Sunday,
March 11, 2007 Vol. IV No.
5 |
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Welcome
to the
Over the
Airwaves
aviation journal. This complimentary bi-weekly e-mailing
is being sent to pilots and aviation enthusiasts around the
world. Its aim
is to promote
flight safety, encourage students and new pilots, and to build
enthusiasm for aviation in general.
Dear Pilots and Aviation Enthusiasts:
Pulling the Trigger!
Ordinarily, OTA remains focused upon flight safety issues along with tools and techniques to make us all more proficient pilots. The time has come, however, when all of us must load our proverbial rifles, take aim, and prepare to pull the trigger. What's the target? Our target (figuratively speaking, of course) are those people we send to Washington, DC to represent our collective interests. In this case, our interests focus upon the avoidance of unfair and unreasonable taxation of general aviation.
The perpetrators of this unfair shift in financial responsibility are cash-starved, big airline corporations looking for ways to remain financially afloat. These politically savvy friends of the Bush Administration believe that if they can shift most of the burden of underwriting the FAA to us GA pilots, they can save millions in operating costs. They're right. They can! But fair is fair . . . On the surface, there is nothing inherently wrong with user fees. People who use the service should have the responsibility of paying for it. Curiously, this is the way our current system is structured. Every paying passenger who boards an airliner pays for his or her fair share of system costs through ticket price taxes. This is the way it has been for over 40 years. We GA pilots, too, pay our share through taxes we pay on the aviation fuel we burn. Together, passenger ticket taxes and GA fuel taxes provide a fair and equitable basis to underwrite total system costs. Enter the airlines . . .
Hmmm . . . so the airlines go to Congress in an attempt to reduce their taxes by shifting the burden to somebody else - like general aviation! Regrettably, some myopic members of Congress appear to be buying into the airlines' heavy-handed, ill-logical argument. Worse, the FAA . . . who works for the Bush Administration, is in bed with the airlines in this surreptitious and grossly unfair transfer of financial responsibility. Politics as usual, folks! The reality is . . . it won't work! Should this unfair plan ever be enacted, general aviation will crumble under its weight. We will simply stop flying due to the horrendous financial burdens placed upon us. Imagine another $.70/gallon in taxes. How about paying $30 for a FSS briefing. Want the ILS? Yep . . . $14! Not only will many of us stop flying, those who remain will curtail any form of recurrent training outside of a simulator. In short . . . we're dead in the water! GA will come to a screeching stop, and so will the supply of future airline pilots! AOPA has a plan
AOPA is tracking the movement of the airlines' destructive plan through the legislative process. They know the influential members of Congress who hold sway over this legislation, and they know when critical votes will take place. AOPA will soon be calling upon each of us to act at the RIGHT time. They will tell us which members of Congress needs to hear from us and when. When that call comes, each of us must be ready to act as instructed. Letters, visits, telephone calls, whatever. We must be ready to descend upon Congress in a unified voice that says NO to proposed user fee changes! AOPA will issue the firing order. When it comes, be ready. Be ready to pull the trigger. Fly safe, Bob
Miller, ATP, CfII When the Engine Stops! Stuff happens . . . . and when it does, will we be ready? Take, for example, an engine failure. It's rare (and often prevented by keeping gas in the tanks), but when it does, what we do in the first few seconds or minutes can spell the difference between an interesting experience and tragedy. Was this Bonanza pilot ready?
Yep . . . the engine sputtered and quit immediately after clearing the trees. According to the NTSB report, "the airplane was observed to enter a steep bank to the left estimated at between 45 to 100 degrees. The nose of the airplane pitched down and two witnesses observed the airplane level out before it collided with the ground." Why the engine quit is a secondary issue for our purposes here. The matter we are concerned with is, why did the airplane stall, then spin into the ground? More importantly, how can we prevent this from occurring to us? The NTSB report is clear. Its probable cause finding is shown below:
So what did he do wrong? The engine quit suddenly at very low altitude. Obstacles were likely looming. Instinctively, the pilot likely pulled back on the yoke in a vain effort to postpone the inevitable. If he pitched up while attempting a steep turn to avoid obstacles or to return to the airport, his stall speed would be far higher than it would have been in level flight. Below is an extract from the accident airplane's Pilot Operating Handbook:
Proper action would have been . . . When the engine quit on the takeoff, there could be only ONE proper action for this pilot to perform. That would be to immediately lower the nose to achieve best glide speed. Allowing or causing the airplane to pitch to its critical angle of attack MUST be avoided! Next, unless above 1,500' to 2,000' AGL when the engine quits, no thought should be given to returning back to the airport. Instead, landing straight ahead or within 30 degrees either side of the extended runway centerline is the only reasonable option . . . regardless of obstacles. Remember, nothing other than a bridge abutment hurts as badly as a stall/spin into the ground! The risks of a stall/spin are far too high! The need for self-preservation is a powerful motivator. Looking out and seeing nothing but obstacles straight ahead often causes the non-proficient pilot to do something he or she shouldn't - like yanking and banking at low altitudes and at low speeds to avoid obstacles or to return to the airport. The Solution . . . Practice, practice, and more practice, at a safe altitude, is the ONLY effective way we can be assured of NOT doing something wrong should the engine fail.
Take your practice to the next step by having an instructor induce sufficient yaw force to put the airplane into the first turn of a spin, then practice recovering before the completion of the first full turn (unless the airplane is spin certified). In summary, how serious is the fatal stall/spin accident scenario? It happens about once a week in the United States! Instant Instrument Scan - The key to safe IFR flight! Below are two instrument panels. Scroll down, look at each, and estimate the amount of time it takes you to determine the flight attitude depicted by each panel. What flight attitude is this airplane in?
What flight attitude is this airplane in?
The good news and bad The first panel displays a simple 45 degree steep turn. Every primary and instrument pilot performs this maneuver on check rides. The second panel displays a diving spiral. Tragically, this is typically the last view of the panel that instrument pilots who lose control of the airplane in the clouds sees before impact. If you required more than a couple of seconds to correctly interpret each of these instrument panels, you could be due for some serious recurrent instrument training. Every instrument student is taught the importance of an effective instrument scan. The reality is, however, it takes many hours of instrument flight to develop an effective instrument scan. Worse, it takes only a couple of weeks to lose it! The single instrument fixation Most non-proficient instrument pilots exhibit a profound tendency to focus or fixate on one instrument for excessive periods of time. Scroll back up and look at the attitude indicator in each of the displayed panels. Each reads roughly the same, yet their corresponding airplanes are in dramatically different flight attitudes. Fixating on this one instrument could ruin your day . . . forever! The key to effective instrument scan
An effective instrument scan requires many hours to acquire and frequent reinforcement to maintain. This, in fact, is the first skill that the instrument pilot loses through even several weeks of not flying on the gauges. To go several months or more without reinforcing one's instrument scan is a license for self-destruction. The antidote, of course, is frequent recurrent training in a REAL airplane in REAL instrument conditions. What about glass instrument panels?
The attitude and heading indicators are much larger, but the moving altimeter and airspeed tapes are, in fact, smaller than conventional gauges. Having all critical flight parameters overlaying the horizon dramatically improves our ability to see and interpret the information. It still requires lots of practice to assimilate all of this information in ways that help us to control the airplane in the clouds. Glass panels have, in fact, been criticized by some as giving us MORE information that we can reasonably manage. Kill the autopilot! While powerful labor savers, excessive dependence upon the autopilot have cost us far too many lives. Climbing up and through the muck while our cockpit technology controls the airplane is not a whole lot different than riding in the back of an airliner. Sure, we're responsible to keep an eye on things, but it does nothing for our ability to control the airplane solely by reference to the gauges. Once we lose this precious skill (and it only takes a few weeks of non instrument flying), we wind up placing our lives in the hands of often finicky technology. FAA Airmen Records
You can do all of these things and more right online. Click HERE to link on to the FAA's Airmen Certification Branch in Oklahoma City. Instrument Approach to Minimums
Few things other than, say, a traffic collision alert or rapidly accumulating ice, evoke the emotions of an instrument pilot quite like getting ready to fly an instrument approach down to minimums. The reason is simple. The margins for error are nearly non-existent. Racing down in the clag a couple hundred feet above the trees or buildings is NO place for the non-proficient instrument pilot to be. What can we do to minimize the likelihood of error? What can we do to avoid screwing up an instrument approach? In a word, preparation! While obvious to the reader reading this on a computer screen, adequate pre-approach preparation is often the cause of tragic mishaps.
Answer: Sure . . . before we take off! Sitting in a warm FBO with a cup of coffee and an oatmeal cookie is the best time to begin the approach procedure briefing. What is the weather at the destination? What approaches are available? Are they all up and working (NOTAMs)? Big question? Do I have the requisite approach plates? Don't be surprised by this question. Pilots occasionally transition from the enroute phase of the flight without the correct plates in their bag! Yep, my dog ate my instrument plates! In-flight approach briefing begins15 minutes out . . .
We then begin a systematic briefing. There are many ways to do this. I have long used the "Approach" mnemonic as illustrated in the box below. This system catches all of the major and minor elements of an instrument approach plate.
Turning on to the Final Approach Course By now, everything should be in order. The approach plate has been fully briefed. We're hearing the Morse code identifier for the localizer or VOR and the dots and dashes check out. Our attention shifts to a centering the localizer or VOR needle.
Our next fix, in most cases, is the final approach fix (FAF). As we pass over this fix, we confirm our altitude and run our pre-landing checklist. That's it . . . . we're done with checklists, configuration changes, trim and power adjustments by the time we depart the FAF. Our job now is to keep the needle(s) centered and count down the time and feet remaining, in hundreds, to the DA or MDA. Our reward, of course, is an awaiting runway just ahead and below. As we settle down on the runway, we pat ourselves on the back and say, "Well done!" Clearly, there is more than one way to skin the instrument cat. Do it right or do it wrong. It's all a matter of proper instruction and lots of practice. Left Turning Tendencies - Beware!!
Imagine rolling down the runway in marginal VFR or IFR conditions or at night in an airplane at maximum gross weight. As you climb, you fail to notice your slowly declining airspeed. You also fail to apply sufficient right rudder to offset your airplane's natural left turning tendencies. Instead, you remain focused solely upon maintaining a wings level climb attitude with yoke or stick. A buffeting sensation is felt. You attribute it to choppy or turbulent air. Suddenly, one wing falls out from under you. Your passengers scream. Your mind is suddenly frozen in fear. What happened? While we proficient pilots appreciate the safety significance of coordinated (ball centered) flight, there are others who missed this point in their training. These hapless folks fail to understand that fatal spins can easily result when an uncoordinated airplane stalls. Enter the left turning tendencies . . . Let's take a moment to review why most single engine piston airplanes require lots of right rudder on takeoff to maintain coordinated flight. 1 - The Twisting Torque Effect:
Torque effect is easily observed in your automobile when looking into the engine compartment while somebody accelerates the engine (when it is not in gear, of course.) The engine appears to twist slightly from side to side. This is the reaction of the engine block in response to the action of the accelerating crankshaft. The same twisting action occurs in single engine airplanes as the engine is accelerated. The engine block's twisting action caused by an accelerating crankshaft (with attached propeller) pulls the airplane to the left. 2 - Asymmetrical loading of propeller (P-factor)
A careful look at the adjacent illustration reveals that the downward turning propeller blade takes a bigger "bite" out of the air than the upward turning blade. Since the downward turning blade (on the right side as viewed from the pilot's seat) creates more thrust than the upward turning blade on the left side, it "pulls" the nose around to the left. 3 - Corkscrew Slipstream Effect
The high-speed rotation of an airplane propeller gives a corkscrew or spiraling rotation to the slipstream. At high propeller speeds and low forward speed (as in the takeoffs and approaches to power-on stalls), this spiraling rotation is very compact and exerts a strong sideward force on the airplane’s vertical tail surface. When this spiraling slipstream strikes the vertical fin on the left, it causes a left turning moment about the airplane’s vertical axis. The more compact the spiral, the more prominent this force is. As the forward speed increases, however, the spiral elongates and becomes less effective. 4 - Gyroscopic effect The rotating propeller makes a very good gyroscope and thus has similar properties. Any time a force is applied to deflect the propeller out of its plane of rotation, the resulting force is 90° ahead of and in the direction of rotation, causing a pitching moment, a yawing moment, or a combination of the two depending upon the point at which the force was applied.
The left turning resultant force from the gyroscopic precession occurs when the tail comes up (or nose comes down) and the common textbook example is the tail coming up when a tail dragger is taking off. When the nose comes up in a tricycle gear airplane at rotation there is a right turning resultant force during the brief period that the pitch is changing. In summary, the combined effect of the left turning tendencies can exert enough yawing force on a climbing airplane to convert a simple stall into a sudden spin. When this happens close to the ground, the results are nearly always fatal. The solution, of course, is to always keep the ball in the inclinometer centered! Dramatic Bail-Out Video!!!
Click HERE to view a classic video of Kevin Eldridge bailing out of his burning Corsair during the first annual Phoenix Air Races. After viewing this remarkable video, click HERE to read the details of how this F4U-1 Corsair warbird was outfitted with a 4,000 horsepower Pratt and Whitney R-4360 and had its wings clipped for the race! Even more dramatic is Eldridge's account of how he managed to get of this burning airplane while traveling at over 400 knots! Our thanks for the good folks on the AVSIG board for posting this dramatic video and story. Banking . . . the Precursor to Unexpected Flight Attitudes!
The controls get mushy. The airplane begins to buffet as the wings' angle of attack approaches the critical attack angle where a stall will occur. Now add some banking . . . Adding 30 degrees bank or more to the above scenario begins to change things significantly. The green arc of the airspeed indicator now becomes useless as a measure of safe operating range. As illustrated in the graphic below, banking increases the load factor. And when the load factor increases, so does the stall speed!
Here's the scenario . . . We are maneuvering solely by reference to the instruments. While changing headings, we notice a loss of altitude, so we pitch up. WHAM! The nose suddenly drops. Our altimeter begins unwinding and the noise of air rushing our airframe increases. We pull back harder on the yoke, but this worsens the problem. We're now in a spiral dive! What happened? What happened? For whatever reason, we elected to commence a turn. Distracted, perhaps, by accumulating ice or even by a talking passenger, we fixated on the heading indicator to the exclusion of our other instruments. We were unaware of our steepening bank angle. Hearing the sound of increasing wind over the airframe, we glanced at our airspeed indicator (increasing). Our focus then shifted to the altimeter and vertical speed indicator (decreasing). Unaware of that our bank angle reached 80 degrees, we pulled back aggressively on the yoke to stop any further loss in altitude. As we did so, our indicated airspeed dropped to 90 knots. Enter Load Factor! Looking at the chart below, we see that an 80 degree bank angle produces a 6G load factor.
As every student pilot should know, stall speed increases in proportion to the square root of the load factor. In this case, the square root of the 6 G load factor equals 2.44. When we multiply our normal, wings level stall speed of 40KIAS by 2.44, our calculated new stall speed is 97KIAS. Factoring in a 6G load factor, it is easy to understand how we entered a stall at 90KIAS. That's what caused the nose to suddenly drop. If our turn was uncoordinated, an aggravated stall resulted (spin)! We exacerbated the problem by continually pulling back on the yoke to arrest our rapidly decreasing altitude. This caused our deeply banked airplane to enter an ever-tightening descending turn which quickly turned into a grave-yard spiral! In summary, the obvious defense against the above described scenario is an effective instrument scan. Distractions in the cockpit can disrupt this scan. When this happens, trouble will follow! Like everything we read here and in other publications, real learning will not occur until we get out and replicate this scenario in a real airplane with an experienced instructor aboard. This scenario, in fact, should be practiced at least twice annually. It should certainly be included in every flight review and instrument proficiency check. Non-Current Instrument Pilot Ignores CFI's Warnings . . .
After completing the BFR, the CFI conducting both said that they did not complete an IPC because "the pilot's performance under the hood indicated a need for (more) instrument training." The CFI said that the pilot did not return to him for additional instrument training and he was not aware of the pilot receiving any instrument training subsequent to their flight. In fact, his logbook revealed only 117 total hours over the previous six years, all of which were in the same Cessna 172. Six months later this pilot, still not IFR current, called the Buffalo, NY Flight Service Station and requested a weather briefing for a flight from from Rochester, NY to Morgantown, WV. He said to the specialist, "I'd rather go VFR but I can go IFR." Because of the reported weather, he filed an IFR flight plan. The weather . . . The weather reported along his route of flight was scattered clouds at 3,500 feet with ceilings broken at 4,500 feet and 6,500 feet respectively. The temperature was 51 degrees and the dew point was 46 degrees. Then the unexpected happened! Enroute, the pilot radioed the Clarksburg Approach Control and amended his destination to Charleston, West Virginia. Clarksburg Approach then instructed him to climb from 5,000 feet and to maintain 6,000 feet. Shortly thereafter, the pilot called Clarksburg Approach and reported that he had "...lost power."The airplane was approximately 5,500 feet heading 220 degrees. The controller advised the pilot that Morgantown Airport was ". . . at your 6 o'clock and 5 miles." The controller
advised the pilot to turn left to a heading of 020 degrees
and repeated the instructions. The pilot responded, "I
hear you and I'm making a left turn to . . . what heading?"
The controller repeated the instructions and the pilot
acknowledged, "...020 degrees." The controller again advised a left turn to 020 degrees. The controller then issued a low altitude alert and a heading change to avoid a tower. After a delay, the pilot responded, "I cannot make the airport...I've got a field picked out if I can make it." No further calls were received from N9388G. The crash site . . . The wreckage path was oriented 070 degrees on rising terrain. The left wing was separated from the fuselage but still attached by cables. The empennage and tail section were folded forward over the roof of the airplane. The engine and firewall were pushed up and aft. The
instrument panel was destroyed and forced aft into the
cockpit area. The right hand-grip of the left control yoke
was broken off. The forward cabin floor in the area of the
rudder pedals at both pilot stations was forced aft into the
cockpit. Okay . . . what happened? The accident chain here is long. It began six months earlier, of course, when the accident pilot ignored his flight instructor's suggestion that he receive more instrument training. Second, the accident pilot filed an instrument flight plan even though he was neither current nor proficient. This act of apparent self-deluding, impulsive behavior likely happens in the real world far many more times than we realize. Third, when his engine failed, ATC was quick to point the hapless pilot in the direction of the nearest airport, which was less than five miles away. A quick reference to the C-172 POH reveals that this make/model airplane has a 10 to 1 glide ration. At 5,000', he could have easily made the suggested airport. Curiously, the controller had to issue repeated heading reminders before the pilot commenced his turn. It was this delay that cost him precious time and ultimately his life. The good news/bad news of the instrument rating! There is no question that the pursuit and receipt of an instrument rating makes us all better pilots. We learn the finer points of trimming, instrument cross-check, interpretation, and aircraft control, and we become far more aware of the vagaries of the national airspace system. From a more practical perspective, our dispatch rate (percentage of times we can fly due to weather issues) increases dramatically. The bad news is, frankly, a killer. An instrument rating in the hands of a non-current, non-proficient pilot is a license to kill, pure and simple. As the accident pilot in this article discovered, he possessed neither the instrument skills (as told to him by his flight instructor) nor the legal authority (because he was not instrument current) to file and fly on an instrument flight plan. His actions, in this regard, cost him his life. Far to common a scenario! The FAA's Airman Certification Branch tells us that about 50% of all GA pilots are instrument rated. What the FAA cannot tells us, is what percentage of instrument rated pilots are legally current and/or proficient on the gauges. My guess is, less than 10 or 15% . . . . seriously. The FAA addressed this serious skill deficiency recently by reducing the requirements for remaining "legally" current (removal of the 6 hour rule). This action was no different than giving a drunk coffee before allowing him to drive! While this stroke of regulatory change made more instrument pilots "legal," it did nothing for their proficiency. Personal question: Instrument rated pilots - Could you pass the instrument knowledge, oral, and practical test today?
Crosswind Landing Fears!
While certainly justified when the winds are howling, good crosswind instruction and lots of practice can dramatically increase our number of flyable days. Why crosswind landings scare us! Crosswind landings scare us because they are counter-intuitive to what we learned in driver education. When an automobile starts to skid on the highway, we are taught and subsequently conditioned to turn the wheel into the direction of the skid.
Picture in your mind what happens to our airplane while on short final with a direct crosswind from the left. The wind presses against our vertical stabilizer (tail), which pushes the nose to the left. Looking out the windscreen, we get the impression that our airplane is skidding, just like an automobile skidding on the ice. Instinctively (as in driving a car), we turn the wheel to the right.
The correct procedure! Unlike our skid response in an automobile, in airplanes we deliberately turn away from the direction of the skid. With a "gusty" crosswind from the left (which, again, pushes our tail right and our nose left), we turn (bank) to the left. We call this "leaning into the wind." See the illustration below.
By leaning into the crosswind and correcting with opposite rudder, we keep the upwind wing down, thereby preventing the "gusty" crosswind from upsetting the airplane. Again, the turn is just the opposite of what we've been conditioned to do in a skidding automobile. The follow through . . . Flying airplanes is a lot like playing golf. The landing isn't finished until the follow-through is complete. Once the airplane is down on the runway, we must continue leaning (banking) into the crosswind until coming to a complete stop.
The illustration on the left shows what happens if we fail to continue leaning (banking) into the wind and correcting with opposite rudder on the landing roll-out. Note how the wind from the right gets under the right wing and forces the left (downwind) wing to strike the runway surface! This is easily avoided, of course, by holding the yoke or stick into the wind until coming to a complete stop. Like all such lessons, reading and doing are two different things. Get out and practice crosswind landings using the techniques described herein. When all else fails . . . Go Around! Crosswind landing should not be thought of as "all or nothing" exercises. Instead, we should always be conditioned to go around anytime anything in the landing sequence is not quite right. If we are unable to correct for the crosswind effect on our landing airplane, advance the throttle smartly and go around. If we can't get in on the second or third attempt, go to a neighboring airport where the runway is more inline with the prevailing winds. Emergency Simulations Close to the Ground - A formula for disaster!
The note said, "180 degree Pwr Off Lndg [and] Eng Fail after T/O & RTN." The CFI and his student left the classroom and climbed into a Super Decathlon to practice what they apparently discussed on the ground. A witness reported observing the airplane on its takeoff roll. After the airplane became airborne, it climbed at an estimated 45-degree nose up pitch attitude. The witness stated that the airplane climbed between 300 and 400 feet above the ground, whereupon it appeared to stall. Another witness said that the airplane made a steep left bank and looked as though it was out of control. As the airplane descended in a nose down attitude, it completely reversed its direction. The airplane burst into flames seconds after crashing into the ground. Training scenarios gone wrong! The instructor aboard the accident aircraft was no young kid with a fresh CFI certificate in his pocket. As is often the case with such bold simulations, this fellow was a 6,000 hour former military pilot with an airline transport pilot certificate with a DC-9 type rating. The annals of aviation accident history are filled with accounts of training scenarios gone wrong. When they go wrong close to the ground, the results are generally bad.
Simulated engine out returns to the airport is one of the most common simulations having bad outcomes. Even in a very capable and highly maneuverable airplane like a Super Decathlon, in the hands of a skilled pilot, cannot do the impossible. With insufficient airspeed and altitude it, like all airplanes, cannot make the required turn to the runway. Practice engine failures after takeoff at safe altitudes!!
Rather than practicing this exercise close to the ground, climb to 3,000' AGL or more. Achieve level slow flight at a precise altitude. Advance to full throttle and establish a normal climb rate. Then retard the engine to idle, note the altitude, then initiate a 90/270 degree turn back to an imaginary runway. Note the total altitude loss in this maneuver. Downwind landing complicates the maneuver!
Aside from the obvious risks of a stall/spin when making an
emergency return to the airport, keep in mind that you will
be making a downwind landing from an unstabilized approach.
You might survive the turn, but lose it all on the higher
than normal landing speed.
Take a group of 118 pilots with ages ranging from 40 to 69 years and who have 300 to 15,000 hours. Run each of these pilots through an aggressive series of flight simulator exercises. These exercises test communications, traffic avoidance, scanning cockpit instruments, and landing skills. Repeat this study annually for three years. Would you expect the younger pilots to perform better than the older ones? Do younger pilots perform better than older ones? Do older pilots with advanced pilot ratings perform better than younger pilots without them? These are just a couple of questions that a group of researchers set out to answer. Their study was supported by the Sierra-Pacific Mental Illness Research, Education, and Clinical Center, the Medical Research Service of the Department of Veteran Affairs, and the National Institute on Aging.
The research team concluded that "these longitudinal findings support previous cross-sectional studies in aviation as well as non-aviation domains, which demonstrated the advantageous effect of prior experience and specialized expertise on older adults' skilled cognitive performances." An abstract of this study can be found HERE. What does this study tell us? As in all such studies, the findings are only as accurate as the research protocols used. Lots of contaminating factors can negate the findings of improperly designed and conducted research. Assuming it was designed and conducted properly, this study does confirm the obvious. Young minds act faster than older ones. Experience and specialized expertise in older pilots trumps younger pilots with little experience or specialized expertise. So what are the qualifications of a "perfect" flight instructor? Answer: The "perfect" flight instructor would be a wisdom-filled 18,000 hour pilot who is 19 years old!
In reality, our
ability as airmen represents a trade-off of factors.
The only uncontrollable factor, of course is age.
Therefore, if experience and specialized expertise trumps
youth, it stands to reason that as each of us ages, we
pursue specific steps to acquire more experience (fly more)
and to acquire more specialized expertise (additional pilot
ratings and certificates). Fly safe, Bob
Miller, ATP, CfII
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Unless you've
been spending too much time in an unheated hangar, the
subject of "user fees" should be familiar term to
anyone with a pilot certificate. It
means, simply, burdening us GA pilots with the bulk of
the cost of underwriting future FAA operations.
The
airlines are strapped for cash. They cannot
control labor costs. They cannot control
maintenance costs. They cannot control fuel costs.
They cannot afford to replace their aging fleet of
airplanes. Maybe there is something inherently wrong with
airline management (but that's another story).
While
OTA
has been an occasional thorn in the side of AOPA and its
Air Safety Foundation (ASF), AOPA is primed and ready,
with our help, to kill this absurd abuse of the power to
tax.
Last
September, the pilot of a Beech F-33A took off with two
passengers from Alabaster, AL. 
Go out and practice slow flight in wings
level and in banked flight. Become proficient in stall
recovery. Practice accelerated (banked) stalls.
The
ability to take a mental snapshot of the six flying
instruments and instantly process the information is
central to safe instrument flight. This is a
form of mental conditioning for which, unfortunately, there
are no shortcuts. 
We've
accumulated enough experience with glass panels to suggest
that this technology does NOT afford automatic immunity
against getting disoriented in the clouds. 
Question:
When does the approach preparation
begin?
Fifteen
minutes out
is where the serious in-flight approach briefing begins. We have
the ATIS (or ASOS/AWOS). We know what approach is in
use (or the approach we plan to use), and we mount the
correct plate on our kneeboard. 
Our
margins for error begin to narrow quickly as we ease
ourselves down the final approach course at the proper
altitudes. 
There
is a reason why parachutes are required for aerobatic flight
and when engaged in air racing events. And we
have the video to prove it!
Every primary pilot understands the
challenges of operating at minimal controllable airspeed
(MCA). Holding altitude while operating at the
bottom of the green arc on the airspeed indicator can be a
handful. 
It
was a classic case of apparent pilot arrogance or ineptness.
This 2,000 hour, IFR rated, but not instrument current,
Cessna 172 pilot underwent a flight review (BFR)
and an instrument proficient check (IPC). 
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sign up for
Over the Airwaves
Want
to know the #1 reason why people cancel flights? Yep -
it's crosswinds at the airport. Unlike thunderstorms,
low ceilings, or poor visibility, winds are nearly always
with us.
This
works in automobiles but it produces disastrous results in airplanes!
Whoa!
This is a very bad thing to do in this airborne scenario.
Turning the wheel (yoke or stick) to the right causes our
left wing to rise. This exposes the left wing's
underside to the full force of the crosswind. An upset
close to the ground is sure to result!
The
whiteboard in the training classroom at the Oroville
Municipal Airport, Oroville, California gave a hint of what was
about to happen. 
Achieving
realism when designing and conducting simulated emergencies
is important, but realism can be dangerous if it leaves
little or no "backdoors." 
The results of this
study were published in the February 27, 2007, issue of
Neurology®, the scientific journal of the American Academy
of Neurology, show expert knowledge may offset the impact of
old age in some occupations.
