X	"The highest art form of all is a human being in control of himself and his airplane in flight, urging the spirit of a machine to match his own." — Richard Bach, 'A Gift Of Wings,' 1974

Dear Pilots and Aviation Enthusiasts:      

No Hands Flying

Perhaps you haven't noticed lately, but the control devices on our airplanes are getting smaller.  We've transitioned from the large, two ham-fisted yokes on the Beech Bonanza and Cessna 210s down to six inch tall side-sticks on the Cirrus SR22 and Columbia 400.

It could be that aircraft engineers are sending us all a message to stop yanking and banking our airplanes like airline baggage handlers tossing luggage onto conveyor belts. 

Instead, we should be controlling our airplanes using slight thumb and forefinger pressures with the delicacy of an eye surgeon performing a corneal transplant.

The infamous "death grip"

The next time you fly with a buddy, take a look at his or her left hand as it grips the yoke during take-off or landing. 

Notice the white discoloration of the knuckles as a "death grip" is placed on the yoke.  Truth be told, let's take a look at our own hand! 

Yep, we're squeezing the blood right out of our hand(s) as we wrestle a ton or more of angry machinery into the air!

So why do we do this?

Why do we feel it necessary to squeeze the life out of the control yoke? 

Answer: 

Actually, there are two reasons.  First, our primary instructor never corrected us of this bad habit.  Second, our airplane is so badly trimmed that it takes the strength of a weight lifter to maintain the desired pitch attitude.

As a result, we're not able to "feel" the airplane.  We're insensitive to the almost imperceptible little queues it is sending us.  Instead, we push, pull, yank, and bank until our passengers want to toss their lunch. 

We fight to maintain altitude, struggle to keep the wings level, and engage in a game of "dueling needles" as we struggle to remain centered on the glideslope and localizer during instrument approaches.

Try "No Hands" flying!

It is usually by the second lesson that properly trained flight students learn the delicate art of "no hands" flying.  They do this, of course, by learning how to trim the last ounce of either "push" or "pull" pressure out of the yoke or stick. 

Once done, they leave their left hand on their lap and they use their right hand to adjust power for whatever changes of altitude are desired.  If they wish to descend 500 feet per minute, they pull back 300 RPM or 3" of manifold pressure.  If they wish to climb, they go to full power.  Simple as 1-2-3.

Heading changes?

Heading changes, you ask?  Simple.  They use the big toe on either foot to apply tiny pressure on the appropriate rudder pedal.  

Okay, I can envision the "coordination" folks beginning to squirm in their seats.  "How can a coordinated turn be achieved by using rudder only to produce turns?" 

Answer:  Try it!  And when you do, you will note that the inclinometer ball in a properly rigged and trimmed airplane will remain within the cage as the airplane turns from slight rudder pressures only. 

The inherent benefit of "no hands" flying is to ensure and verify that the airplane is properly trimmed for each phase of flight.  When done so, very light control touches and measured power changes are all that is needed to produce the desired heading and altitude.

 Big Dividends for the instrument student!

Primary students who were trained using this technique will experience a very easy transition to instrument flight.  Unlike their "ham-fisted" brethren, they will not be chasing the needles or fighting with the altimeter. 

Instead, they will be able to effortlessly follow controller assigned headings and descent instructions.  Complying with published instrument approach procedures (IAPs) will be a cinch!

Unusual attitude recovery . . . a walk in the park!

Recovery from unusual attitudes can be made very simple when accomplished in a meticulously trimmed ("hands free") airplane.  In fact, a full recovery from most unusual attitudes can be made using rudder inputs only.  This, of course, is aircraft specific.   Please note that some high performance aircraft will require both aileron and rudder inputs to recover from some unusual attitude maneuvers.

Should the controls lock up!

One final benefit of "no hands" flying will be seen in the unlikely event of a failure in the yoke/stick controls caused by a broken cable or a failed pulley.  Assuming the airplane was properly trimmed when the failure occurred, bank and altitude can be controlled using power and rudder inputs only.

In summary, as pilots of newer aircraft with side-sticks have discovered, very little input is necessary to control both heading and altitude when the airplane is trimmed for "hands off" flight.  It makes the airplane far easier to fly, the passengers enjoy the increased smoothness, and a far safer aircraft operation is produced.

Try it . . . you'll like it! 
 

Bob Miller, ATP, CFII
rjma@rjma.com
716-864-8100

 
 

It's Time to Say "Farewell"

Remember back in April of this year when Lockheed-Martin first took over the flight service stations?  Over the Airwaves was one of the first aviation publications to report on the very serious conversion problems that resulted.

Today, some five months later, it appears that the Lock-Mart folks have ironed out many of the wrinkles, but like Wal-Mart stores, we're left with bargain-basement quality, inexperienced sales personnel, and questionable service.

We pilots adapted.  But rather than buying into the FAA's discount store philosophy, many of us became DUATs "power-users."  We combined the enormous wealth of weather information and graphics available on our home computers with the ability to file flight plans on DUATs to become "educated consumers."  

Voila', it worked.  We can self-brief faster and more thoroughly via DUATs than by having the stuff read to us over the phone by inexperienced cash register clerks who have never sat in the left front seat of an airplane (no disrespect intended for those few FSS specialists who migrated over to Lock-Mart from the old system.)

OTA is certainly not alone in this opinion.  Ross Russo, writing in IFR Magazine this month, suggests that we should "Just Let AFSS Fade Away."  Click HERE to view and read this outstanding article.

DUATs might be gone, too!

Beware! There is more trouble on the horizon.  Before we become too smug in our ability to self-brief and file flight plans online, the FAA brain-children who gave away our old AFSS to Lock-Mart could soon be taking away DUATs as well!  If that happens, we could all be shopping at Lock-Mart.

There is another option being rumored about.  DUATs could stay, but rather than having two private companies competing with each other to provide the best DUATs service possible, those same FAA brain-children may simply hand over the DUATs contract to Lock-Mart.  Hey, this is our government, folks.  We elected them!

AOPA to the Rescue!!!!!

Let's not forget that AOPA was a big proponent of privatizing the AFSS in the first place.  While slow to step in when the Lock-Mart conversion went awry, AOPA did flex its mighty muscle with the FAA to get the train back on the track.

Since AOPA is our muscle, let's all encourage them to keep a close eye on our DUATs options!

As for AFSS, perhaps it's time to allow it to simply fade away.  The 21st century is here.  We can brief ourselves!

Circling Approaches - Beware!!

So what's the big deal about circling approaches?  We instrument pilots simply descend down to the circling minimums.  We catch a glimpse of the runway, then we charge along at one-half the pattern altitude to the opposite end of the airport. 

We then hang a couple of low-level turns, then drop it on the runway as if it were a walk in the park, right?

Answer:  Yep . . . but only if we're instrument current, proficient, and able to maneuver safely a couple hundred feet above the ground with very low ceilings and questionable visibility. 

If there is any question about this, don't try it!  Instead, go out and get some competent instruction.

We have a sad tale about a fellow who thought he could do this.  Sadly, he couldn't and he and a woman with her four children aboard paid the ultimate price.  Actually, one person riding in the rearward facing seat in the back did survive with just two broken legs.

Facts of this fatal circling accident

The pilot of a Bonanza A36 enroute from Hannibal, Missouri contacted Kansas City Approach Control.

The Approach Controller issued weather information then instructed the pilot to expect the VOR approach to Runway 23 at the Grain Valley, Missouri airport.

The weather conditions at the nearest weather reporting airport were reported as 600 foot overcast, 3 miles visibility in fog, temperature 36 degrees F, dew point 33 degrees F, and winds out of 030 degrees at 10 knots.

Unfortunately, what happened next occurs all too frequently!  

According to voice tapes, the pilot said, ". . . I'm having a little bit of trouble here. . . I need to get back up top."

The controller replied saying, "Bonanza three two five...do you want to go back out for another approach?"

The piloted responded in the affirmative, and received radar vectors for the second approach.  The pilot accepted the clearance for the second approach.

He then stated,  ". . . five eight three two five at the airport, have the airport in sight."  The controller asked the pilot if he was canceling IFR, but got no response.

The pilot then called the airport CTAF/UNICOM frequency and asked about field conditions.  The field attendant told the pilot that the ceiling was about 400 to 500 feet and the visibility was about 3 miles.

There were no further known communications with the accident airplane.

What the witnesses saw . . .

Witnesses reported that the airplane flew over the airport on a westerly heading.  They stated everything seemed normal until the airplane suddenly rocked side-to-side, nosed up and then pitched down into the ground.

The airplane impacted terrain in a pasture about 1/2 mile northwest of the airport.

According to the NTSB report, all of the airplane occupants wore lap belts at the time of impact.  Shoulder harnesses, available to the two front seat occupants, were located in the stowed position.

Information contained in the autopsy reports indicates the front seat occupants died as a result of multiple head and chest injuries. The rear facing occupant in the seat behind the pilot received the least critical injuries (broken legs).

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows: "The instrument rated private pilot's inadvertent stall while circling to land.  The weather was a factor." NTSB Report

So what REALLY happened?

The facts contained in the NTSB report suggest that the pilot was having some difficulty with this approach.  He was on his second attempt. The reported weather was  hovering near or below minimums. 

He was apparently attempting a circling approach.  The direction of his impact path suggests that he was turning inbound on the final approach course when he lost control of the airplane. 

Again according to witnesses, the airplane ". . . suddenly rocked side to side, nosed up and then pitched down into the ground."  

Could this suggest a classic stall/spin scenario?  I think so.  He was low, slow, and turning . . . in low visibility weather. 

Doing circling approaches requires optimal pilot proficiency to perform safely.  If there is any question about this proficiency, finding another airport with more favorable winds could be a better solution.

Get off the Pavement!

While it presents no particular challenge, landing on grass is one of the ways many new pilots take their first adventuresome steps away from the comfort and security of paved runways.

Actually, setting an airplane down on a smooth grass strip is far easier on the tires than traditional concrete or blacktop and, well . . . it's a lot more fun! 

The photo above is of instrument student, John Wilson of Akron, NY on the grass at South Dayton, NY located about 15 miles east of Dunkirk (KDKK), NY.  If you land there, be sure to walk over to Racer's Cafe, a newly remodeled restaurant featuring the best hamburgers in the area!

Contrary to popular OWTs (old wives' tales), landing on grass runways is not prohibited by most aircraft insurance policies unless, of course, you plan to do it in your Falcon Jet.  But you might want to check your policy just to be sure.

A couple words of caution . . .

The first word of caution makes a good bit of sense.  Check your sectional chart before landing.  Grass strips are denoted by a magenta colored circle.  If the circle has a "R" in the middle, it's private.  Don't land there (other than in an emergency) without prior permission.

A second word of caution . . . critters!  Beware of anything from woodchucks to deer who might like to walk across an attractive grass runway!  Sometimes a low fly-by helps to clear the way.  In most cases, however, just be beware of their possible presence.

Third . . . soft or wet grass!  We did not learn soft field operations just to pass the checkride!  Exercise caution when operating on grass fields following heavy rains or during the spring thaw!

Fourth . . . neglect.  We occasionally encounter a grass field that has not been used in several months or more.  In such instances, be particularly alert for foreign objects like tree branches, woodchuck holes, or other debris.

In most cases, however, you'll find grass or turf fields to be fun experiences. 

Stump the Chump

This is another new OTA section that will appear from time to time.  In it will be placed particularly unique or challenging questions submitted by  OTA readers followed by OTA's attempt to answer it. 

The first such question was submitted by chief OTA proof reader, Barry McCollom of Kerrville, Texas.  Here it is:

Question: Subject:  Instrument Approach Procedures About three years ago, one of our RNAV (GPS) approaches at ERV had a total make-over, with an effective time of 0901Z on a certain date. That equates to 4:01 AM which no sane person would be out flying at that time. Our question - what if we were to commence that old approach at 0859Z? Then two minutes into that approach the new approach legally takes effect. Would our IFR approved navigator be smart enough, at 0901Z to 'flag off' forcing us to a missed approach, or would it allow us to continue using the old approach even though the new approach just took effect? It's doubtful ATC would be up-to-speed on the change. We queried this question to numerous people; AOPA, Jeppessen, FAA, CFIIs, etc. - no one could seem to understand our question, which I believe to be reasonable and sensible. While I realize it's highly unlikely that any certain person would actually be shooting a RNAV (GPS) approach at 4:01 AM that just happened to have a complete change of procedure at that exact time, it's certainly feasible it could occur. Lots of freight dogs out there at that time of morning could certainly eventually run into this scenario.

Answer: 

I referred your question to the FAA's crack Northeast Regional Counsel. The lady (non-pilot) lawyer there told me that the pilot "would commence the approach using the old data, then at the effective moment of change, he (or she) would whip out the new data card, insert it into the GPS box, give it several seconds to load, then complete the approach using the new data."

If you believe that story, I have a wonderfully clear letter of interpretation from the same lady lawyer that you can read regarding the definition of "known ice!"

In truth, no GPS box that I'm aware of would "flag off" if the procedure being flown suddenly became obsolete.

Actually, the scenario you describe happens all of the time. FDC NOTAMs announce procedure changes everyday, but our data cards and paper approach plates come out every 28 or 56 days. Thus, unless you scrutinize FDC NOTAMS before every flight (which, in theory, we should, but sometimes do not), we're likely to be flying out-of-date procedures more often than we know.

As for the "legality" of same, ATC can only clear us for an approved approach.  It's up to the pilot to determine if any recent changes have been made to that approach. The ONLY way the FAA might find us negligent in this regard would be if we ran into something on the way in, then they discovered we were using out-of-date data. Otherwise, nobody cares.

On a related question, can we initiate an approach before its effective date? Sure, why not? If we have it in our database or we have the approach plates for the new procedure, go ahead and fly it. Chances are, this approach is safer than the one it replaces.

Hope this helps.
 

Aero-News.Net Features OTA in Podcasts

"In-Flight Emergencies" is the latest in a series of podcasts I have been doing with Aero-News.Net's Paul Plack.  It describes the importance of having common in-flight emergency procedures committed to memory.

You can hear, or download for later listening, this 15 minute interview and any of the previously conducted podcasts by clicking on the titles below:

* In-Flight Emergencies * No Hands Flying * Bonanzas to LaGuardia * IFR to VFR and GPS Direct * Passion for Flight * Stabilized Approaches * Teachable Moments * ATC Services * Live from Oshkosh '07 * Windshear * Diversions * Density Altitude * Thunderstorms * Stress and Pilot Performance * Light Sport Pilot Program

By the way, Aero-News.Net is a FREE daily online publication that is packed with aviation related news.  It is the first thing I read every morning.  You can log on to Aero-News.Net and subscribe for your free subscription by clicking HERE.

Propeller Fatigue . . . A time-bomb waiting to explode!

It is part of every pre-flight inspection, but how many times do we take a magnifying glass to a propeller to check for cracks?  Okay, so that may be a bit of over-kill, but tiny cracks in the propeller surface can occur.  When they do, beware!

Tragically, a Piper PA-28-140 pilot and his passenger learned this lesson the hard way.  The pilot, who had 160 hours total time, paid with his life!

Within moments after liftoff from the Toughkenemon, Pennsylvania airport, there was a loud metallic-sounding explosion.  Oil sprayed all over the windscreen.   The passenger later said, "It sounded like someone threw a big chunk of metal in the engine, and the engine cowling opened up like a can of sardines."

Again, according to the passenger, the pilot maneuvered the airplane toward an open area bordered by trees.  He noted that they were too low to clear the trees.  It then burst into flames just as they hit the ground. The passenger escaped the wreckage, but burned his hands in his efforts to assist the pilot.

The airplane was examined at the site and with the exception of a propeller blade, all major components were accounted for at the scene.  A nearby resident later recovered the broken segment of propeller.

The engine was examined at the Lycoming Engine factory. Examination revealed no pre-impact anomalies or mechanical deficiencies.

The cause!

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows: Separation of the propeller blade due to fatigue. NTST Report

According to the NTSB Report, the airplane was manufactured in 1972, and had accrued approximately 4,813 total aircraft hours.  The airplane's engine had accrued a total of about 4,700 hours of operation and about 475 hours since overhaul.

Examination of the airplane's maintenance records revealed that on April 6, 1995, an entry stated, "Remove paint, remove damage from face of blades, correct angles, dress, track, balance, alodine, and repaint."

A subsequent entry dated May 7, 1998 stated that the propeller was "repitched to 60" following an engine overhaul and conversion. Entries dated July 6, 2001 and July 25, 2002, reflected annual inspections respectively, each included "filed and inspected prop" in the text.

Again, according to the NTSB Report, the propeller and the associated broken segment were examined at the Safety Board Materials Laboratory. Examination revealed that a large portion of the fracture surface displayed crack arrest positions typical of fatigue cracking.  The fracture features emanated from an origin area on the camber (forward) surface of the propeller.

Microscopic examination revealed an area of corrosion around the fatigue origin, as well as sanding scratches and conversion (Alodine) coating.

The lesson . . .

While rare as far as accident causes, a propeller failure in flight produces devastating consequences.  The immediate imbalance caused by the separation of even a small segment of the propeller can produce catastrophic engine failure.

The best defense is a careful examination of the propeller(s) prior to beginning any flight.  Look for chips, tiny cracks, and even scratches in the propeller surface from tip to hub.  If there is any question , don't launch without having it looked at by a trained professional.

"The primary purpose of the ATC system is to prevent a collision between aircraft operating in the system and to organize and expedite the flow of traffic." -- FAA Order 7110.65,  Paragraph 2-1-1

 

Question:  ATC has knowledge of severe weather along your route of flight.  Are they obligated to tell you about it? 

 

Answer:  It depends upon their workload at the time.

 

Let's look at a classic case that cost a famous pilot his life!

 

On April 19, 2006, Scott Crossfield, who gained fame in an earlier era of aviation for being the first man to fly at twice the speed of sound, took off from Prattville, Alabama in his Cessna 210. 

 

The sky ahead was a turbulent mess of convective activity, thunderstorms, and heavy rain showers.  Crossfield's apparent intent was to maneuver his away around these obvious risks enroute to his destination of Manassas, Virginia.

 

Was Crossfield aware of these weather risks?  If so, was he planning on using ATC's help to maneuver around them?  Hmm . . . .

 

Here's what we know

 

Crossfield had logged onto a computer and received five separate DUATs briefings over the 24 hour period leading up to his departure.  Based on the information in those briefings, thunderstorms were forecast along his planned route of flight.  Before departure, Crossfield discussed the weather with an acquaintance and mentioned that he "might need to work his way around some weather, but it did not look serious."
 

The area forecast along his planned route of flight called for an area of IFR to marginal VFR conditions with isolated thunderstorms and moderate rain.  These thunderstorms had a possibility of being severe, with cloud tops reaching 43,000 feet.

In addition, the National Weather Service reported an ongoing cluster of strong to severe thunderstorms moving into northern Georgia, as a forward-propagating mesoscale convective system or squall line. 

 

The area was expected to further destabilize by midday because of surface heating, thus, enhancing the threat of organized severe thunderstorms and supercell thunderstorms. These thunderstorms had the high likelihood of producing hail, damaging high winds, and possible tornadoes.

 

Convective SIGMET 15E issued during Crossfield's flight warned of an area of severe embedded thunderstorms over portions of Alabama, Georgia, Tennessee, and North Carolina.  These thunderstorms had the potential for 2 inch size hail at the surface and aloft, wind gusts to 60 knots, severe to extreme turbulence, severe icing, localized IFR conditions, and microburst potential.

 

Severe Weather Forecast Alert number 208, issued was also issued at the same time warning of a line of strong to severe thunderstorms moving southward through the area.

 

ATC communications

 

Shortly after takeoff, Crossfield contacted Montgomery air traffic control and was cleared to climb to 10,000 feet.   He was then handed off to Atlanta Center (sector 9).  Several minutes later, Crossfield was cleared to 11,000 feet and was instructed to contact Atlanta Center (sector 4) when reaching 11,000 feet.  He complied as instructed and was given the local altimeter setting by the Atlanta Center sector 4 controller.

Another controller had just taken over the sector 4 radar position when Crossfield checked in.  He was briefed by the departing controller about an area of severe weather north of Atlanta, which included Crossfield's route of flight. 

 

The sector 4 controller handed Crossfield off to the Atlanta Center sector 5 controller, who subsequently issued Crossfield two local altimeter settings.  He was then instructed to contact the next Atlanta Center controller (sector 38).  

 

Crossfield checked in with the sector 38 controller but did not receive a response, so he repeated it.  The sector 38 controller replied with the local altimeter setting. 

 

Crossfield replied,  "Atlanta, this is seven niner x-ray I'd like to deviate south weather."

 

The sector 38 controller answered, "Six five seven niner x-ray roger we'll show you deviating south for weather and your mode C indicates one one thousand five hundred."

 

Crossfield did not respond.   Radar contact was lost with the airplane at 5,500 feet.  A plot of the aircraft radar track data indicated that the airplane entered a level 6 (extreme) thunderstorm before the loss of radar contact. 

 

According to the NTSB report, the airplane impacted remote mountainous terrain north of Atlanta.  The main wreckage was located in an impact crater that measured 4 1/2 feet deep and 6 feet wide. Damage to the dense overhead foliage was limited, consistent with a near vertical descent path.

 

Was ATC negligent in this case?

 

* The primary purpose of the ATC system is to prevent a collision between aircraft operating in the system and to organize and expedite the flow of traffic. * In addition to its primary function, the ATC system has the capability to provide (with certain limitations) additional services. * Controllers shall provide additional service procedures to the extent permitted by higher priority duties and other circumstances. The provision of additional services is not optional on the part of the controller, but rather is required when the work situation permits.

Hmmmm.  See the last sentence?  ". . . when the work situation permits."

Looking a little deeper into the Air Traffic Controllers' Handbook (FAA Order 7110.65, Paragraph 2-1-2 "Duty Priorities")

* Give first priority to separating aircraft and issuing safety alerts as required in this order. * Use good judgment when prioritizing all other provisions of this order, based on the requirements of the situation at hand. * First perform the action that is most critical from a safety standpoint. * Provide additional services to the extent possible, contingent only on higher priority duties and other factors, including limitations of radar, volume of traffic, frequency congestion, and workload.

 

Here again, note the last sentence.

Still wondering?  Let's look at one last part of Air Traffic Controllers' Handbook (FAA Order 7110.65, Paragraph 2-6-4, "Weather and Chaff Services").

* Issue pertinent information on observed/reported weather or chaff areas. Provide radar navigation guidance and/or approve deviations around weather or chaff areas when requested by the pilot. * Issue weather and chaff information by defining the area of coverage in terms of azimuth (by referring to the 12-hour clock) and distance from the aircraft or by indicating the general width of the area of coverage in terms of fixes or distance and direction from fixes. * Issue the level of echo intensity when that information is available. * When a deviation cannot be approved as requested and the situation permits, suggest an alternative course of action. * In areas of significant weather, plan ahead and be prepared to suggest, on the pilot's request, alternative routes/altitudes. * Weather significant to the safety of aircraft includes conditions, such as tornadoes, lines of thunderstorms, embedded thunderstorms, large hail, wind shear, microbursts, moderate to extreme turbulence (including clear air turbulence), and light to severe icing.

 

Still wondering if the controller was negligent?  The NTSB was wondering, too, so they went back and examined the controller's workload at the time. 

 

According to the NTSB report, at the time of the accident, the Atlanta Center sector 38 controller's workload consisted of the accident airplane and one other airplane. 

 

In addition, a review of sector 38 communications and radar data failed to identify any limitations of radar, excessive traffic, frequency congestions, or workload issues that would have prevented the controller from issuing pertinent weather information to the accident airplane.
 

The NTSB issues its probable cause finding:

 

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows: "The pilot's failure to obtain updated en route weather information, which resulted in his continued instrument flight into a widespread area of severe convective activity, and the air traffic controller's failure to provide adverse weather avoidance assistance, as required by Federal Aviation Administration directives, both of which led to the airplane's encounter with a severe thunderstorm and subsequent loss of control." NTSB Report

 

Clearly, the accident chain goes way back before Scott Crossfield stepped foot in his accident airplane.  There was enough weather information available to even the boldest pilot that getting through Georgia on that particular time of day in a Cessna 210 was going to be not only risky, but downright dangerous.

 

Second, even though the controller in this case was cited for being a contributing factor to this accident, there are cases when ATC's workload may be too busy to keep us pilots informed of hazardous weather ahead.  Since we have no way to determine if this is the case when we're aloft, our dependence upon ATC to voluntarily offer "steers" around weather is unwise.

 

Thus, when we instrument pilots are in doubt about weather immediately ahead, let's not wait to be told about it.  Instead, speak up!  Query the controller.  If we still do not receive a satisfactory response, speak up again.  Finally, if our repeated calls do not produce the information we require, remember WHO is responsible for the safe outcome of our flight. 

 

If necessary, declare an emergency, then turn in the direction of safer weather.  That will get us the attention we require and we live to explain it to the judge!

 

As in all such cases, the rules governing the safety of flight are often unclear or ambiguous.  Risks, even on smooth weather flights, are always with us.  Our job is to continually assess those risks, then to take the action we as pilots-in-command deem necessary to produce a safe outcome.

 

 

Bob Miller, ATP, CFII
rjma@rjma.com
716-864-8100