Sunday,
February 11, 2007 Vol. IV No.
3 |
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Welcome
to the
Over the
Airwaves
aviation journal. This complimentary bi-weekly e-mailing
is being sent to pilots and aviation enthusiasts around the
world. Its aim
is to promote
flight safety, encourage students and new pilots, and to build
enthusiasm for aviation in general.
Dear Pilots and Aviation Enthusiasts:
Mechanical Killers According to AOPA's Air Safety Foundation (ASF), approximately 15 percent of all fatal accidents are caused by mechanical factors. Like all such data, however, this relatively low incidence of serious mechanical failure is open to broad interpretation. For example, what would be the percentage of fatal mechanical failures if we removed the non-proficient pilot from the data pool? Sure, if we factored out the dumb pilot tricks, basic judgment errors, and poor aeronautical decision making, then mechanical factors and weather would be about all that remains as the leading cause of fatal accidents. And weather is easily dealt with by the proficient pilot. So this leaves mechanical factors as the major factor in fatal accidents by otherwise proficient pilots! Scary thought! This is a pretty scary thought since even the most proficient pilot seldom has formal training or experience in airframe and power plant matters. Other than routine pre-flight inspections, we leave the heavy duty aircraft maintenance stuff to the pros. This is another way of saying that truly proficient pilots entrust their lives in the hands of other people. Are you okay with that? Hmmmm . . . I'm not.
As I look back over my flying career, the only near mishaps I ever experienced were due to mechanical issues. For example, I had a turbocharger oil fitting work itself loose at flight level 200 while on a six hour flight from Buffalo, NY to New Orleans. I taxied up to the FBO with oil dripping on the tarmac. I shut the engine down with less than three quarts of oil remaining! Upon returning from another long night flight, I heard something ticking in the engine as I rolled up to the FBO. It turns out that the ticking sound was coming from pieces of a self-destructing piston skirt slinging around in the crankcase.
The same week, a mechanic noticed a discoloration on the white oil filter of a Diamond Katana I had recently ferried from London, Ontario to one of my students back in Buffalo, NY. Tracing the origin of this discoloration, he found a sizeable crack in the exhaust manifold passing near the oil filter! This aircraft was minutes from a major oil-fueled engine fire. So what is the proficient pilot to do about major maintenance items? The first thing we proficient pilots need to do is become airframe and power plant savvy. Rather than leaving the heavy duty maintenance stuff to the pros, we should become conversant with every major system in the airplanes we fly. No, we do not need to sit for the A&P exam, but we had better know what goes on behind the scenes. For example, I'm no longer comfortable in any piston airplane that has not undergone a recent exhaust pressure test using shop air and a pail of soapy water to reveal for leaks. Next, my T-210 never undergoes a 100 hour inspection or annual without me standing beside my mechanic throughout the process. I'm particularly sensitive about high pressure oil line fittings! Similarly, I observe the compression checks and compare the data
with previous test results. I also have
an oil sample taken at every 100 hour inspection for
There is something else we as aircraft owners can do. My friend, Mike Busch, is a well-known and highly respected aircraft mechanical guru (who also founded AVWEB). Mike conducts weekend Savvy Aviator Seminars throughout the United States that help proficient pilots become more aware of the mechanical aspects of their airplanes. For those readers residing close to Buffalo, NY, Ron Ciura is another well-respected A&P IA who runs periodic aircraft maintenance courses for the proficient pilot. The MOST important part . . .
We can ensure that ONLY the best qualified A&Ps work on our airplanes. Once we find these A&Ps, we encourage them to dig for safety issues. Finding the best qualified A&Ps goes far beyond simple reference checks. It goes beyond friendships. Instead, it goes to reputation for excellence. Just as in selecting a flight instructor, choosing the best qualified A&P could be the most important decision we ever make as aviators. Yep, for the proficient pilot, mechanical issues account for the vast majority of all fatal accidents. The more we know about this important aspect of aviation, the greater our probability of always arriving alive! Fly safe,
Bob Miller, ATP, CFII Good News and Bad about Temperature Inversions!
Weather is the single greatest risk factor any aviator faces. The more we know about weather, the greater our chances of surviving to the "old pilot" category! The weather-savvy pilot has a far better sense of what's happening in the environment than one who leaves weather to the Flight Service Station specialist. He or she can look at basic meteorological measures such as temperatures, dew points, adiabatic lapse rates, and frontal movements, and make consistently reliable go/no go decisions. We know, of course, that any systematic study of weather begins with the understanding that the cause of all weather is the uneven heating of the earth's surface by the sun. Curiously, our study of the weather would be made far easier if only temperature changes were involved. Such, of course, is not the case. Nature throws in varying degrees of moisture to help complicate our study. Combining temperature with moisture and the earth's rotation produces enough variation in the weather to challenge even the most proficient pilot. Temperature inversions - the good and the bad One of the challenges facing weather-savvy pilots is produced by temperature inversions. Normally, air cools in a predictable fashion as it lifts. If it is relatively dry, air cools at the rate of 3 degrees Celsius per 1,000 feet. If the air is moist, it cools at between 1.1 and 1.8 degrees Celsius. Averaging the dry and moist air cooling rates produces a 2 degree Celsius per 1,000 feet. This is called the adiabatic lapse rate. Surface-based Inversions In the winter, ice and snow covered lakes and frozen ground serve as giant air conditioners that cool the air flowing over them to temperatures COLDER than the air above it. Voila' . . . we have a temperature inversion. This is called a surface-based temperature inversion. Frontal Inversions Another type of inversion is caused by a cold front that slides in and pushes the warmer air upward. This is called a frontal inversion.
Winter flight operations are occasionally enhanced by having warmer, non-freezing temperatures aloft. This, of course, helps to minimize the likelihood of icing. In such instances, we can launch in sub-freezing temperatures and climb into above-freezing clouds, free of the possibility of icing. Unfortunately, that's about the only good news about inversions. The rest is largely bad.
Two words that can create a bad day for the IFR pilot are: freezing rain! It is the infamous temperature inversion that is nearly always the cause of freezing rain! Rain falling through warmer air that suddenly encounters sub-freezing air below (temperature inversion) turns into super-cooled large droplets (SLDs). Curiously, these sub-freezing water droplets remain in liquid form until they are disturbed by, say, a wing, propeller, or airframe. When that happens, these SLDs attach themselves to that surface in the form of ice! Unfortunately, freezing rain happens fast! It can lay several inches or more of heavy ice on an airplane in seconds. If there is any good news about freezing rain, it only occurs in narrow bands of altitude where the SLDs have not yet crystallized into ice pellets. Generally a quick change in altitude (better up than down) is all that is necessary to escape freezing rain conditions.
If the relative humidity of the air is high, temperature inversions can also contribute to the formation of clouds, fog, haze, or smoke, resulting in diminished visibility in the inversion layer. This condition can become so bad that valley-based communities where pollution is already a problem, e.g., coal mining towns of Pennsylvania and West Virginia, occasionally suffer serious health risks. Similarly, west coast inversions over the Los Angeles basin are largely responsible for the persistent smog in those areas. In summary, the more we understand the relationship between temperatures, moisture, lapse rates, and frontal movements, the better prepared we will be to meet the challenges of cross country flight. Faulty Engine Maintenance Contributes to Fatal Crash While we pilots are ultimately responsible for the safe outcome of every flight, we are still at the mercy of those who perform our major aircraft maintenance.
After departing in a P-210 on a VFR flight from a small airport near Amarillo, Texas enroute to Lubbock, Texas, the pilot called ATC and said, "We've got a problem here. We're going to have to come back and land." The controller asked the pilot what the nature of the emergency was, and the pilot responded, "We've got a cylinder out." Over the next four minutes, the controller and another pilot listening on the same radio frequency attempted to direct the pilot to the closest airport. Unfortunately, the pilot was unable to locate the runway and reported that he was going to have to land in a field. Shortly after, the pilot reported, "Our engine's out now." This was the last radio communication with the pilot. Hitting the ground, he collided with a water well, a parked tractor, and came to rest next to a large propane tank. As a result of the extreme heat associated with the post-impact fire, the tank's safety relief valve popped (as designed), which released propane vapors into the air. These vapors caught on fire and added to the intensity of the fire. The pilot was killed and his passenger suffered serious injuries. What the NTSB discovered
Examination of the engine revealed that the crankcase was
breached above the number 2 cylinder. The components
of the crankshaft and the number 1, number 2, and number 3
connecting rod assemblies exhibited signatures of thermal
distress consistent with a lack of lubrication.
Further examination found that the oil pump driven gear
support shaft in the oil pump housing exhibited full gear
length wear, indicating that it had been operating without
bushings.
Here's what the NTSB concluded in its probable cause
finding:
This is a case where the owner/operator is purely at the mercy of the maintenance shop servicing their airplane. There is no reasonable way that the pilot of this aircraft could have caught this maintenance oversight on a normal preflight inspection. We aircraft owners can shop around for bargain prices in the aircraft maintenance department, but it ultimately comes down to the skills of those who turn the wrenches on our airplanes. We better choose our maintenance shops carefully! Contact Approaches - The big time saver!
Approaching the Buffalo Airport (KBUF) from Mont Tremblant, Quebec last month, ATC descended me down to 4,000 feet for sequencing to the ILS Runway 5 approach. A 2,000' layer of broken clouds and two miles of visibility kept the airport in IFR conditions.
Understandably, after a couple of hours in an airplane cramped with skis and winter weather gear, my family was not in the mood for several more minutes of sightseeing in these bumpy conditions. I called approach control and said, "If you can keep me close to the airport I can take a contact approach." "Can do," said a controller who welcomed any pilot efforts to help lighten his load. I had the required one mile visibility per the AIM 5-5-3 (see below). All I had to do was maneuver around visibility obscuring snow showers and several low clouds. It was my responsibility to maintain obstruction clearance and to see and avoid any other VFR traffic that might be operating in the area.
In summary, the contact approach offers a quick and efficient way to avoid lengthy instrument arrival procedures presuming, of course, that weather conditions permit it. The Fatal VMC - IMC Paradox!
Such was the case with this 500 hour, non-instrument rated Piper Archer pilot. His plan was to depart with a passenger from Berlin, New Hampshire to the Central Jersey Regional Airport in Manville, New Jersey. Prior to departure, he contacted the Bangor Automated
Flight Service Station (AFSS) and requested a weather
briefing. The briefer
reported that there were no weather advisories for his
planned route of flight. The briefer also advised that
the lowest ceilings for his intended route would be 10,000
feet. While providing initial weather information to
the caller, the briefer stated the weather "looks
excellent." The briefer then provided the next day's forecast, and while providing that information, he added, "I would recommend tonight instead of tomorrow." The briefer advised that current conditions at his departure airport were winds calm, clear below 12,000 feet, 10 miles of visibility, temperature 26 degrees Fahrenheit, and an altimeter of 30.21 inches of mercury. The pilot then filed a VFR flight plan with the briefer. The reported weather is as good as it gets!
The pilot took off at 7pm. Shortly after liftoff, he contacted Bangor Radio to activate his VFR flight plan. About five minutes later he reported in at 7,500' and mentioned that he was encountering haze. The briefer advised that his radar indicated high clouds with possible snow aloft. He added that in "the area" ceilings were 9,000 to 11,000 feet broken to overcast, changing to scattered to broken in southern New Hampshire. The pilot then asked what altitude would be required to get out of the haze. The briefer reiterated the information he had already provided. No other transmissions were received from the pilot after acknowledging the requested information from Bangor. The wreckage was found around noon the next day. What happened? Before finding the cause of this fatal accident. Let's review the pilot's decision to launch. He received a thorough FSS weather briefing. The specialist reported solid VFR conditions along his entire route of flight with no adverse flight precautions. The specialist added on several occasions that the weather looked excellent. The only apparent surprise was the haze that the pilot encountered at 7,500 feet. Now the plot thickens. He's flying at night over a sparsely populated area. There is an overcast layer above him obscuring any moonlight. Getting the picture yet? No moon or stars above. No visual references provided by city lights below - there were no cities! The pilot observes haze being reflected by his landing light. He is suddenly caught in a meteorological paradox . . . near perfect weather conditions yet he is unable to find any visual references from which to control his airplane. He was in both VMC and IMC at the very same time! Tragically, this paradox happens far more that many pilots realize. The wreckage holds the clue According to the NTSB report, the right half of the horizontal stabilator was found approximately 500 feet southwest of the start of the debris path. The vertical stabilizer, a section of the right flap, a section of the left aileron, and the outboard section of the left wing were located approximately 400 feet further to the southwest. The left half of the horizontal stabilator was not located. The airplane's structure had suffered a catastrophic in-flight failure. This was likely caused by the pilot's loss of control and resultant excessive airspeed that could only be generated in a graveyard spiral. Here is the NTSB's probable cause determination:
Let's take a peek at the pilot's credentials . . . The pilot held a private pilot certificate with a single engine land rating, with no instrument rating. A review of the pilot's logbook revealed a total of 526.7 hours of flight experience. In addition, the pilot logged a total of 343.8 hours of cross country flight, 141.6 hours of night, 3.6 of simulated instrument, and 17.1 hours in the accident airplane's make and model. Here was a pilot who logged over 340 cross country flight hours, nearly one-half of which were flown at night. What he did NOT have was any reported experience in actual instrument conditions. Worse, the only instrument experience he had was 3.6 hours of simulated instrument time, likely logged as part of his primary pilot training. The missing credential is deafening!!!
The point here is that encountering actual instrument meteorological conditions is not like suddenly turning the kitchen lights off. Instead, IMC develops insidiously, often without notice by the pilot until it's too late. Such was likely the case in this tragic accident. One minute he had ground contact or perhaps a distant light on the ground; the next minute, nothing. He panics. Up suddenly becomes down. Down is up. His altimeter begins to unwind. He pulls back on the yoke to restore lost altitude. The increasing air-stream and engine noise becomes deafening. His passenger starts to scream. Nothing makes sense. Things begin to whirl around in the cockpit. He fights for control. The gauges are spinning. His ears are popping as he races to the ground at over 5,000 feet per minute. He and his passenger will die in about one minute. VFR flight into IMC . . . the #1 weather-related cause of fatal accidents!
More to the point . . . a CFI's refusal to take primary pilots into actual IMC and keep them there until they can safely and reliably turn, climb, and descend solely by reference to the instruments, again in real IMC conditions, is setting future pilots up for the same disaster experienced in the accident scenario above. What about the rest of us? This pilot's experience, which is just one of many similar VFR into IMC fatal accidents that occur each year, should be sufficient motivation for all of us to become current and proficient on the gauges. It makes no difference whether we are IFR rated or not, the ability to fly solely by reference to the instruments quickly fades . . . unless exercised on a regular basis. If we are VFR only pilots and not skilled on the gauges, we need to become skilled sooner rather than later. Better yet, we should secure our instrument rating. If we are IFR rated and not current, we need to get current in actual IMC. Let's not get suckered into believing we can do this in simulated conditions! Here me, please, on this point. Simulated instrument training, either with a view limiting device or in a stationary flight simulator does a very poor job of preparing pilots for the real world of IMC flight. While helpful in teaching IFR procedures, these devices should be the training option of last resort. Donations Graciously Accepted
With this expansion has come a dedicated effort to produce a first-class bi-weekly e-document that is relevant to the informational needs of pilots at all skill and proficiency levels. Similarly, a retrievable library of all past issues is simply a click away. All of this costs money. Our web server fees have increased as have the costs of our weekly email notification alert system. I now have more people involved in website layout, graphics development, and in editorial support. In short, what began as a one hour a week time investment is now consuming the majority of my non-flying, non-instructional work week. Hopefully, all of this activity has helped to make each of our OTA readers better, more proficient pilots. If OTA has helped you, my hope is that you will help OTA to continue producing these bi-weekly e-publications. Any gift you make will be gratefully appreciated. The button link below will bring you to a secure payment site through which credit card gifts can be made. Thanks for your help! Bob Miller The High Flare - then BANG!! There you are . . . hanging 50 feet precariously above the runway surface as you struggle to complete the landing. The airplane seems to be suspended in space, but something tells you that it is not going to remain there for long! Unless you do something quickly, the airplane is not likely to survive the landing. And your ego will incur even bigger dents!
So what do you do? No question here! You advance the throttle to full power. If insufficient runway remains to try another landing, you go around. Flaring too high over the runway is wrought with hazards. Already bordering close to stall speed, the nose can suddenly drop, causing severe nose gear and propeller damage. Crosswinds can exert pressure on the tail, causing the nose to depart from the runway heading. Resultant side loads on the wheels as the airplane touches down can cause the tires to separate from the rims. Proper flaring technique suggests that you continue your descent until less than one-half your total wing span, say 15 or 20 feet above the runway, before beginning the flare. Once you master this, your landings will be perfect every time! Lake Effect Snow - Be Prepared!
Our Cirrus SR22 was tracking well on the snow and ice covered taxiway despite strong winds from the right. We stopped occasionally as wind-blown snow blocked our forward vision. As instructed, my student favored the upwind side of the wide taxiway to give us more maneuvering room should the airplane begin sliding on the slippery surface. He also had his left hand positioned next to the ignition key for quick engine shut-down in the event the wind pushed us into a snow bank. Lastly, he was spring-loaded to swing the airplane into the wind should we begin sliding. Winter operations do require specialized training Unlike summer thunderstorms which are universally bad news for all pilots, winter conditions contain an infinite variety of challenging conditions. Low temperatures, blustery winds, slippery runway and taxi surfaces, and occasionally obscured visibility come with winter operations. Typically, however, these conditions do not prevent launching, but they can keep the pilot on his or her toes. Our training mission this day was partial panel work and to assess and become comfortable in high winds and blowing snow. We succeeded, but not without some unique challenges that caught us by surprise. We called ready for an intersection departure from Buffalo's Runway 23. Unlike the taxiway, the runway was mostly dry with patches of hard packed snow. Its dark color made it easy to track our takeoff roll through the limited visibility caused by the blowing snow. Within seconds, we were in the blue, sun-filled sky above. Like all of my training flights, this one involved a stop for lunch (at the Oswego, NY Airport). Here, my student encountered a (simulated) failed PFD and MFD prior to his ILS Runway 33 approach. We then continued on to Ithaca to visit my colleague, David St. George. Here, my student encountered locked control stick (simulated) as he was vectored for the ILS approach. Careful use of power, trim, rudder were all that was necessary to make this landing work. The final challenge was no simulation!!
What we didn't consider, however, was the five to ten minute delay in the real-time images we were receiving. The 40 minute old KBUF ATIS was not reporting anything unique. Winds right down the runway at 19 with gusts to 29 and a 6,000 foot broken ceiling. Visibility was greater than 6 miles. Still, the image on the MFD of the lake effect snow moving quickly toward our destination airport was causing us concern. ATC issued vectors to Runway 23 and cleared us for the approach. We could see the darkening, snow-filled clouds just west of the airport. Even with snow beginning to blow across the runway, the reported RVR (runway visual range) was over 5,000 feet. Snow was beginning to fall hard as we passed over the runway threshold. By now, we could only see the first one-half of the runway. That's when the stuff hit the fan . . .
Inching along in blizzard conditions on an active runway with jet traffic on final is not a comfortable place to be. The tower cancelled the arriving airliner's landing clearance as we struggled to find our runway exit point. Finally, there it was! We managed to clear the runway and advise the tower in time for the airline guy to be re-cleared for landing. Now becomes the real hard part . . . Our next challenge was to follow the controller's taxi instructions back across the active runway to the ramp in the near-blinding snow conditions. "Taxi west on Alpha turn right on Runway 32 and hold short of Runway 23," said the controller in a calming, re-assuring voice. Easy for him to say, I thought. We could barely make out the taxiway we were on. We crawled along the left side of Taxiway Alpha, following the single row of blue taxiways lights twinkling through the blowing snow. Reaching Runway 32, we turned right as instructed, then stopped in our tracks, not quite sure where it intersected Runway 23, which was still active. As we came to a stop, we saw the image of a Northwest Airlines DC-9 creeping across our intended path. He was the guy following us in on the approach. Both of us were now stopped within 50 yards of each other, eyeball to eyeball, each waiting for further instructions from the tower. It was like a scene of the "The Twilight Zone." We were told to taxi behind the DC-9. He was instructed to turn left to the next taxiway. The additional blowing snow caused by his jet blast totally encapsulated us in a snowy cocoon! We were now in irons, sitting squarely in the middle of the active runway we were instructed to cross. We again advised the tower of our position on the runway, noting that we were still trying to locate the taxiway on the other side. "Take your time," he said, "the reported airport visibility is now down to zero. Nobody is coming in or out." We eventually found our way back to the ramp, parked the airplane, and quickly walked into the warm FBO. So what lessons were learned?
A less obvious but more important lesson is that uplinked weather has a time delay sufficiently long to minimize its effectiveness for "snaking" around nearby weather threats. This training flight also demonstrated the importance of proper ground maneuvering techniques. The combination of wind and icy taxi and runway conditions require that the airplane be "flown" while still on the ground. Control surface position rather than braking can have a greater impact on which direction the airplane rolls on the ground. This flight revealed the importance of ALWAYS knowing precisely where we are when taxiing around busy airports in poor visibility conditions. When in doubt, STOP immediately. Call the tower or ground control and advise them that we are lost. That will get their attention! Lastly, my hat goes off to KBUF's tower controller working on this blustery afternoon. His initials are "LP." He exhibited the high level of professionalism we come to expect from these often unseen men and women who keep us from running into each other. Nice job, Pogo! "Over the Airwaves" Builds Awareness ! ! It has long been understood that a clear definition of the problem is half way to the solution. For us pilots, this means we cannot engage in meaningful recurrent training until we first understand our shortcomings.
 OTA
is designed to help uncover these shortcomings, whether they
be crosswind takeoffs or landings, stall awareness, unusual
attitudes, or spin recoveries.
Or our instrument skills may be less than proficient. We may be having difficulty making effective go/no-go decisions. Each week, OTA helps reader to be aware and understand the many risk factors associated with general aviation. Every issue features actual accident scenarios from which valuable teaching tips help readers to prevent similar mishaps. Please do the flying community a big favor by sending the OTA web link (http://overtheairwaves.com) to your flying friends, clubs, FBOs, flight schools, and individual flight instructors. Sword Fighting 101 . . .
This is nothing new to the instrument student or the non-proficient instrument pilot. The needle moves one way, we steer the airplane in that direction in an endless battle to get the needles in the donut and keep them there. There is a better way!
Let's say the final approach course for the ILS is 360 degrees. You just passed the final approach fix (FAF) on a 360 degree heading. You observe the localizer needle slowly drifting to the right. This is caused by a crosswind from the east. Rather than banking right to "chase" the needle, mentally compute a new heading that will stop the needle's movement. Try making a 10 degree heading to the right. Did that stop the needle's movement? Nope.
The needle now begins to inch back to the left. Now wait until the needle centers in the donut. When that happens, make a 5 degree back to the left. This should cause the needle to remain directly in the middle of the donut! Let's review the turns we made to center the localizer needle. Beginning on a 360 degree heading, we turned a total of 20 degrees to the right followed by 5 degrees back to the left. This produced a final heading of 015 degrees on the heading indicator.
Assuming no further changes in wind direction or velocity, that final heading of 015 degrees should keep the localizer centered all the way to the runway. Now for that pesky glideslope needle . . .
Pilots who developed keen aircraft trimming skills and an intimate familiarity with power settings have far less trouble mastering precision instrument approaches than ham-fisted pilots who learned to land by simply pointing the airplane to the runway. Controlling the glideslope needle begins 5 to 10 minutes before intercepting the localizer. It is here that the airplane is slowed to its approach speed and then is meticulously trimmed for level flight. In a typical trainer like a Cessna 172 or a Piper Warrior, power is set at 2,200 RPM to achieve a 90 knot level flight approach speed. In the Cessna 210 or Beech Bonanza, the manifold pressure is set at 22 inches to produce, say, a 120 knot level flight approach speed. The gentle power pull . . . As per the rules, ATC must put us on the localizer BELOW the glideslope. The typical ATC clearance goes something like this:
At this point, our focus is solely upon intercepting and centering the localizer needle using the technique described above. Very shortly after capturing the localizer, we will begin to see the glideslope needle drop down from the top of the VOR indicator (or HSI). Our focus remains on keeping the localizer needle centered. As the glideslope needle descends to the top of the donut, we slowly reduce power by 300 RMP (or 3" MP). As we do this, the vertical speed indicator (VSI) reveals the first indication of a descent. The VSI settles in at between 400 and 600 feet per minute downward. We then observe the glideslope needle remaining dead center in the donut. We lock in that power setting all of the way to the decision altitude (DA). The Final Approach Fix is the key!
No more configuration, heading, or power changes should have to be made after passing the FAF. Chasing the needles on an instrument approach is a sure sign of non-proficiency. If we find ourselves doing this, it's time to get with an experienced CFII and fix the problem! 360 Degree Power Off Landings - Practice, Practice, Practice! Here's the scenario . . . you are cruising along at about 3,500' AGL when the engine quits. As fate would have it, there is an airport directly below you. Sitting comfortably in front of a computer screen, OTA readers might say to ourselves, "Big deal . . . all we would have to do is make a 360 degree descending turn and land."
If only it were that simple! Take the case of a 1,000 hour pilot of a Mooney M20K who was setting up for a practice VFR ILS approach to the Hillsboro Airport in Oregon in January, 2006. While approaching the final approach fix (FAF), the pilot reported to ATC that he was losing power and needed to "put down." In his last transmission, the pilot said he had a turf airstrip underneath him. A witness, who was a certified pilot, said the airplane went into a steep right turn with a 30 to 40 degree nose low attitude. He said it looked like a spin entry! Unfortunately, things didn't work out as planned. The witness was correct. The airplane stalled, then entered an unrecoverable spin.
This scenario is quite common. An in-flight engine failure requires the pilot to make descending turns to a suitable landing area immediately below. Rather than executing simple descending turns, he or she allows the airplane to enter an uncoordinated stall followed by a spin. This, of course, can be prevented through proper instruction and lots of practice!
If we were to address the safety shortcomings among today's general aviation pilots, where would we begin? Would we begin by changing FAR Part 61 that sets forth the training requirements for pilots? How about the practical test standards (PTS)? Should we shine a light on marginally performing flight schools? What about the designated pilot examiners (DPEs)? In other words, WHO is responsible for preparing tomorrow's pilots and for assuring the competency of today's pilots?
What a pilot learns, he or she learns from the person sitting beside him. If the instructor is good, the person learns more than if the instructor is simply reciting and/or demonstrating elements from the Practical Test Standards or moving lockstep through the flight school generated curriculum. On a personal note, I was once employed as a flight instructor in a Part 141 flight school. After working one evening in challenging winds with an instrument student, the school's (former) chief flight instructor approached me and said, "Bob, we don't want you teaching on windy days like that. It subjects our school to liability risks." I discussed the matter with him, explaining that winds come with the territory here in upstate New York. If we do not prepare students for this reality, who will, I asked?" His response was, "We're here to get students through the checkride. That's it!" I tendered my resignation the next day and never looked back.
Basic
reality check . . .
As for DPEs, there is only so much that these fine men and women can assess during an oral exam and checkride. This leaves the individual flight instructor. Some are very, very good. Many are okay. Far too many are mediocre or worse. This sad but true fact is most assuredly the major reason why our fatal accident rate continues to worsen and a big reason why GA remains statistically 100 times more risky than airline flight. It is certainly the major reason why less than one-half of all student pilots go on to secure their private pilot certificates! Choose your flight instructor carefully! Recognizing the enormous variability in the skills, abilities, wisdom, and judgment of today's flight instructor, the most important safety decision any prospective or active pilot can make is the selection of his or her flight instructor. Unfortunately, this can be a daunting task, particularly for prospective pilots. The obvious question is, what makes a good flight instructor and how can I assess those traits? The answer is simple . . . get references!
So what are we left with? Yep . . . personal references! As has been frequently mentioned in the past here in OTA, both prospective and active pilots seeking advanced training should request the names and telephone numbers of at least five previous students of any candidate CFI. If the CFI is unable or unwilling to provide this information, move on in your CFI search! Hmmm . . . what about the brand new CFI just starting out? Admittedly, this is a tough call. It's your future. No, it's your life. If you want to bank on an untested CFI who has not proven himself or herself competent to provide quality training, that's your call. In this regard, I pick my own CFIs no differently than I select my surgeons. I only go with the very best. Obviously, then, how does a new CFI break into the business? Probably the place for him or her to begin is in an FAA approved Part 141 school where his actions are closely monitored. After a few years there, he or she will have developed a long list of students who can then provide references. So what questions do you ask of a prospective CFI's references?
Questions to
Ask Prospective Flight Instructor
2. Do
you feel that you moved through your training at an adequate pace? In
other words, did you receive your money's worth?
3. Did your CFI go beyond the basic
curriculum and expose you to real world scenarios? For example, did your
instructor expose you to marginal weather conditions like flying in the clouds
or in windy conditions?
4. Was your instruction
limited primarily to local airports or did he or she expose you to many
different airports? 5. Were you able to maintain a cordial relationship with your instructor
throughout your training? Or were there times when your instructor treated
you in a condescending or demeaning fashion?
6. Did your instructor consistently exhibit
a personal interest in your progress or did he or she treat you like a number?
7. Why does this CFI teach? Is it
because he likes to teach or is it because he is simply building logbook hours
for a better piloting opportunity?
As mentioned above, the selection
of one's flight instructor is the most important a
prospective or active pilot can make. What he or she
learns from the
Picking the wrong person is like purchasing a marginal quality life-raft or parachute. It may work for you . . . . then again, it might not! What if you cannot find a suitable CFI in your local community? Unfortunately, very good CFIs are few and far between. If necessary, be prepared to travel some distance for the CFI that is just right for you. Plan on taking temporary residence in a motel, then schedule day-long sessions to maximize your time and minimize your expenses. In summary, preparing pilots for the real world of flight goes far beyond attaining the minimum standards of instruction. The risks are too great and the challenges are too demanding to rely upon simply passing a couple of tests!
Supporting Sponsors We are proud to add a new section to each OTA issue titled, "Supporting Sponsors." As you may have guessed, the bi-weekly production costs of OTA are growing as we reach deep into five digit circulation numbers. A combination of web hosting and mass e-mail circulation costs are beginning to cut into our very limited budget. OTA will begin accepting logo links from aviation oriented service and product suppliers in this section of each issue. A simple click on the sponsor's logo will bring you to their own website. We would be pleased to send you sponsorship rate information by return email. Please click on rjma@rjma.com.
APS Emergency Maneuver Training specializes in upset recovery training, stall/spin awareness, aerobatics and spin recovery training.
Over the Airwaves
is not intended to be your typical training,
official news, or club-type social journal.
Instead, its intent is to stimulate thought,
enhance aviation critical thinking skills, to
encourage the strong pilot, and to disturb the
weaker pilot. With this breadth of scope,
Over the Airwaves will evoke a number of
reactions. Please feel free to share these
reactions with me by clicking
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Past Issues of Click
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to open any previous issue(s) of Over
the Airwaves and to search for any past articles. Technical Assistance I would like to thank the following technical assistance contributors for their valuable help in producing OTA every two weeks: Barry McCollom, Kerrville, TX; Thom Riddle, Buffalo, NY; and Jay Rolls, Macon, GA.
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So
what is a proficient pilot to do to minimize the
risk of suffering a mishap in an aircraft due to mechanical
failure?
In
a more recent mechanical experience, a mechanic
showed me the exhaust manifold from a Bonanza A36 I
had recently flown. This airplane is owned by one of my
students with whom I was about to depart the next
day for the Bahamas. Two of its three attachment
points had failed, allowing hot exhaust
flame and gases to escape inside the engine
compartment. 
spectrographic
analysis.
Even
the most mechanically inclined proficient pilots
cannot find every possible weakness in the
mechanical integrity of the airplanes we fly.
But there is ONE thing we can do to minimize the
likelihood of mechanical disasters. 
If we pilots wanted to focus on one aspect of aviation
that can pay off handsomely in terms of both safety and
convenience, it would have to be the science of meteorology.
There
is one more piece of bad news regarding temperature
inversions. The air
at the top of the version often acts as a lid, keeping
poor weather and pollutants trapped below.
This
past July, a commercial pilot with over 1,400
hours learned this truth the hard way. 
We
learn many infrequently used techniques as part of our
instrument training, then we forget many of them just as soon
as the ink dries the DPE's signature. Sadly, the lowly
contact approach is often one of these memory victims.
Coming
from the northeast, this required a 10 or 15 mile tour
around to the west side of the airport for spacing between
airline arrivals. 
It
is tragic when we pilots skip the basics and venture into
worsening weather conditions and die. But what about
the pilot who does everything right, then meets his own
demise?
The
reported weather conditions were as good as it gets
during the cold month of December in New England. Any
reasonably confident VFR pilot could safely launch in these
conditions.
This
fatal accident points directly to a major gap in FAR 61.109
that specifies the aeronautical experience required for the
private pilot certificate. That gap, of course, is the
absence of any
actual instrument training experience. Currently,
all that is required is three hours of simulated instrument
training.
This
accident scenario debunks every flight instructors'
admonition that the best way to avoid instrument conditions
is to remain clear of clouds. Such naive' instruction
leaves VFR pilots very dangerously under-prepared! To
promote such belief among their students is nothing less
than professional malpractice.
As many of you know,
My
student, who was taking recurrent instrument training, and I
departed the Buffalo/Niagara International Airport (KBUF)
knowing that weather was going to be a unique challenge on
this particular flight. The forecast was calling
for gusty winds to 29 knots, high ceilings, good visibility, and
occasional snow showers. 
Reaching
cruise altitude on our way back to Buffalo, the weather
depiction displayed on the Cirrus' multi-function display
(MFD) revealed that we would be in a horse race with a band
of lake effect snow showers moving eastward off of Lake Erie
toward our destination airport. 
We
rolled out from a near-perfect landing into an instant wall
of snow! The runway edge lights could barely be
seen as the tower controller instructed us to exit at the
first taxiway to the left. Buried in a virtual
whiteout, I called the tower and reported that we would be
slow to find this taxiway. 
The
obvious lesson is that lake effect snow moves in like a thief
in the night. An otherwise pure VFR day or night can
be obliterated instantly by the passage of visibility
obscuring lake effect snow. 
It
was a day like every other in the cockpit. My
instrument student was engaged in a wing-rocking, up and
down sword fight with the localizer and glideslope needles.
Instead
of flying an arbitrary heading toward the localizer needle,
make one or two calculated heading adjustments that stops
the needle's movement.
Make
another 5 degree turn to the right. Yep . . . that
stopped the needle in its tracks. Our next task is to
get the needle to move back toward the center. A
quick mental calculation suggests that another 5 degree turn to
the right will get the needle moving back to the center.
Unlike
tracking the localizer, keeping the glideslope needle
centered is a power management issue. Remember the old
adage that "power controls altitude and pitch controls
airspeed?" This law of aerodynamics is never more
true than when descending on an instrument approach!
The
word "final" in the final approach fix (FAF) has significant
meaning to the instrument pilot. It literally means
that we have completed all of our heading and power setting
adjustments before passing beyond this critical point on the
approach. Our gear is down and our flaps are where we
want them. 
There is only one
answer to this question. It is the person sitting
in the airplane beside the pilot receiving the training. Practical
Test Standards (PTS), FAR Part 61, and flight school
training curricula are nothing but printed documents stacked
neatly on a shelf or stuffed in a flight bag. They do
nothing to actually impart the skills we need to meet the
demanding challenges of real world flight.
There is a cold,
hard reality inherent in this business of improving flight
safety. That reality is, we will not be
seeing any significant changes in the PTS. We will not be seeing
weak or unethical flight schools being put out of business.
Unfortunately,
there are no "consumer reports" organizations that
can dismantle individual CFIs in the laboratory and evaluate
and report on their various strengths and weaknesses as is
done on consumer products. Nor do other outwardly
observable characteristics such as age, sex, pilot ratings,
or logbook hours differentiate the quality of individual
CFIs.
1.
If you were to seek advanced instruction, would you engage the same CFI?
If not, why?
person
sitting in the right seat sets the stage for all future
flight. Pick the right person and you will be equipped
to make the aeronautical decisions that will keep you free
of compromising in-flight circumstances.
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