for given flight operations. Instrument pilots are provided detailed procedures for operating in
IMC. Do
these procedures help us to say "no" when we haven't
flown on the gauges in the last five months? Of course
not.
Second,
we systematically stretch our personal operating envelope.
Here, we slowly expand what many call their "personal
minimums." Take crosswinds, for example. We
get out and practice takeoffs and landings in crosswinds.
In time, we add a couple more crosswind knots to our comfort
zone.
Here's
another example. Instrument pilots are admonished
to not enter sub-freezing clouds in a non-known ice
certified airplane. Let's say that a pilot in
level flight elects to enter a stratus cloud layer whose
outside temperature is +9dC. Legal? Sure,
why not?
There are few things that produce a
tighter "pucker factor" to inexperienced
or timid flight
instructors than the matter of stall and spin awareness training. 
Throughout
each of these documents we note the FAA's emphasis on the importance of stall
and spin awareness training. 
Writing
in the December, 2007 issue of AOPA PILOT, noted aviation
expert Barry Schiff offers a useful observation when quoting
Jack Eggspuehler, former president of NAFI (National
Association of Flight Instructors). Eggspuehler notes
that the current generation of flight instructors attempting
to teach spins "would be the blind leading the blind."
There are
lots of ways to remember where to position the controls during a tailwind taxi,
but the one that's easiest for me to remember is this. "Fly down and away
from the wind!"
The
rationale is simple . . . autopilots occasionally fail. When they do, the
nonproficient pilot can quickly become overwhelmed.
They
say you can't judge a book by its cover, but the same
doesn't always hold true for airplanes. What you see
on the outside of an airplane is often indicative of what's
going on in the inside.
Moving
ever deeper into the miracles of cyberspace technology, we can now click on over
17 hours of video streaming safety messages from GA's leading experts in flight
safety.
We
all like to feel the main gear "kiss" the runway just before the nose
wheel settles to the ground. Such feather-soft landings are also pleasing
to the passengers. But we nary want to use this technique during strong,
gusty crosswinds! 
While
we know very little about the details, a fatal Cirrus SR22 accident occurred in
Faribault Municipal Airport, Minnesota last Sunday that exhibits risk factors
similar to those described in the above scenario. 
Keeping
the nose down or level with the ground, we lower the upwind wing slightly and
maintain directional control with rudder. At no time do we allow the
nose to raise back up and thereby subject the wings to sudden lifting by gusty
winds. Extreme care must be exercised, of course, to prevent the nose
wheel from impacting the runway before the main gear.
It's
not your typical ground school. In fact, there is very little mention of
FAA knowledge or practical tests. Instead, the sole purpose of our
"Adventures in Aviation" is to excite and engage high school students in the
wonderful world of aviation!
Most
of us have observed sloping runways at one time or another. The typical
practice is to take off down hill and land uphill. But what do we do if
the winds dictate otherwise?
If
the slope is steep, such as at the Falwell Airport (W24) in Lynchburg, VA where
one end of the runway is 137 feet higher than the other end, you either takeoff
down hill or you do not take off at all! (See photo left taken by Dan
Maloney.)
This RV6 pilot
was completing a 116 mile cross-country flight to Sinton, Texas.
Approaching his destination, he was cleared for the Runway 14, VOR/DME/GPS
approach. The published weather minimums for the GPS Runway 14 are a
500-foot ceiling and one-mile visibility.
In this tragic
case, our attention can easily be directed to the altimeter.
After all, it is in our altimeter that we place our 100 percent
confidence when avoiding terrain or obstacle below. This
becomes CRITICALLY important, of course, when intentionally
descending down low along the final approach course with no outside
visual references. 
This
is the second challenging question for our experts in
the Stump the Chump section of
Nearly
every new production airplane, from Cessna 172s to Boeing 787s,
comes equipped with primary and multi-function glass displays that
render round gauges a vestige of an earlier era in aviation.
Are
you ready for the major leagues of IFR operations? Have you
always wanted to play with the big dogs of aviation. There is
no better place do all of this than to fly in and through New York
City's Class B airspace.
You
will not find any prohibition in FAR Part 91 against taking
off into a 100 foot ceiling and less than a one-quarter mile
visibility. 
By now, the pilot was nearly out of options. Carrying
ice, he had little chance of climbing out of the IFR conditions. His only
remaining chance of survival was to get cleared for a nearby instrument
approach. 
The
probability of icing increases dramatically if there is a low pressure area
nearby that is pulling up warm, moist air from the south where it eventually
reaches colder temperatures from the north. Then add frontal movement
along the route of flight and, voila', big time ice!
The
nice thing about changes is that, for the most part, they are intended to make
our pilot job easier. Easier, that is, when things are working properly!
But when they fail, the very things that were supposed to make our job easier
suddenly become our enemy. 
Then,
of course, some of us will be whistling through the air in our very light jets (VLJs)
at speeds known only to military, corporate, and airline pilots . . . but
without the initial and recurrent training requirements known to these
professional pilots. 
