Sunday,  September 2, 2007                                           Vol. IV No. 17 
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Welcome to the Over the Airwaves aviation journal.  This complimentary bi-weekly e-mailing is being sent to pilots and aviation enthusiasts around the world.  Its aim is to promote flight safety, encourage students and new pilots, and to build enthusiasm for aviation in general. 
 
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"You land a million planes safely, then you have one little mid-air and you never hear the end of it ..."
— Air Traffic Controller, New York TRACON, Westbury Long island. Opening quotation in movie 'Pushing Tin', 1999  


Dear Pilots and Aviation Enthusiasts:      

In-Flight Emergencies

In-flight emergencies do not happen very often, but when they do, they can cause a temporary neurological flat-line quicker than a French guillotine!

My student and I had been practicing instrument approaches last week at the Jamestown, NY Airport. The weather was a whisker above ILS minimums.  This was the real deal and the first one in many days.  I was happy that my student had an opportunity to experience it.

As for me, a long and near perfect summer had allowed my skill on the gauges to diminish somewhat.  Thinking back, it had been several weeks since I had gotten down and low on an instrument approach.   I could feel the challenge of keeping the needles centered as vividly as did my student.

Finishing our work out, we climbed back up to our cruise altitude for the 55 mile trip back to our home field in Akron, NY.  A slow moving cold front had created IFR conditions all the way up to 16,000 feet, so we simply cruised along in the clag chatting back and forth about the lesson of the day.

Our conversation was interrupted by a flickering yellow low voltage annunciator light.  I looked down at the load meter and quickly confirmed that the electrical charging system had failed.

The irony was beyond my belief.  I had been fussing with similar electrical problems in my own airplane for the past month.  Now the same thing was happening in the trainer, but this time it occurred while in solid IMC.

The Brain Fade Begins . . .

It's one thing for all of us to sit back and rationally think about what we would do when reading about in-flight emergencies.  I have surely been guilty of this.  But when it happens for real . . . to us, while in the clag, strange things begin to happen.

The first thing we notice is a sense of disbelief.  Something must be wrong.  This cannot be happening!  Next, our mind becomes flooded with options, followed immediately by the inability to make a quick decision.  Something must be done, but we're not sure what to do first.

Reading this, the obvious choices come to mind, but when the reality of all the possible nasty outcomes take charge, we struggle to get through the simple things.  This was no simulator exercise;  there was no tossing off of the view limiting device.  The cards were all on the table.

Our airplane, a rented Piper Warrior was old and tired.  I was uncertain as to the condition of its battery.  We had only the standard "steam gauges."  We were 15 minutes from any suitable airport and there was no predicting how much battery time we had remaining. Once gone, our ability to navigate down  to an instrument approach procedure would have ended.

Fight vs. Flight . . .

My point in relating this experience is not to review what to do with a failed alternator in IMC.  Rather, it is to remind us all that our human brains have very little capacity to deal effectively with sudden emergencies. 

Instead, we go into what the psychologists call "fight or flight" mode.  We react rather than act.  We look for instant solutions rather than methodically resolving the problem.

Strangely, in a true in-flight emergency, our instrument panel takes on an amorphous appearance.  Once easy to navigate GPS or nav radio buttons suddenly become strangers to us.  Even the simple task of reducing the electrical load requires major concentration, sometimes more than we have to give.

Passengers or even fellow crew members can present unexpected challenges during in-flight emergencies.  Their demeanor ranges from mild concern to outright panic.  I've observed low time pilots place a strangle hold on the yoke during severe turbulence or upsets in IFR conditions.

Practice - Practice - Practice!

There is only one way to prepare for in-flight emergencies.  That way is to practice them repeatedly until our "fight or flight" response produces the most appropriate intervention.

Engine fire in flight?  First response . . . fuel shut off. 

Failed engine?  First response . . . best glide speed. 

Runaway trim or autopilot?  First response . . . pull the circuit breaker.

Lost vacuum in IMC?  First response . . . backup pump and shift scan to turn coordinator, maintain wings level flight attitude.

Failed alternator?  First response . . . cycle the alternator field master switch, reduce the electrical load.  

The list of possible in-flight emergencies is long, but it is not endless.   We should routinely play the various "what if" scenarios on every flight we take.  Practice running through the appropriate emergency responses for each scenario.  Do this over and over and over again until they become second nature.

In summary, mechanical problems play a role in one out of every ten fatal accidents.  How we react to those problems and, better yet, what we do about them while aloft can easily spell the difference between tragedy and just another day in the air.

Remember, despite all of their bells and whistles, an airplane abides by simple laws of physics.  Forward airspeed creates lift and lift is what keeps us from running into things.  Above all else, fly the airplane, then attend to the emergency!

 
Bob Miller, ATP, CFII
rjma@rjma.com
716-864-8100

  Send this site to a friend! (click here)
 

 

There's Rain . . . then there is REAL Rain!

"It's raining, it's pouring, but is the old man really snoring?"  We go to the airport and check the weather.   Scattered rain showers are forecast along our planned route of flight.  Is it safe to go?

The answer depends, of course, on what lies just above those rain clouds!

Rain is a curious phenomenon.  It either falls as gentle drops on rose petals or it descends out of mature thunderstorms in sufficient volume to flood entire communities.  Our job as pilots is to properly discern the difference before getting wet! 

Rain . . . what is it?

Rain, of course, results from the condensation of water vapor in the air.  Caused by a collapsing of the temperature/dew point spread, tiny water droplets averaging less than 200 microns wide develop to form clouds.

These tiny water droplets are lifted by heat, upwardly spiraling low pressure areas, passing fronts, or thunderstorms. Eventually, these microscopic size water droplets merge into larger, visible water droplets.  As they increase in size, they become too large to remain suspended in the cloud and literally "fall" out of the cloud as rain drops. 

The friendly nimbostratus cloud

Rain falling from nimbostratus clouds is a pure delight.  The ride is generally smooth and the falling rain-drops offer an efficient way to clean the airplane.

Aside from its visibility obscuring effect, such rain poses little or no risk to the GA pilot.   Being instrument qualified and current, of course, may be necessary to traverse such showery precipitation.

Like Spring rains, widespread rain showers are typically associated with low pressure areas.  Tops of nimbostratus clouds generally remain below 6,000 feet.

The hostile cumulonimbus cloud!!

If nimbostratus clouds are like lap kittens, cumulonimbus clouds are the lions of the jungle.  They soar high into the flight levels with enough internal energy to wreak havoc for even large transport size aircraft.

The immediate risk posed to aircraft is that their towering mass is often obscured by low level cloud cover.  Unless equipped with stormscope and live weather radar, their presence often goes unnoticed to the hapless GA pilot . . . until it's too late.

Because of the intensity of the lifting action inside cumulonimbus clouds, the rain is not released until it reaches enormous proportions. 

In the worst forms, cumulonimbus clouds form thunderstorms that carry its rain high into the sub-freezing levels where it forms super-cooled water droplets and frozen pellets. 

Repeated cycles of falling and lifting adds frozen layers to each droplet, thereby forming hail.  Each hail stone grows in diameter with each repeated vertical cycle.

Our best defense . . .

A thorough pre-flight briefing is one of the best ways to distinguish between nimbostratus and cumulonimbus clouds.  Beyond that, our next best defense comes from having a stormscope and live weather radar aboard our aircraft.  Next comes uplinked NEXRAD weather.

If none of these defensive strategies are pursued, the pilot is at the mercy of nature.  This is a position that none of us ever wants to be in! 

So, the next time rain is in the forecast, stop and consider what lies above those rain clouds.  If nothing, fine . . . take advantage of the airplane wash.  If it's towering cumulonimbus clouds, don't go there!

 

Understanding the Magneto Check . . .

Just before takeoff, we run our piston engines up to high RPM, e.g., 1,600 to 2,000 RPM.  With our right hand on the throttle, left hand on the ignition key, and both eyes on the tachometer, we begin performing the ubiquitous "mag check."

Switching the ignition key to the left mag, we note a 50 to 100 RPM drop.  Repeating the process, we switch the key to the right mag and note a similar 50 to 100 RPM drop. 

Life is good.  The mags are operating properly.  Presuming that everything else checks out, we taxi onto the active runway and takeoff.

But what if life is not good?

What if something other than the expected 50 to 100 RPM drop occurs when we do our mag check?  What does it mean?

Before considering this question, let's review the typical dual magneto system found in most piston driven, light aircraft engines.  

The drawing below illustrates a four cylinder aircraft engine with dual magneto systems.  Note that each cylinder is served by two spark plugs, one upper and one lower.  One magneto sends electrical impulses to the upper two spark plugs on one side of the engine and the two lower spark plugs on the opposite side of the engine.

We normally operate with both magneto systems operating.  Aside from obvious redundancy, a better fuel burn efficiency is achieved by having two spark plugs firing simultaneously within each cylinder.

Interpreting the mag check results . . .

Back to the run-up pad.  After setting the engine to high RPM, we turn the key two clicks to the left.  With this, only the right mag is operating.  The left mag is shut off.  A 50 to 100 RPM drop is a result of the lost fuel burn efficiency resulting from two firing spark plugs in each cylinder.

What happens if there is NO RPM drop after switching to one mag system or the other?

The failure to note an RPM drop after switching off one mag means that BOTH mag systems are still turned on and operating.  The likely culprit is an open circuit occurring somewhere between the ignition switch and the "P lead" wire attached to the side of the magneto that was switched off.  When this circuit is open, the mag will continue to operate.  This condition is referred to as a "hot" mag.

Having a "hot" mag, while not particularly hazardous in flight, it means that if a fuel/air charge remains in the cylinders, the engine can fire simply by rotating the propeller.  This represents an obvious hazard to persons walking around or near the airplane.

What happens if the engine quits after switching to one mag?

If the engine quits when switching to either the right or left mag, THAT mag is likely defective. 

Again, the risks of running with just one operative mag should be obvious.  First, we have a less than optimal fuel burn efficiency.  Second, and more important, we've lost the redundant benefit of having two operating mag systems.

Lastly, what does a more than 100 RPM drop when switching mags mean?

A more than 100 RPM drop is generally accompanied by the presence of engine roughness.  The classic culprit here is a bad or fouled spark plug.  Recall that one spark plug in each cylinder is operating when only one mag system is turned on.  If one of those single spark plugs is bad or fouled, one entire cylinder will not fire, thus producing both a lower RPM and associated engine roughness.

There is a possible fix for this problem that can be achieved without leaving the run-up pad.  Try aggressively leaning the mixture while again running the engine momentarily at high RPM. This process may help to clean up the fouled plug.

In summary, performing a pre-flight mag check is basic to nearly all piston aircraft  operations.  We need to know what the results REALLY mean.

 

National Airspace System - Who Pays?

Air Transport Association

In what is one of the best editorials on the subject of user fees, Aviation Safety Magazine editor, Jeb Burnside, succinctly tells it like it is.  The airlines pay essentially nothing for their use of the national airspace system.

Writing in the September, 2007 issue of Aviation Safety Magazine, Burnside reminds us that the airlines received $15 billion in direct grants and loan guarantees from the federal government in the days following the September 11, 2001 attacks.  Thus far, only $130 million has been paid back.

Yes, the airlines do pay 4.3 cents a gallon of jet fuel used in federal excise taxes, but they turn around and deduct this amount from their corporate income taxes.

Then there is the 7.5% tax on their ticket price, plus any applicable segment fees.  Remember, however, each passenger pays this tax . . . not the airlines.

Sure, there are landing fees, gate-lease fees, and other airport use charges, but these charges are paid to the local municipalities owning and operating the airports, not to the federal government.

Are airlines paying an unfair share?

So who is paying for the federal government's massive investment in the ATC infrastructure, navaids, and airport improvement operations?  Is it the airlines??   Not by a long shot.  Actually, not at all!

It is you and me . . . the taxpayer.  And if the airlines get their way, they'll see to it that general aviation makes up the difference through user fees!

NOW is the time to contact our U.S. House and Senate representatives.  They will be voting on this matter very, very soon! 

 

Anatomy of a a Spin

Yep . . . fatal stall/spins continue to happen every week of the year.  Yet flight schools and flight instructors alike take comfort in the fact that spin recoveries are no longer required by FAR 61.109.   If they are not required, why teach them?

We teach them if we respect the future safety of our students!

There are really just a handful of things that can get us in an airplane.  Assuming our airplane is running properly and that we have fuel in the tanks, the things that can instantly send us to the Promised Land are: (1) mid-air collisions; (2) flying into something hard (CFIT); (3) in-flight break-up due to extreme turbulence; (4) loss of control in the clouds; and (5) stall/spin close to the ground.

Sure, there are more, but these are the biggies.  So if we can look out the window to avoid mid-airs, obstacles, and bad weather, the only thing left that can get us is the dreaded stall/spin event.

Forces that lead to a stall/spin . . .

Most of us know the stall speeds of the airplane we fly.  Curiously, we believe that if maintain an airspeed above our stall speed, we can prevent a spin.  In other words, no stall/no spin.

Wrong, Charlie Brown!

Let's look at what happens when a pilot rolls into a 60 degree, level flight, bank turn.   The resultant centrifugal forces places a 2G load factor on the wings.

We know that our stall speed INCREASES in relation to the square root of our load factor.   Thus, a 2G load increases our stall speed by a factor of 1.41.  Ergo, if our wings level stall speed is 40 KIAS, our stall speed in a 60 degree bank increases to 56 knots.

Get the picture?  The pilot rolls into a level 60 degree bank while allowing his airspeed to drop to, say 53 KIAS. 

This, of course, is still well above his wings level stall speed of 40 KIAS.  At the same time, his turn is not perfectly coordinated. 

Wham!  One wing suddenly drops out from under him.  He's in a SPIN!   His stalled airplane begins to pivot around its vertical axis. 

So much for the no stall/no spin argument!

So much for the no stall/no spin argument!  Our hapless pilot finds himself staring at the revolving ground below.  He waggles his wings in a vain effort to recover before becoming a lawn dart. 

The plain truth is that the airplane did stall, but it stalled quickly and unexpectedly at a speed higher than his wings-level 40 KIAS stall speed.

Too late.  He's dead!

Spin training opponents argue that since most fatal stall/spins occur at or below traffic pattern altitude where they are not recoverable, why bother doing spin training?

Huh?  This logic reveals a level of naiveté that defies reason!

What if?

What if this pilot previously had an opportunity to replicate this scenario at a safe altitude with an experienced CFI aboard?  He would have quickly observed (and felt) how quickly a 60 degree, uncoordinated banked turn at airspeeds ABOVE his wings-level stall speed can quickly turn into a stall/spin! 

He or she will never forget this feeling!

To suggest that such spin training at the primary pilot training level is not useful or necessary to safe flight is, well, irresponsible, in my opinion.

 

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What if a Pulley Breaks or a Cable Jams in Flight??

Of all possible in-flight emergencies, the odds of experiencing a genuine control system failure are very small.  But as Mr. Murphy once noted, "stuff happens" . . . and his corollary . . . "it always happens at the worst time."

Examine the diagram

The diagram (left) illustrates the simplicity of a basic aircraft control system.  Despite this simplicity, note the number of pulleys, connections, and cables needed to make the whole thing work properly.

Now imagine what would happen if just one pulley bolt broke or worked loose.  Yes . . . a complete control system lock-up would likely result!

What would we do?

We would likely "fight" the control yoke or stick in a vain effort to eliminate the jam.  Regrettably, this likely only worsens the problem.

But there is a solution.   Let's assume that the broken component has not changed or altered the position of the affected control surfaces and we were in straight and level flight at cruise power setting when the yoke or stick jammed.   Could we land the airplane successfully?

Sure we could!  We would use power (throttle) to control altitude and rudder to control bank.  The landing may not be pretty but, with a little practice, we would likely walk away.

Hands free flying . . . try it!

We proficient pilots should be able to operate our airplanes in all phases of flight with minimal movement of the yoke or stick.  With a proper trim setting dialed in, the desired rate of climb and descent is controlled by power.  Gentle pressures on the rudder pedals can be made to control heading.

Called the "poor man's autopilot," this technique leaves both hands free to perform other tasks.  Try it.

 

Life as an Airline Pilot!

Have you ever wanted to know what it takes to become an airline pilot?  Click HERE.

 

Boldness or Ignorance??

It was late afternoon last October when an instrument rated commercial pilot filed a VFR flight plan for a trip departing Mesa, Arizona to Provo, Utah.  He then climbed aboard his 150 horsepower, 1976 Cessna 172M and made ready for his planned 4.7 hour flight. 

The only apparent weather factor influencing his trip was a frontal storm system bringing rain and low ceilings that would be moving slowly across his intended path from the northwest.

His route of flight would be taking him across some of the most rugged terrain in the United States including the very sparsely populated 1.98 million acre Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument.

Was the pilot and his airplane up to the task?

Anybody who has flown the venerable Cessna 172 knows that it is a wonderful airplane.  In the hands of a capable pilot and in the right weather conditions, even this trip over very high terrain would be doable.  But this was not to be the case on this ill-fated night.

As for the pilot, he had logged a total of 480 hours since receiving his private pilot certificate in 2000.  While instrument rated, he had logged only 1.8 hours of actual instrument flight experience!  The rest of his 78 hours of instrument training had been conducted in simulated conditions.

Other than a flight review and an instrument proficiency check (IPC), each completed several days before this flight, he had not flown at all in the previous year.

Was he ready and able?

What do you think?  Was he ready for this trip?  Apparently the CFI who signed off his flight review and instrument proficiency check earlier in the month thought he was.  Remember, flight review and IPC endorsements come with NO qualifiers or imposed restrictions.

Weather did become a challenge along this route of flight.  Nexrad and satellite weather imagery indicated that a frontal system was moving through the area bringing with it strong winds with occasional heavy rain.  Weather reports at Page, Arizona reported an overcast layer at 8,000 feet and light rain was falling to the surface.

There was no moon to illuminate the dark featureless terrain below.

We can only imagine the terror!

The only evidence of what happened that night was recorded in the memory of a handheld Garmin 195 GPS the pilot had been carrying along with him.  It revealed that the cruise portion of the flight varied from 7,100 feet to 10,900 feet. 

In the last 1 minute and 51 seconds of flight, the airplane's altitude decreased from 10,588 feet to 5,927 feet, and the aircraft turned from 319 degrees to 162 degrees. During the last 26 seconds of the flight, the airplane's rate of descent was approximately 6,245 feet per minute with the airplane's groundspeed increasing from 110 knots to 202 knots!

The only way a Cessna 172 could reach a vertical velocity of 6,245 feet per minute would be for it to be in a near straight-down grave-yard spiral!

The wreckage . . .

All of the airplane's major components and flight controls were accounted for at the accident site. The main fuselage, cockpit area, and empennage were crushed and fragmented.  The seats had separated from the seat tracks and the seat tracks were fragmented.  Both wings separated from the fuselage.  The flap actuator measurement indicated that the flaps were retracted.   The engine had separated from the aircraft and was stripped of all its accessories, the accessory case, oil sump, intake and exhaust tubes, baffling and number 2 cylinder head.

The medical examiner determined that the pilot died from blunt trauma injuries.

Where did things go wrong?

It doesn't take a "Monday morning quarterback" to piece together this accident chain.  It was simply a case of too much mission for a too little experienced and questionably trained pilot.

A 4.5 hour night flight over rugged, featureless terrain with no moonlight to help illuminate the route in an airplane with no autopilot would be tough enough for any pilot.  Add stormy, IFR weather to mix and we have a sure-fire formula for disaster.

Was it a simple case of over-confidence, reckless indifference, or basic ignorance?  Whatever the reason, we have a pilot who apparently failed to understand the risks.  Worse, when he encountered the worst of these risks, he was unable to satisfactorily resolve them.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

"The pilot's failure to maintain aircraft control. Contributing factors were the pilot's lack of experience of flying on instruments on a dark night and in rainy weather."

NTSB Report

Learning point . . .

Flight risks begin mounting the moment we climb into our airplane.  Some, like surface winds, ceiling, and visibility are readily apparent.  Other risks are far more subtle.  They are the ones that "sneak up" and get us when we least expect them. 

In this case, the most subtle risk was the pilot's own lack of experience in actual IMC weather.  Sure, he had an instrument rating.  In his mind, he likely figured that he was good to go in the clouds.  After all, the CFII who, several days prior to his fatal flight, said he was good to go in the clouds by endorsing his logbook with an IPC said he was!

Our aim as pilots is to ensure that we recognize ALL of the risks before commencing any flight . . . including our own level of proficiency.

 

Aero-News.Net Features OTA in Podcasts

"Passion for Flight" is the latest in a series of podcasts I have been doing with Aero-News.Net's Paul Plack.

You can hear, or download for later listening, this 15 minute interview and any of the previously conducted podcasts by clicking on the titles below:

* Passion for Flight
* Stabilized Approaches
* Teachable Moments
*
ATC Services

*
Live from Oshkosh '07

*
Windshear
* Diversions

* Density Altitude

* Thunderstorms

* Stress and Pilot Performance
* Light Sport Pilot Program

By the way, Aero-News.Net is a FREE daily online publication that is packed with aviation related news.  It is the first thing I read every morning.  You can log on to Aero-News.Net and subscribe for your free subscription by clicking HERE.

 

New York City Tour Response . . . Phenomenal!!

The OTA reader response to my invitation for one-day tours of the New York City airports was nothing short of phenomenal!  Originally scheduled to occur once weekly, I am now doubling up to two tours a week.

We leave Buffalo, NY in your airplane at 8am and fly via the Nobbi Four STAR to Westchester (KHPN), then to LaGuardia (KLGA), then to Kennedy (KJFK), then up the VFR Hudson River Corridor, then to Newark (KEWR), then to Teterboro (KTEB).  Time permitting, the trip also includes a quick trip into Manhattan for a pastrami sandwich at the famed Carnegie Deli.

The entire trip, which includes a logged flight review and an instrument proficiency check (IPC), is $599.00.  Click HERE for more information.

 

The Propeller-Busting Porpoise!!

Many a flight instructor has looked out over the runway and watched in horror as their student bounces off the nose wheel and begins to porpoise down the runway. 

"Bounce one . . . bounce two . . . Oh #*@###!"

There, in a single moment of landing mismanagement, the propeller strikes the runway surface and a very expensive repair bill is generated!

Why do these frequent events continue to happen and what can we do to prevent them? 

Answer in two words . . . . "GO AROUND!"

Simple as it sounds, the admonition to go around after the second bounce somehow never registers.  Instead, the hapless pilot continues to struggle through the landing process in a futile attempt to recover from a bad landing.  Each subsequent bounce produces a worsening event until the propeller comes crashing down on the pavement.

The best solution . . . is prevention!

The best way to prevent a porpoise or bounced landing is, first, a stabilized approach.  This is followed by keeping the nose wheel off the runway throughout the touchdown process. 

Lastly, consider making every landing a soft-field landing!

 

Quotable

"The fishermen know that the sea is dangerous and the storm terrible, but they never found these dangers sufficient reason for remaining ashore."
-- Vincent Van Gogh

 

While Vincent Van Gogh did not know it at the time, his observation regarding fishermen points to one of the greatest misunderstandings  circulating throughout the general aviation community.   It also points to, perhaps, the greatest underlying cause of our chronic fatal accident rate.

 

Putting Van Gogh's quotation in its original context does not suggest that fishermen of his day carelessly set sail in the face of dangerous storms, as some readers might interpret. 

 

Rather, it implies quite clearly that these fishermen recognized and understood the dangers and they used this understanding to their advantage each time they set sail.

 

We pilots, on the other hand, often view the dangers of the sky above quite differently.  Rather than understanding and dealing with them, we simply avoid them.   We view low ceilings, poor visibility, high winds, icing, and thunderstorms as reasons to remain on the ground.  Flight training is cancelled, business and pleasure trips get rescheduled, and our airplanes go back in the hangar.

 

Right in theory but wrong in practice!

 

While there is nothing wrong with avoiding dangers, we owe ourselves a much better response than simply canceling the mission and locking the hangar doors anytime these dangers appear on the horizon.

 

Instead, we need to recognize these dangers as definable risks that are, in fact, ever-present in the sky around us.  Just like infectious diseases, we cannot prevent illness by simply avoiding other people.  Instead, we take knowledgeable precautions, then we proceed with our daily tasks accordingly.

 

What precautions can we pilots take? 

 

Rather than simply remaining on the ground when dangers lurk, we can learn to evaluate their relative risks.  We begin by recognizing the limits of our airplanes, followed closely by knowing our own airmanship skills.  We then conduct a careful "backdoor" analysis where escape routes can be found should our original risk assessment prove incorrect. 

 

This all involves two very basic requirements:  (1) proper training and (2) meaningful experience.  We need effective training to understand the inherent nature of each flight risk.  Once trained, we apply what has been learned in the real world setting.

 

Herein lies one of the greatest weaknesses in our traditional flight training community.  Simply put, we teach flight students to avoid rather than to deal with the dangers of flight.  We demonstrate this point by canceling training when the ceiling gets low, the visibility drops, or when the winds kick up.  

 

Consequently, the most frequent weather-related fatal accidents result from continued VFR flight into IFR conditions.   The most frequent non-fatal accident we experience occurs during landings.   

 

Duh . . . could it be because our flight students seldom, if ever, experience declining ceilings and visibilities in the training environment?  As for landing accidents, could it be because flight students seldom, if ever, experienced a 20 knot crosswind landing with a skilled CFI sitting beside them?

 

Accidents happen because of pilot error in over 80 percent of all cases investigated by the NTSB.  This fact, alone, speaks volumes regarding the way we teach people to fly airplanes! 

 

As for experience, the only experience most beginning pilots ever acquire is fair-weather flying.  Taught to avoid crosswinds, low ceilings, and limited visibility, we receive no crosswind, low ceiling, or limited visibility experience.  Then when motoring along and the challenging weather appears, the hapless pilot chokes.  He or she struggles for control against dangers they do not understand. 

 

Far too quickly, they become victims rather than survivors.  They succumb rather than succeed.  They face a challenge they neither knew nor experienced before.  Unlike the fishermen before them, these neophyte, ill-trained pilots with no weather flying experience fall victim to the sea of angry air around them!  

 

We proficient pilots know better!

 

We proficient pilots know better.  Our training prepares us for the inherent risks of flight.  We see the dangers for what they are.  We assess our machines, our skill sets, our experiences, and we formulate solid strategies to deal with these risks. 

 

We have gold-plated "back doors" in the unlikely event our estimates of the situation prove incorrect.  And when the cards are  stacked against us, we know when to turn around or remain on the ground.

 

We take no comfort in locking our airplanes in the hangar when the winds blow, or the ceiling lowers, the cold clouds appear, or the visibility casts a haze over the airport. 

 

We are the fishermen of old!


Bob Miller, ATP, CFII
rjma@rjma.com
716-864-8100

Send this site to a friend! (click here)


 
 

Upcoming! ! !

Angel Flight Fundraiser
Saturday, September 15, 2007
Orchard Park, NY

Seldom does Over the Airwaves have the opportunity to promote an event as worthwhile as this.  My good friend, Joe DeMarco and his wife, Diane, are hosting their second annual fundraising event to support Angel Flight, Northeast.  Last year's event raised nearly $70,000 in support of this wonderful activity!

Joe DeMarco is one of the busiest Angel Pilots in the nation.  He volunteers his time, his fuel, and his Cirrus SR22 in transporting patients every week to and from hospitals throughout the northeast.

Let's all get behind this effort!!  See details in the poster below:


Harvest Festival Benefit
Saturday, September 29, 2007
4pm to 8pm
Akron Airport (9G3), NY

This charitable event is to help young people pursue career opportunities in aviation, to support missionary aviation programs, and to enhance flight safety.

You can support this worthwhile event by purchasing tickets and joining in the festivities.  You can also help to sponsor this event by purchasing an ad in our program booklet.  Ad rates are shown HERE.

Please demonstrate your commitment to the future of general aviation through your support of this event!

 

Read Back

The following reader comments were received over the past 14 days:

"I must take issue with your comments in
IFR Arrival to a VFR-Only Field Results in a Stall/Spin Fatal End in the latest edition of OTA.  In the article you made the following comments:
 
'How many fatal stall/spin accidents must we experience before somebody gets the message that we need spin training??'

"I personally feel that the GA training industry is not prepared to provide safe spin training and I also question whether it is necessary at all.  When I read this particular article, I see a pilot who made one bad decision after another and I don't think any amount of stall/spin training would have prevented this accident.  In my opinion what the general aviation training industry needs more than anything is a focus on the principles set forth by FITS (FAA/Industry Training Standards) such as Single Pilot Resource Management, Aeronautical Decision Making, Risk Management, etc." 

"I realize that it is common for NTSB reports to give a probable cause similar to the one cited in this accident but that only tells us what happened immediately prior to impact.  What about the pilot's decision to spiral down to a VFR airport in IMC conditions?" 

"I would almost bet that if you could look at the pilot's history you would find a pattern of bad decisions made by the pilot that simply did not lead to his death prior to the final bad decision that did.  In my opinion this accident is hardly a stall/spin accident,  it is a text book example of a 'bad decision' accident."
-- David Thompson, Parker Colorado

 

Reply: No argument here.  From what we can glean from the NTSB report, this guy made lots of bad decisions.  However, it was his poor execution of a spiral down through a hole in the clouds that resulted in the apparent stall/spin that ultimately killed him and his passengers. 

This may be a giant leap, but my guess is that had he been properly trained in spins, he would not have even attempted such a maneuver close to the ground, much less through a low level hole in the clouds.

As for whether or not the GA flight training community is prepared to provide safe spin training, that's a valid question.  The best solution, in my opinion, would be for GA pilots to seek out and obtain quality spin training from reputable (skilled) sources.
-- Bob Miller, Over the Airwaves


"Bob, as an under 200 hour pilot and the owner of a 31 year old Mooney M20F I want to thank you for all that you have done for me in the last 6 months as I read Over the Airwaves." 

"This past Friday I finished my longest cross country to date (88R to KJYO). During that series of flights (2 fuel stops) I had the opportunity to fly around some weather across Tennessee, Kentucky and West Virginia. In that experience, with a cloud obscured horizon and towering clouds in the distance on both sides, I finally understood how easy it might be to become a victim of spatial disorientation."

"On several occasions every ounce of my being was telling me that I was doing something other than flying straight and level.  Each and every time I used the skills that I've learned in working on my Instrument rating to evaluate the situation and believe the instruments instead of the seat of my pants. I was never out of VMC, but just like flying at night over the ocean it was virtually an instrument flight. The entire time I reminded myself of the lessons you have outlined here and executed the flight safely."

"I also had the opportunity to fly the strict environment of the DC ADIZ. No real big deal, just a series of complex rules that have very serious consequences if they are not followed. All in all, it was a great trip and I owe you at least in part for helping me make it safely."
-- Mike Stevens

Reply:  Mike, you discovered why VFR-only (and non-proficient IFR rated) pilots get themselves into trouble.  VFR and IFR conditions can exist in the same place and at the same time.  That is one of the more curious paradoxes of aviation!
-- Bob Miller, Over the Airwaves


"Bob, as usual, another fine OTA Journal.  A few questions/comments:  Regarding the direct routing problems. Can you site a reference where it is permissible to use the OROCA as a minimum altitude for off airway routing? Also, can a pilot insist on getting that altitude, of course with no other conflicting traffic? An example might be where there's a high airway MEA, but one is not within the 22 miles for a MOCA descent, so he requests an off-route clearance direct to wherever and a descent to the OROCA. Comments?"

"Regarding the cruise clearance, I believe that one may descend or climb at will with a cruise clearance, however, he may not return to the vacating altitude once he has REPORTED out of that altitude. Have I got that right? Keep up the good work."
-- Larry Olson, St. Pete, FL

Reply:  There is no reference that says one can have an OROCA altitude.  Minimum IFR altitudes are determined by ATC based upon the MVAs for any particular location.

Your interpretation of the cruise clearance is correct.

-- Bob Miller, Over the Airwaves


"Hi Bob: You might consider publishing a table of statistics in each OTA issue, showing by month the number of downed airplanes, fatalities and injuries.  You will scare a few people away from flying; they shouldn't be flying anyway. You will also further drive home the message -- don't be a statistic.  Be prepared by education and training."
-- Regards, Jonathan

Reply:  I thought about doing that, Jonathan, but doing that every month could scare me away as well!
-- Bob Miller, Over the Airwaves



"Hi Bob... nice that you share your screw ups.... too often 'experts' feel pressure to be perfect... and not admit being human and just plain doing the wrong thing. Keep scribbling, stay well." 
-- Rich
 

Reply: The key to becoming a so-called expert is to survive the many screw ups one must make to achieve that dubious distinction!
-- Bob Miller, Over the Airwaves



"There is a major flaw in the 'Know Your Charging System' article by Robert M. Adkins in how it applies to Light Cessnas, including your 210 as follows:

The ALT switch in a Cessna does NOT carry 2A to 5A of Field current!  It carries only a few mA of current used as a "logic" signal to enable the Alternator Control Unit.

Unlike a Piper, this connection to the ACU is NOT used to "sense" the aircraft's bus voltage. There is a separate connection (not shown in Adkin's diagram) directly from the alternator output terminal to the ACU which both supplies the field current and is used for sensing.

The failure of the ALT switch in Cessnas is common, resulting in the "low voltage" condition you experienced, but for a different reason than implied either by Adkins Piper article, or Kevin Rose's diagnosis!

The problem in Cessnas stems from the VERY small current that the ALT switch contacts carry. The current is so small that the switch fails not due to a slightly increased resistance (which does cause over-voltage trips in Pipers), but because the switch becomes 'intermittent' (totally open), simply preventing the ACU from turning on the alternator...

Kevin Rose's diagnosis of spurious over-voltage trips might be correct for a Piper, but not for a Cessna. In your 210, the over-voltage sensor NEVER tripped, your ACU simply got 'turned off' by not getting the 'enable' signal via the ALT switch...

He did identify the root cause of your failure (bad switch), but by luck; not by understanding the underlying system...

Your episode does typify the experience of thousands of airplane owners who have had a charging issue, and gotten a bill for over a $1,000 for 'shotgun' replacement of the alternator, Alternator Controller, over-voltage sensor, and master contactor, when a $12 switch, or 15 minutes work with a ScotchBrite pad would have fixed the problem..."
-- Mike Mladejovsky, Phd E.E., PP with 3000+ hours.
(twenty years owning/fixing various aircraft)