Sunday,  March 25, 2007                                           Vol. IV No. 6 
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Welcome to the Over the Airwaves aviation journal.  This complimentary bi-weekly e-mailing is being sent to pilots and aviation enthusiasts around the world.  Its aim is to promote flight safety, encourage students and new pilots, and to build enthusiasm for aviation in general. 
 
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"The sea is dangerous and its storms terrible, but these obstacles have never been sufficient reason to remain ashore. . . . Unlike the mediocre, intrepid spirits seek victory over those things that seem impossible. . . . It is with an iron will that they embark on the most daring of all endeavors. . . . to meet the shadowy future without fear and conquer the unknown."

— Ferdinand Magellan, circa 1520

Dear Pilots and Aviation Enthusiasts:      

Picking our Battles!!

Like so many people in our fast-paced society, we pilots have more battles than we can possibly afford to wage.  The airline guys continue to fight wage and benefit reductions.  We GA pilots are looking square in the face of user fee-induced hikes in our operating costs.

GA aircraft manufacturers have their battles, too.  Cirrus Design, for example, will likely spend endless months in court because of folks like Melanie Lidle.  It was Ms. Lidle's attorney who recently filed a far-fetched product liability and negligence suit against Cirrus Design. 

The suit alleges that a catastrophic failure in the airplane's control system prevented it from making tight turns.  This caused Lidle and his flight instructor to crash into a New York City apartment building.  With litigation like this, we wonder why new airplanes cost so much!

Rising fuel prices is no small battle either.  When it costs $250 or more to fill up a four-seat trainer, pilots begin to wonder if it is worth it! 

Lower profile battles . . .

Then there are numerous lower profile battles that we in the flight training community face.   They include the continued employment by flight schools of inept, immature, questionably skilled, judgment-challenged, and insensitive CFIs standing in line for airline jobs.  Many of these ego-centric CFIs are largely responsible for our over 50% flight student dropout rate.

These lower profile battles also include the continued inclusion of no longer relevant questions on knowledge tests to probe the depths of our ability to meet the rigors of whatever rating or certificate we are pursuing. 

With the vast amount of information we must know to operate safely in today's national airspace system, the equipping of new pilots with antiquated knowledge tools we will never use is, well, shameful.

The list continues . . .

In reality, there are as many battles to fight within the GA community as there are pilots.  Each of us has one gripe or another.  Hanging around the coffee pot in a warm hangar or airport office provides ample proof of this.

Some of our battles are so profound that large multi-million dollar pilot memberships organizations have been formed to fight them for us.  But that's okay . . . many of these battles do require formidable armies to win.

But there is one battle that we GA pilots must fight alone!

When we get up in the morning and survey the state of general aviation, there is one battle that we must fight alone.  This battle ground is located in the gray matter between our ears.  Its combatants are our perceptions and reality.

Our perceptions tell us we're okay as pilots.   Our perceptions tell us that our skills, learned long ago, are still as sharp as ever.  They tell us that we can still make sound aeronautical decisions.  They remind us that everything we're about to do today, we did safely in the past.   They tell us that we're okay as pilots.

The other combatant is reality.  Reality is the unpleasant fact than non-proficient pilots die in airplanes . . . nearly every day (on average).  Our perceptions tell us that it can't happen to us.  Tragically, it does!

This battle need not be lost . .  .

Winning the perceptions versus reality battle requires an ongoing commitment to frequent flying and annual recurrent training.  

Sure, lot of things stand in our way of winning this battle.  Money, time, family obligations, weather, whatever.  As a result, we begin to lose ground, slowly at first.  As the days turn into weeks and weeks into months, our inactivity leaves us dangerously unprepared for the challenges we'll face the next time we climb into the cockpit.

Fortunately, it does not take much to win the battle of perceptions versus reality.  The first step is to recognize that we have lost some precious skills and that our aeronautical decision-making ability may be tarnished.

Next, we need to engage an experienced flight instructor and schedule several hours of "tune-up" work.  Traffic patterns, slow flight, stalls, spin awareness, GPS navigation, and radio communications is a good place to start.  Make such "tune-up" exercises an annual event.   For the instrument pilot, these "tune-up" exercises involve lots of partial panel work, diversions, and circling approaches in actual IFR conditions.

No, we'll never be able to fight all the battles.  This leaves us no choice but to pick carefully the ones we do need to fight.  The best place to start is that battleground between our ears!  Once that battle is won, we can pick up our swords and shields and look for others to wage.
 

Fly safe,

Bob Miller, ATP, CfII
rjma@rjma.com
716-864-8100

 

Spring Rains and Wet Runways - Beware!

It doesn't take much water on the runway to turn an airplane temporarily into boat!  That's because of a unique phenomenon called "dynamic hydroplaning."

Dynamic hydroplaning is a condition in which the airplane tires ride on a thin sheet of water rather than on the runway’s surface. Because hydroplaning wheels are not touching the runway, braking and directional control are almost nil.

Tire pressure is a factor in dynamic hydroplaning. By the simple formula shown in the adjacent graphic, we can calculate the minimum speed, in knots, at which hydroplaning will begin.

In plain language, the minimum hydroplaning speed is determined by multiplying the square root of the main gear tire pressure in pounds per square inch (p.s.i.), by nine.  For example, if the main gear tire pressure is at 36 pounds per square inch, the airplane would begin hydroplaning at 54 knots.

Landing at higher than recommended touchdown speeds exposes the airplane to a greater potential for hydroplaning.  Once hydroplaning starts, it can continue well below the minimum, initial hydroplaning speed.

When the runway is wet, anticipate braking problems well before landing and be prepared for hydroplaning.  Select a suitable runway most aligned with the wind.  Mechanical braking may be ineffective, so aerodynamic braking should be used to its fullest advantage.

 

Losing it the last minute on the ILS!

Not surprisingly, the most challenging part of any instrument flight is often the final approach to landing.  And the most demanding portion of the final approach is the last couple hundred feet to the decision height (DH) or missed approach point (MAP).   When mistakes are made here, the outcome is often tragic.

In February, 2005, a 395 hour, instrument rated pilot flying a Columbia 400, with three passengers aboard, lost it right at DH last year while attempting an ILS approach to minimums at the Stafford Regional Airport in Virginia.

All four people perished in the accident.

Could Fatigue have been a factor?

As is often the case, the accident occurred at the end of what was probably a long day for the pilot.  They had been returning from a night basketball game in Winston-Salem, NC.  The weather along the route was IFR.  

Their originally intended destination was the Fredericksburg-Shannon Airport in Virginia.  After flying the GPS approach to this airport and executing the published missed approach procedure, the pilot called Potomac Approach and requested to be re-cleared to the Stafford Regional Airport. 

Weather at Stafford was no better than at Shannon, but they have an ILS procedure with a 200' decision height.  So far, so go.  The decisions were correct. 

The only thing working against the pilot, other than the weather, was his possible fatigue.   As a low time pilot operating a sophisticated airplane,  he had his hands full.  In any case, he was cleared for the ILS Runway 33 approach to Shannon.

According to the NTSB report, things we going along fine as the aircraft intercepted the localizer and slithered down the glideslope.  According to the FAA's recorded radar track, the pilot was on the localizer right down to 300' above the airport elevation.  Then he apparently lost it!  The airplane hit trees 300 yards to the left and about 3/4ths down the 5,000' runway. 

Weather - "Misty and nasty"

The weather at the airport was calm winds, 1 1/4 statue miles visibility, light drizzle, an overcast ceiling at 500 feet, temperature 41 degrees F, dew point 37 degrees F.

The wife of one of the passengers, who went to the airport that evening, noted that it was a "misty, nasty night."   There were also spots with fog, and a fog layer above her.  When a police cruiser with flashing lights went out on the tarmac, she could initially see it, but she soon lost it in the fog.

Could autopilot dependence have been a factor?

Unfortunately, without the infamous black box and cockpit voice recorder, we will never know what actually transpired in the cockpit during the final seconds before the crash. 

One area that has been a constant concern to me with low time pilots flying sophisticated airplanes is their dependence upon the autopilot to fly instrument approaches.

In this fatal accident scenario, had the pilot been flying an autopilot coupled approach, he would have had to "kill" the autopilot shortly before or upon reaching the decision height.  An immediate transition to "hand flying" would then be required to either land or fly the missed approach procedure.

Again for emphasis, we have no clue about what actually transpired on this fatal flight, but had the pilot fumbled only a split second in this fast airplane when transitioning from autopilot to hand flying while descending down through 200'AGL (or less), he could easily find himself in the trees! 

Lessons learned . . .

There is only one reason for recounting any tragic accident here in OTA and that is that we might learn something from it.  In this case, we can infer several learning points that benefit all pilots, both low and high time. 

Fatigue:

Physical or mental fatigue can instantly turn an otherwise proficient instrument pilot into a rank beginner!  The information we need to process and the judgment and skills required to fly an instrument approach down to minimums demands PEAK human performance.  Anything short of this, particularly when racing over the trees and buildings at 200' above the ground, is like flying the final couple hundred feet blindfolded!

Autopilot Dependence:

If I could have my way, autopilots on GA aircraft should automatically disconnect at the final approach fix.  Perhaps this is an extreme solution, but it might have saved the day for these folks.   Remember, too, if we are unable to hand fly the airplane from the FAF to the runway, we have no business depending upon the autopilot to fly it for us.

We pilots with autopilot equipped airplanes ought to routinely hand fly the entire approach at least once out of every three instrument approaches.

Missing the Missed:

The first word in 99% of all missed approach instructions is CLIMB (in the other 1%, the first word is IMMEDIATELY).   We must be "spring-loaded" to execute the missed approach procedure upon reaching the decision height (DH) or missed approach point (MAP). 

Similarly, we must be ready to execute the missed anytime either the localizer or glideslope needle goes full scale when inside the final approach fix (FAF).  While it's tempting to make gross heading and altitude corrections between the FAF and the runway, the margins are too close for a safe outcome every time.  

Remember, if we're routinely having trouble with needles between the FAF and the runway, it's more important that we get with an experienced CFII and get that problem fixed.

Faulty Personal Minimums:

One last and very important lesson.  This has to do with "Personal Minimums."  Many less than proficient pilots take comfort in establishing their own personal minimums.   While fine in theory, take a closer look at this accident.  

The reported weather at Stafford was 1 1/4th mile visibility and a 500 foot ceiling.  This is well above the published ILS approach minimums for this airport.  

Witnesses on the ground, however, reported that the fog was so thick, emergency vehicles with flashing lights could NOT be seen crossing the runway.   In all likely event, the pilot of the ill-fated aircraft encountered unexpected  fog while on short final.  So much for personal minimums!

Cell Phone Use on the Approach:

One troubling aspect of this scenario is the NTSB's reporting (see link below) that one of the passengers used a cell phone while on the approach just two minutes prior to ATC's of terminating radar services. 

Could this use of an electronic device have possibly interfered with the localizer/glideslope signal?  Remember, such use while in IFR conditions is prohibited under FAR 91.21(2).

Law Suits:

No listing of lessons learned from fatal accidents would be complete without including the inevitability of law suits.  There are law firms who specialize in handling aviation accidents.  They read the daily NTSB reports, then swoop down on the family members of victims, promising them quick and easy cash for their heartaches. 

Flying with your best buddies?  Unfortunately, its not our buddies who sue.  It's their family members!

In summary, there are dozens of things that can complicate our proficiency when flying an instrument approach to minimums.   Proper planning and approach preparation is the key to success! 

NTSB Report

 

Pitch vs. Power

If you want to light a fire under a group of pilots, try tossing the pitch vs. power subject into the conversation.  The result will be an exchange of circuitous logic where neither side of the debate wins or loses.

When descending down the ILS, for example, the question will be, "Do I set the power, then alter pitch to keep me on the glideslope (GS)?"   Or, perhaps, "Do I set the pitch then, then alter power to keep me on the GS?"

The answer is . . . BOTH!

Let's say our objective is to remain firmly centered on the GS (as it should be).  Should we drop below the GS, we can increase pitch which, of course, will cause our airspeed to reduce.  When airspeed drops, lift is reduced.  This means we must add power to increase airspeed.  As the aircraft speeds up, lift is increased.

To keep from climbing above the GS, we must lower the pitch to reduce the angle of attack. 

If we want the aircraft to decelerate while remaining on the GS, power must be decreased.  As the aircraft slows down, lift is reduced.  Then we must increase the pitch in order to increase the angle of attack.

The reverse is also true.  If we want to increase airspeed while on the GS, power must be increased to overcome drag.  As the aircraft speeds up, lift is increased.  Then we must decrease pitch in order to decrease the angle of attack.

Clearly, then, the most precise method of controlling flight path is to use pitch and power to remain on the GS at the desired airspeed.

And we wonder why the pitch vs. power debate continues.  The truth is, power and pitch are inter-related when it comes to remaining on the GS.  One without the other simply will not work.

 

OTA Articles Published Monthly in Atlantic Flyer

Just in case you are not getting enough of OTA on your computer screen, you can pick up any monthly issue of Atlantic Flyer and find OTA articles published there as well.

Atlantic Flyer is a popular general aviation newspaper that is distributed through over 850 airports throughout the United States. 

 

Keeping the Spark Alive!

The mag check is as basic to piston engine flying as is looking into the mirror before leaving home in the morning.   It is a ritual seldom ever forgotten by even the most careless pilot.  But what we are really looking for when we perform this mag check . . . and why?

What are we looking for?

It is fairly common knowledge, even among beginning pilots, that each cylinder in a piston engine has two sparkplugs . . . for two reasons.   One reason is for improved combustion;  the other is for redundancy.

In addition, there are two independent magnetos that send electrical impulses to the sparkplugs.  These electrical impulses create the spark that ignites the fuel in each cylinder.

One sparkplug from each cylinder is connected to the right magneto and the other sparkplug is connected to the left magneto.  Both magnetos are "ON" during normal operation.

What to look for in the mag check . . .

Engines operate more efficiently with two sparkplugs igniting the fuel/air mixture in each cylinder.  Under normal circumstances, we will see a 50 to 75 RPM drop when we turn off either the right or left mag.

When we switch to left or right mag Diagnosis
50 to 75 RPM Drop Normal operation
Drop greater than 75 RPM Worn mag or fouled plug(s).
No RPM drop "Hot Mag" - both are still operating even though we have attempted to turn one off.
Engine quits Bad mag.

What to do with an abnormal mag check

Like so many other things in aviation, it depends!  An excessive RPM drop is the most common abnormal response to a mag check.  This is typically an indication of one or more fouled plugs.  Aggressive leaning during the high RPM run-up will occasionally solve this problem.

If the engine runs normally on either mag after this lean run-up, we should be good to go.  Be sure, of course, to switch on BOTH mags before launching.

What if we get no RPM drop?   Hmmm. . . likely this means that the "P" lead to one or the mags is broken.  This can be confirmed by turning the ignition switch to "off."  If the engine continues to run, it's likely the "P" lead.  Get it fixed before launching.  

Lastly, what if the engine quits when we switch to either mag?  This is a sure indication that the mag we switched to is bad.  Obviously, DON'T fly!

A word or two about doing engine run-ups . . .

I was standing on the ramp of a neighboring airport on a cold morning recently when a flight instructor and student boarded a Piper Arrow.  I heard the word "CLEAR," followed by engine start. 

Almost instantly, I heard the engine accelerate to high RPM as the CFI was apparently demonstrating how to perform a mag check.  "Ouch," I said to myself.  Instead, this was a lesson on how to abuse a cold engine!

Second, I watched people walking behind this airplane grab their hats and coats as ramp dust and debris was blown across their path!

The message here is simple.  Engine run-ups and mag checks should never be performed on COLD engines.  Instead, allow sufficient time for the oil temperature to rise into the "green" on the gauge or at least 100d F.

Next . . . perform engine run-ups and mag checks ONLY in designated run-up areas.  If none are indicated, taxi close to the departure runway and perform them there.

In summary, piston engines require three elements to operate: (1) fuel; (2) air; and (3) a spark.  Properly diagnosing our magneto system is a basic requirement of safe flight.

 

Night Currency . . . more than a legal requirement!

Has it been a while since you have done any night flying?  Day and night, it's all the same, right?   Maybe yes, maybe no.  Like so many other aspects of aviation, it depends.

For example, let's take a sophisticated single like a Piper Cherokee Six.  Pile in three friends and fly to a nearby airport for dinner.   Do you see any problem so far?   Weather you ask?  VFR.   This flight had all of the makings of a wonderful evening of enjoyment on this September 10th evening in 2005.

The missing pieces

Now let's fill in the missing pieces.  First, the big piece.  The pilot had not flown at night at any time in the previous 16 years.  In fact, the pilot had only logged a total of 7 hours in the previous 16 years!  Those 7 hours were received 2 months earlier as part of an insurance checkout on his recently purchased Piper Cherokee Six and an biennial flight review (BFR) that was included as part of that checkout. 

His total time of 150 hours were logged in the three year span from 1987, when he earned his private pilot certificate, to 1990.

Back to the flight . . .

Winds on the evening of this flight were reported at 130 degrees at 3 knots;  visibility was 6 miles with haze;  the sky was clear and the temperature was 23 degrees Celsius and dew point 17 degrees Celsius.  According to the U.S. Naval Observatory, 41-percent of the moon's visible disk was illuminated.

The flight began in
Rochester, Indiana at 8:40pm of September 10, 2005.  The pilot and three friends were returning to their home base in Wabash, Indiana from an earlier flight they made that afternoon to Rochester, Indiana for dinner.

They arrived back over the Wabash Municipal Airport (IWH) 20 minutes later (9:00pm).  Note:  Sunset occurred at this airport at 7:00pm and the end of civil twilight was 7:28pm.

The recorded radar track from Fort Wayne Approach Control picked up the aircraft 1.6 nm east of the destination airport.   The aircraft had completed a 90 degree turn from a heading of north to the west, which was consistent with the approach requirements for the landing runway.  They didn't make it!

A witness to the accident reported that the airplane flew over the airport and circled toward the south, continuing to the west, then north before she lost sight of the airplane.  The witness stated that the engine sounded "like the throttle was turned down to an idle."  The witness reported that she heard the crash, followed by two explosions, and then she saw a fire north of her position.

Another witness reported that he saw an airplane "coming in for what we thought was a landing." The witness stated that the airplane "circled out of sight" and then he heard the engine "sputter then rev up really high, we thought a plane was going to take off, so we stopped to watch the plane."  The witness reported hearing the crash, followed by seeing an explosion.

All four persons died in the crash.
 

From the NTSB Report . . .

"The main wreckage was found in a soybean field approximately 1/3 nm south of the runway 9 threshold. The first evidence of ground contact was about 161 feet northwest of the main wreckage. The initial ground scar contained small pieces of red navigational lens material and the left wingtip navigation light cover. The wreckage debris path was about 161 feet long on a 145 degree magnetic heading."

"The entire fuselage was destroyed by fire. The only identifiable fuselage components remaining were of steel construction. All seats had separated from their respective attachment points. The instrument panel was destroyed by fire.  The empennage had separated from the fuselage at the dorsal fin area. The separation area was consumed by fire."


"The probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The pilot's spatial disorientation that resulted in his failure to maintain clearance from terrain. Factors to the accident were the pilot's lack of recent night experience and the hazy night conditions."

In summary, we have a 150 hour pilot, who hasn't flown in 16 years, step up to the plate and purchase a sophisticated six place airplane just 2 months before the fatal crash.  He finds a CFI to give him some instruction in his new airplane.   In the process, the CFI throws in a biennial flight review (BFR), all in a total of 7 hours of flight training.

The record does not tell us how proficient this pilot became after receiving just 7 hours of flight training in a HIGH PERFORMANCE aircraft.   Did he receive the required endorsement?  Did he meet the insurance company requirements for dual instruction in this aircraft?

FAR 61.31 - Type rating requirements, additional training, and authorization requirements (extracts):

(f) Additional training required for operating high-performance airplanes. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (f)(2) of this section, no person may act as pilot in command of a high-performance airplane (an airplane with an engine of more than 200 horsepower), unless the person has --

(ii) Received a one-time endorsement in the pilot's logbook from an authorized instructor who certifies the person is proficient to operate a high-performance airplane.

Aside from of the "legal" currency requirements, did this pilot know and understand even the most basic rules governing flight operations in the national airspace system?  How much refresher training would YOU require after a 16 year lapse in flying?

The record shows no evidence of the pilot's night flying in the past 16 years.  He attempted his first night flight with three passengers aboard.  Was he current for night flight?

FAR 61.57(b) - Recent flight experience: Pilot in command:

"No person may act as pilot in command of an aircraft carrying passengers during the period beginning 1 hour after sunset and ending 1 hour before sunrise, unless within the preceding 90 days that person has made at least three takeoffs and three landings to a full stop during the period beginning 1 hour after sunset and ending 1 hour before sunrise."

Lessons Learned . . .

As in all such accident reporting, we can only draw conclusions based upon the NTSB Reports.  Other mitigating factors could have taken place that were not contained in these reports. 

Like so many wrecks, the accident chain began long before this fatal flight.   Any low time pilot (150 hours in this case) who has not flown in 16 years (1990 through 2005) would likely require far more than a simple BFR to be deemed proficient again.  In this case, it would be like starting from scratch.  Following a minimum of 15 to 20 hours of dual instruction, such pilot should be taken through the entire Private Pilot Practical Test Standards before receiving a flight review endorsement.

Then, stepping up to a high performance airplane like a Cherokee Six would require a minimum of 10 hours of instruction just to learn the systems. 

Lastly, night flying.  Aside from the regulatory requirements set forth in FAR 61.57(b), night flying can be far more demanding than many low time pilots imagine.  The reduction of outside visual cues, particularly on a hazy night over rural terrain, can easily turn a routine VFR flight into an IFR challenge.   Likely, this is what occurred over the Wabash Municipal Airport on that September evening in 2005.

Was the CFI Culpable?

Was the CFI culpable in this accident?  The courts will likely rule upon the actions of the flight instructor who was the last CFI to sign this dead pilot's logbook.  This, of course, represents a stern warning to ALL flight instructors. 

We are and should be held responsible for our decisions regarding the flight proficiency of any pilot whose logbook we endorse.  Legal ramifications aside (which are substantial), we have a morale obligation to that pilot, to his or her family, to the passengers they carry, and to the GA community-at-large, to ensure that the endorsed pilot is, indeed, proficient!

There have been numerous occasions where I recommended that pilots coming to me for a required flight review or instrument proficiency check (IPC) obtain additional instruction before I would sign their logbook.  Most did, while a couple of notable exceptions sought out another less demanding CFI to sign them off.   As my Mom was fond of saying, "It all comes out in the wash."   As for me, I'd hate to be that less demanding CFI who signed the book should that pilot hurt himself or others in an airplane!

NTSB Report

 

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Turning around!!

The annals of aviation history are filled with accounts of pilots attempting a 180 degree turn, then running into something hard . . . like the side of a hill, mountain, or building.

The most notable recent event of this kind occurred in New York City last October when NY Yankee pitcher Cory Lidle and his flight instructor attempted a 180 degree turn over the East River in New York City.

The question in all such cases is, "How wide will the turn be in terms of lateral feet?"

The answer to this question, of course, depends upon three factors:  (1) airspeed; (2) bank angle; and (3) winds.

Airspeed:

Looking first at airspeed, as the illustration below shows, the radius of any turn increases as airspeed increases (assuming constant bank angle).  This fact can easily surprise pilots who transition to high performance airplanes. 

Reader note:  The following two paragraphs were changed on 3/31/07 to reflect corrected turnaround distances.  Thanks to eagle-eyed OTA reader, Thom Riddle who first pointed out the error and thanks to Keith Harlock who re-computed the correct turnaround distances.

A Cessna 172 flying at 100 knots will require a 3,000' (2x radius) wide turn when banking at 30 degrees to complete a 180 degree turnaround.   A high performance airplane flying at 200 knots, while in the same 30 degree bank angle will require more than four times the lateral distance or 13,000' to make the turn!  

Bank Angle:

Now take a Cirrus SR20 flying at 150 knots.  A 180 degree turn can be accomplished in 4,000' at a 45 degree bank angle.  Reducing that bank angle to 15 degrees increases the turn width four times - to 16,000'.

Wind:

A 30 knot cross wind moves us laterally at 50' per second.  If we initiate a left 180 degree turn at 150 knots in a 30 knot direct crosswind from the right, while banking at 30 degrees in our Cirrus SR20, it will require 41 seconds to complete the turn.  During that 180 degree turn, the 30 knot crosswind will move us laterally over 2,000' beyond what would be required in a no-wind turn.

In summary, turning around whenever weather ahead posses a risk is always a good idea.  When doing so, however, never forget that the radius of your turn may be far greater than expected.

 

Circling Approaches - The good, the bad, and the ugly!

Mention circling approaches to a group of hardened instrument pilots and you'll hear a lot of debate.  Depending upon circumstances, points of view will range from "useful" to "deadly." 

Many operators including some airlines prohibit their pilots from conducting circling approaches under certain circumstances, particularly at night.  Curiously, however, circling approaches can be a safer alternative to making a downwind or even a crosswind landing. You just have to play by the rules!

A quick review . . .

Circling approaches are used anytime the final approach segment of a published approach procedure is aligned more than 30 degrees from the runway heading.  Such instrument approaches have an alpha character in the approach title rather than a runway number, e.g., VOR-A approach.

Circling approaches are also used because of winds, to land on some runway other than the one for which an instrument approach procedure (IAP) has been established.

A look at the rules (AIM 5-4-20)

Here is what the Aeronautical Information Manual has to say about circling approaches.  First, pilots should remain at or above the circling altitude until the aircraft is continuously in a position from which a descent to a landing on the intended runway can be made at a normal rate of descent using normal maneuvers.

Second, pilots must use sound judgment, have an in depth knowledge of their capabilities, and fully understand the aircraft performance to determine the exact circling maneuver since weather, unique airport design, and the aircraft position, altitude, and airspeed must all be considered.

More from AIM 5-4-20:

1. Maneuver the shortest path to the base or downwind leg, as appropriate, considering existing weather conditions. There is no restriction from passing over the airport or other runways.

2. It should be recognized that circling maneuvers may be made while VFR or other flying is in progress at the airport. Standard left turns or specific instruction from the controller for maneuvering must be considered when circling to land.

3. At airports without a control tower, it may be desirable to fly over the airport to observe wind and turn indicators and other traffic which may be on the runway or flying in the vicinity of the airport.

Size of the Circling Area around the airport

The published circling minimums for any airport affords us a minimum of 300' of obstacle clearance anywhere in the protected area.  The size of this protected area is defined by the approach category of the landing aircraft as illustrated in the chart (left).

The key in performing a circle to land maneuver is to remain far enough away from the landing runway so that no unusual flight attitudes or maneuvers are required to land.  

In low visibility, however, we need to remain close enough to the landing runway so as to not lose sight of it!

Now for the good, the bad, and the ugly . . .

The Good . . .

Circling approaches offer many advantages.  The first, of course, is safety.  By executing a circling approach, we can often position ourselves to land on the most wind-favorable runway. 

Second, circling approaches can save us time . . . and lots of it.  Let's say an airport having only one north/south runway is served by instrument approaches to either end of that runway.   We're flying southward with a tailwind.   Ordinarily, we would select the approach to runway 36 in order to land into the wind.   This would involve flying at least 10 miles south of the airport, then 10 miles back to the airport in order to properly execute the instrument approach to runway 36.

Why not, instead, request the instrument approach to runway 18 (with a tailwind), descend down through the clouds and then "circle" to runway 36.  In the process, you save 20 miles of flying!

The Bad . . .  

Any maneuver that adds to the complexity of an instrument approach ups the ante a bit in terms of risk.  In the example above, flying an approach with a tailwind puts us nose-to-nose with traffic departing in the opposite direction.  EXTREME care must be taken to coordinate our approach with departing traffic or traffic in the pattern.

In addition, minimum circling altitudes are often set substantially lower than the published traffic pattern altitude.  This means you could be maneuvering around the airport at a very low altitudes!

Another complicating factor occurs when it becomes necessary to execute a missed approach while circling the airport.  This happens after we begin the circling maneuver and we lose sight of the landing runway.   The proper procedure calls for flying toward the center the airport, then flying the missed approach procedure.

Circling and Missed Approach Obstruction Clearance Areas

Now for the ugly!!

Messing up a circling approach can have deadly consequences.  This was dramatically demonstrated by the fatal crash of an Air China Boeing 767-200 (wide body) on April 15, 2002.  The aircraft was executing a circling maneuver at the Busan/Gimhae International Airport in South Korea. 

This airport has one published instrument approach procedure.  It is the ILS/DME approach to Runway 36L. 

The surface winds were from 220 degrees at 7 knots and 2 miles visibility in rain and fog.  The sky condition was reported as scattered clouds at 500 feet, broken ceiling at 1,000 feet and overcast at 2,500 feet.  Mountainous terrain north of the airport was obscured by clouds and fog.

The aircraft was at 17,000' and about 32 nautical miles northwest of the airport.  ATC began issuing vectors to the airport.  The controller advised the crew to expect the runway 36L for landing. 

A short time later, ATC advised the crew to expect clearance for the circling approach to Runway 18R.  The crew acknowledged the runway change. 

A short discussion followed between the crew and ATC regarding the approach category of the B-767-200.  The airport met the circling minimums for Category C aircraft but not Category D aircraft.  The B-767 was a Category C aircraft.

ATC then turned the aircraft onto the final approach course for Runway 36L with additional instructions to circle to Runway 18R.  As the aircraft descended down the final approach course, the crew searched for the runway. 

The captain asked, “Do we have to maintain this altitude?” the captain said. The first officer replied that they could “continue down to 700 feet.”   He then said that the wind was “too strong” and asked the captain if he wanted the landing gear extended.

The captain told the first officer to extend the landing gear and
select flaps 20.  The aircraft was descending through 2,208 feet with a calibrated airspeed of 175 knots; groundspeed was 222 knots.

The approach controller confirmed that the crew had the airport in sight and told them to establish radio communication with
the tower.  The report said that the instruction was not acknowledged.  Instead, the second officer replied, “Circle, circle, 18 right.”

The captain told the first officer to disconnect the autopilot and turn left. (Circling was authorized only west of Runway 36L.)  The first officer disconnected the autopilot and began to hand-fly the aircraft.

“OK, maintain 700 feet,” the captain said. “Watching the altitude.”

The captain said, “Twenty seconds. … Keep watching the runway.”

NOTE: The circling-approach procedure used in Air China B-767 flight simulator training called for flight crewmembers to begin timing when abeam the approach threshold of the landing runway and to begin the turn to base after 20 seconds.

“Turning,” the first officer said. He then re-engaged the autopilot and selected the heading mode.

The captain said, “Can you see abeam end of runway?”

“Abeam runway end,” the first officer said. The aircraft was on the right downwind a heading of 350 degrees, airspeed was 158 knots, and groundspeed was 170 knots when the captain disconnected the autopilot, hand-flew the aircraft into a right bank and told the first officer to reduce speed.

NOTE: The captain later told investigators that, although he had seen the runway lights on final approach to Runway 36L, he did not see the runway lights while on right downwind to Runway 18R.  He said that the cloud bases gradually became lower as the aircraft was flown on downwind.

The captain said, “Turning base. … I have control.”

The first officer said, “Turn quickly, not too late.”

Approximately 40 seconds elapsed from the captain’s announcement that he was beginning the timing for the turn to base and when aircraft heading finally passed through 360 degrees toward the south. 

The aircraft was on a heading of 007 degrees and in a right
bank of 24 degrees.  The first officer said, “Pay attention to the altitude-keeping.”

“Assist me to find the runway,” the captain said.

"It’s getting difficult to fly,” came the first officer's reply.  This remark was made presumably as the flight entered the clouds.  He added, "Pay attention to the altitude."

 The captain said, “Have the runway in sight?”

“No, I cannot see out,” the first officer said. “Must go around.”

The captain did not respond.

NOTE: The captain later stated that during the base turn, they entered the clouds but did not execute an immediate go-around, having thought that he would go around after they rolled out on final.

The first officer said, “Pull up. Pull up.”

The aircraft struck Mount Dotdae.  The first officer, second officer, six cabin crewmembers and 121 passengers were killed; the captain, two cabin crewmembers and 34 passengers received serious injuries.

The accident report the General Administration of Civil Aviation of China (CAAC) concluded that the possible causes of the accident were the following:

• At the time of the accident, weather conditions were poor, with low cloud, precipitation and low visibility. There was a strong tail wind on the downwind leg, and the mountainous area north of the airport was covered by cloud;

• The flight crew mishandled the circling approach to
Runway 18R. The flight crew did not make the base-leg turn at the proper time, thus causing the aircraft to fly outside the circling-approach protection area. The flight crew didn’t execute a missed approach when they lost sight of the runway during the visual maneuvering of the circling approach; and,

• When an MSAW warning appeared on the radar display, the controller failed to provide a safety warning to the flight crew.

The decisive factor, according to the accident report, was the aircraft's flying outside the circling-approach protected area for both categories C and D.  The accident report also said that the aircraft was flown at airspeeds between 150 knots and 160 knots on downwind, which exceeded the maximum speed of 140 knots for a circling approach flown in a Category C aircraft.

A lesson for us all

Circling approaches are a strange concoction of IFR to VFR procedures generally conducted in poor weather.  They involve low altitude turns within a defined area.  Performed properly, they are as safe as any other instrument procedure, but the margin for error is, well . . . about as narrow as it gets.

Following a rash of circling approach accidents, the FAA added them to the Instrument Proficiency Check (IPC) requirements.  This, of course, annoyed those flight schools who depend heavily upon flight simulators for instrument training (since circling maneuvers cannot be realistically performed on anything less than a full-motion, airline type simulator.

Since circling approaches are useful tools to the instrument pilot, they should be practiced often.  When called to use them in unfamiliar airports, at night, in mountainous areas, serious thought should be given to finding another more suitable alternate!

More information regarding this accident.

 

Solving the Mystery of "YAW"

With automatic transmissions coming standard on nearly every automobile on the market today, one wonders just how many of us can drive "stick?"

The same can be said about late model production GA aircraft.  While none come equipped with automatic transmissions, many of them require little or no rudder input to perform a coordinated turn.  This, of course, begs the question, how many of us use our rudder pedals effectively?

Why rudder?

Ask any flight student what the rudder is for and he or she will give you the stock answer:  "To correct for adverse yaw."

Next question . . . what is adverse yaw and how is it caused?

Now the answer is a bit slower in coming.   "Ahhh . . . adverse yaw is caused by . . .  Hmmm, I'm not really quite sure."

What is Adverse Yaw?

Adverse yaw is the turning of the airplane about its vertical axis as depicted in the illustration (right).

When turning right, for example, we cause the aileron on the left wing to deflect downward.  This causes the left wing to lift. 

As with all lift, induced drag is an undesirable by-product.  This added induced drag on the left wing attempts to yaw the airplane’s nose in the direction of the raised wing (left in this case). 

In addition, the lowered aileron on the left wing produces more parasitic drag than the raised aileron on the right wing.  This, too, yaws the nose to the left in a right turn.

More Right Rudder!!

So how do we counteract this yawing force to the left as we make a right turn? 

Answer:  The rudder (of course)!

Applying aileron pressure is necessary to
place the airplane in the desired angle of bank, while simultaneously applying rudder pressure to counteract the resultant adverse yaw.

The amount of rudder control required is greatest at low airspeeds, high angles of attack, and with large aileron deflections.  However, with lower airspeeds, the vertical stabilizer/rudder combination becomes less effective, and magnifies the control problems associated with adverse yaw.

Also More Elevator . . .

During a turn, the angle of attack must be increased by applying elevator pressure because more lift is required than when in straight and level
flight. The steeper the turn, the more back elevator pressure is needed.

As the desired angle of bank is established, aileron and rudder pressures are relaxed.  This stops the bank from increasing because the aileron and rudder control surfaces will be neutral in their streamlined position. Elevator pressure is then held constant to maintain a constant altitude.

Factory to the Rescue!

Our good friends at the factory have helped to reduce the effects of adverse yaw by designing features into the design of some of their aircraft. 

Differential ailerons is one such feature.  Here, the up moving aileron creates more of a deflection than the down moving aileron.  This serves to "balance" the parasitic drag described above.

A rudder/aileron inter-connect system is another way manufacturers have helped to reduce adverse yaw.  As we apply aileron pressure to bank, the inter-connect system automatically applies rudder pressure in the same direction.

In summary, achieving coordinated flight and keeping the ball in the inclinometer centered does more than keep your flight instructor happy.  It WILL prevent an inadvertent spin!!!!  Remember, a spin results from an uncoordinated stall!
 

 

 

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"Not-So-Quiet-Birdmen" Dine in Style!

Every pilot has a sacred obligation to keep the spirit of aviation alive and well.   This occasionally involves ritual eating and drinking, boisterous tales of aerial heroism, and shared secrets never before discussed in open forum. 

A growing group of Buffalo-area aviators are doing their best to promote the spirit of aviation in an informal group they formed about six months ago called the "Not-So-Quiet-Birdmen." 

There is no agenda, no business to conduct, no dues, and certainly no speakers! 

Members of the Buffalo NSQB include (in no particular order) Jeff Carrick, Dan Maloney, Jim Pawlicki, Bob Race, Mark Croce, Mark Weissman, Ken Condrell, Kelly Brannen, Hank Stockwell, Pete Treichler, Jerry Felber, Louie Nalbone, Bob Miller, Keith Harlock, John Schmid, Gene Maloney, and John Canty.

This group met for dinner earlier this week at the Buffalo Chop House.  New York State's finest steaks, chops, and seafood were consumed with great delight along with an occasional toast to the intrepid airmen who made it possible for us all to enjoy our dream.

Our next Buffalo NSQB gathering will be held at the Italian Fisherman Restaurant on Bemus Point (Chautaugua Lake, NY) in May.  Ground transportation will be provided from the Jamestown Airport.  Any non-bashful airman wishing to join us can do so by replying to me at rjma@rjma.com

OTA readers are invited to share their example by forming "NSQB" chapters in their own communities!

Note:  Any connection with the highly respected "Quiet Birdmen" (QBs) organization is purely coincidental and unintended!

 

Quotable

"When will these old products go away?  As long as they are listed in the PTS and are included on knowledge tests, they can't go away.  It will take the FAA to develop new test questions before we can probably drop the old products." 

"It is my personal belief that all knowledge tests (PVT thru ATP) should include questions about weather radar ( i.e., NEXRAD) interpretation and limitations, especially since this data is now becoming available in the cockpit." 
  -- Larry Burch,-- 30+ year weather forecaster (currently at the NWS's Aviation Weather Center...home of ADDS). 

Every flight instructor knows that FAA knowledge tests are riddled with outdated questions that address useless trivia that have no bearing on the safety of flight in today's national airspace system.  The old black and white radar summary charts, for example, haven't been used by the U.S. Weather Service since the 1980s.  Yet there are multiple questions on these relics of an earlier age on every knowledge test from private pilot to ATP.

Meanwhile, NEXRAD images are depended upon by thousands of GA pilots to make critical go/no go decisions.  They view these images on their computers, on their cell phones, and on portable and panel-mounted GPS units.   How many knowledge test questions address NEXRAD interpretation and limitations?  None!

Flight students spend endless hours working through ADF and RMI orientation questions while the FAA is decommissioning these hold-overs from the 1940s and 50s.  Meanwhile, knowledge tests are devoid of the legal ramifications of using handheld GPSs to navigate through controlled airspace.

This problem isn't going to be fixed any time soon.

Let's face it.  Updating the airman knowledge tests (and the PTS) would have a profound effect on what all GA pilots know and do.  While it makes absolute sense to fix this problem right now, the FAA appears focused upon other priorities.

No, Virginia, the airman knowledge tests are so far down the flag pole that they will not be saluted by the FAA until the polar ice cap totally melts. 

So what should we be doing about it?

Ultimately, it is the flight school and/or flight instructor that sets the pace of learning for every pilot under his or her tutelage.   All of us wants to be sure that each student is equipped with the knowledge and tools that will enable him or her to operate safely in today's national airspace system. 

To burden students with knowledge and tools they will NOT need or use is, frankly, a gross waste of the students' time, money, and patience.   Granted, picking and choosing what students need to know to pass the various tests is something that we CFIs cannot do.  But we can place emphasis on knowledge elements we deem more important than others. 

Given the enormous challenges facing today's GA pilots, radar summary charts and ADFs are not high on my list of flight safety priorities.  The sooner the FAA addresses this issue, the easier my job will become.  More importantly, the safer our  pilots will become!

 

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Read Back

The following reader comments were received over the past 14 days:
"I heard about OTA from the "Beech Owners List". Checked OTA out and found it a useful resource. Keep up the good work and add me to the list!"
-- Rayvon Williams, Watsonville, California

"This is my first look at OTA and I find it excellent! Sort of reminds me of Stick and Rudder in my student days - the joy of connecting with a serious bank of knowledge.  Thank you."
-- Robert Szego


"I belong to AOPA, EAA, and some other initials, but Over the Airwaves has to be one of the best sources of pilot information - without the ads and hype - I've had the opportunity to read!  Keep up the good work. I'm also going to forward this to others in my EAA Chapter and at the airport!"


"This OTA issue was the first I have seen and is great. Thanks.  I am retired Captain United Airlines. Currently fly Citation II out of BLM, NJ and BCT, Boca Raton, Fl."
-- Robert Beavis, Sea Girt, New Jersey


"I'm  on the Albany FSDO's FAASTeam.  Over the Airwaves looks to be both interesting and valuable. If you have no objections, I'm going to put a link to it on our private airport's website -- Thanks!
-- Stan Levandowski, Fishkill, New York

Reply:  Absolutely!  I encourage every aviation website to link to Over the Airwaves!
-- Bob Miller, Over the Airwaves 

"I was impressed with Over the Airwaves site at first glance. Your format choice is easy to read and well written. Keep up the good work!"
-
- Floyd A. Johnson III, Williamson, New York


"In the last issue of Over the Airwaves you state that airlines are cash strapped and list several examples.  One example you use is "out of control labor costs". You could not be MORE out of line or more guilty of spreading dis-information!"

"Take a look across the board and tell me that airline management has NOT 'controlled' or taken money from pilots.  MAIR funneled money from Mesaba Airlines (a profitable operation) then declared bankruptcy to have labor contracts thrown out in court."

"Comair Pilots voted for concessions that were supposed to 'fix' their airlines woes only to have their management run to a sympathetic judge, file a 1113C hearing and have their contract thrown out also."

"The list goes on and on throughout the industry and it is patently ignorant or disingenuous of you to suggest that extreme labor costs are to blame for user fees.  It is also insulting to spend 12-14 hour workdays flying around in the nation's busiest airspace and have YOU join in the on going erosion of my profession. HORRIBLE!"

"I joined your list to enhance the tools I use for Aeronautical Decision Making- Not a furtherance of the onslaught against the wages I EARN to support and feed my wife."

"Balance your attacks with facts and fix your aim on the correct target, politicians and the Gordon Geckos of today's airline managers."
-- Matt Loiacono
 

Reply:  First of all, Matt, let's review what I wrote (below):
 
"The airlines are strapped for cash.  They cannot control labor costs.  They cannot control maintenance costs.  They cannot control fuel costs.  They cannot afford to replace their aging fleet of airplanes." 

I did not refer to "out of control labor costs," as you suggest.  Had I said that, your anger would have been easily justified!

By writing that the airlines "cannot control labor costs," I meant to say that, like fuel and equipment, you cannot run an airline without labor.  It still requires human crews to fly airplanes, human baggage handlers to load airplanes, and human mechanics to fix airplanes.  Try as many airline managements would like, you cannot automate the aerial transportation of people, freight, and mail. 

I also did not mean to say, as you suggested in your feedback, that extreme labor costs are to blame for user fees.  Nor do I wish to participate in the on-going erosion of your profession.

Clearly, my reference to the airlines' role in user fees touched upon a nerve.  Several other airline pilot readers wrote in and expressed views similar to yours, so I must accept responsibility for being less than clear in my writing.  For this, I apologize.

Over the Airwaves is an aviation safety publication, not a political blog.  It was for this reason that I was reluctant to write a piece on user fees.  But since user fees do adversely impact flight safety, I felt it was worth doing.

On a final note, Matt, there is a ray of good news in all of this for you and other airplane pilots.  That is, if user fees materialize, the flow of new pilots coming into the airlines will quickly dry up.  Through the laws of supply and demand, the future compensation of all present airline pilots should skyrocket! 
-- Bob Miller, Over the Airwaves 


Heard last week on the Beechcraft on-line forum . . .

"Listen up for a heads up! Some of you guys get the bi-weekly e-zine from my friend Bob Miller.  He's a boisterous CFII from Western NY State that likes to rattle cages! (must have came out of the same gene pool as Kevin, Al, Weebs and Myself)!"

"Remember, he started the Temp/Dewpoint Icing deal on the AOPA website that our ADO/Regional FAA office down in Jamaica, NY got involved in?!?!?!"

"Anyway......this edition of
Over the Airways addresses a lot of the things we've "discussed" on the Beechlist lately. Ya think Bob is ease dropping on us? I do.  So what?"

"Nevertheless, he's a good guy........old school CFI with a solid background in teaching flying skills, IMHO the correct way!  I tend to agree with about 95+ odd percent of what he says.  NOW.... go get a beverage of your liking and click on some pretty good reading!"
-- Scott Thomas

Reply:  Thanks for the plug, Scott.  Now about the 5% of the stuff you don't agree with me on!
-- Bob Miller, Over the Airwaves 

Thanks to OTA collaborator Cameron Dunlap for passing along this bit of gossip.


"Over the Airwaves is a very informative and valuable service to the aviation community and I look forward to regular notification of future postings."
-- Jim Osborn, Louisiana, Missouri


"Bob,  I read with interest OTA's account of the user fees debate from here in Europe where user fees are a fact of life. The truth is that there are no simple truths in the debate and the g