March, 2009 Vol. VI, No.
3 |
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Welcome
to the
Over the
Airwaves
aviation journal. This complimentary e-publication
is prepared monthly for pilots and aviation enthusiasts around the
world. Its aim
is to promote
flight safety, encourage students and new pilots, and to build
enthusiasm for aviation in general.
GA Economic Stimulus Package While our government struggles to revitalize our economy by loading unbearable debt on the shoulders of our grandchildren, we aviators must do our part to protect the economic well-being of our fragile industry. Surprising as this may sound, we can do this without federal bailouts. All we need to do is fly more! First, a little background. Curiously, we pilots do more to drive up the cost of flying than any other single factor in aviation. Look at flight training, for example. The less frequently we train, the greater the total hours it takes to obtain our desired certificate or rating. This translates to more training dollars expended which, in turn, leaves less money for us to exercise our new flying privileges and/or to purchase an airplane. Let's look at our aircraft maintenance costs? There is nothing more expensive than an airplane sitting on the ground! Try adding up the fixed costs of aircraft ownership, e.g., hangar, insurance, inspections, etc., for an entire year, then divide that number by the total hours flown in that same year to obtain the cost per hour. For people who fly little, the resultant number can be staggering. Next, look at safety costs. Each week that we do not fly takes a dramatic toll on our piloting proficiency. As proficiency decreases, the probability of experiencing an expensive incident or accident increases. Eventually, we lose critical skills like instrument scanning and crosswind landing proficiency that we paid dearly to obtain. Ultimately, our insurance costs skyrocket. Before long our aerial inactivity drives up the total costs of flying to a point where we pack it all in. The privilege of flight that we worked hard to achieve is sacrificed on the altar of inactivity. All of this self-induced waste of resources is largely responsible for our recent decline in general aviation. Eventually, our decline in flying activity reaches the aircraft manufacturing industry. When airplane production stops, talented people lose their jobs. In turn, suppliers to the aircraft industry suffer. Before long, the entire GA infrastructure collapses and we pilots stand around blaming the rotten economy when we have nobody to blame but ourselves. It's NOT the economy, stupid! No, we cannot blame the high cost of flying on our recessionary economy. Fuel prices are not keeping us on the ground. Insurance premiums have nothing to do with it. Instead, many of us have succumbed to making excuses rather than going out and doing something about it. We listen to the doomsayers on television. We believe the headlines that tell us the sky is falling. We give in to a world of pygmy thinkers who insist that a 1930's depression is just around the corner. We lock the hangar doors. No, it's not the economy. Instead, the high cost of flying arises from the fact that we're not flying enough! So, fly more!
If at least 50% of us do this and do it aggressively, general aviation will thrive despite our economy. That's my proposed economic stimulus package for general aviation! Come to think
about it, this same kind of economic stimulus model
could work for the nation as well . . . and our
grandchildren would be happier! Fly safe, fly smart.
The question goes something like this: "If I train on a glass panel will my skills transfer back to round (steam) gauges?" Answer: Absolutely. In fact, your steam gauge skills will be enhanced because of your heightened awareness of changing flight parameters developed during your glass panel training. The digital environment of glass panels displays information numerically rather than by swinging needles. Thus, a 20 foot altitude or 5 knot airspeed deviation that would likely go unnoticed on steam gauges is readily apparent on the glass. Having this level of flight parameter sensitivity produces smoother pilot input response. Once developed, this smoother pilot response is carried back to the steam gauge environment, thus improving overall pilot proficiency. Thus, one can easily argue that each hour spent training on glass panel displays makes us better overall pilots, both on glass and on conventional panels.
More Speed: Power vs. Drag Legendary aviator Jimmy Doolittle once said, "Every time I lost an air race, I went out and bought a bigger motor." Jimmy had the right idea, in part. More power generally equates to more speed. The other part of that increasing speed idea has to do with drag. Jimmy would have been just as right had he said, "Every time I lost an air race, I found new ways to decrease drag." A quick look at the images below illustrate the effect of drag on airplanes. Note the image on the left shows the disrupted airflow created by various objects. The flat plate, of course, creates the most disruption and resultant drag. A sphere creates less disruption. The image on the right illustrates a speed modification installed at the wing root (yellow box). This spherical surface causes significantly less airflow disruption and drag than a conventional wing attachment without this mod. The end result is more speed.
There are lots of things we can do to our airplanes to reduce speed-robbing drag. A good place to begin looking is the good folks at LoPresti Speed Merchants. Depending upon your airplane make/model, simple speed mods can make a BIG difference in speed.
Click HERE for more information on LoPresti speed mods. Keeping our airplanes clean is another way to reduce skin friction drag.
A
smooth and glossy finish aids in transition of air across
the surface of the wing. Since dirt on an aircraft
disrupts the free flow of air and increases drag, we should
keep the surfaces of our aircraft clean and waxed. It was intended to be a pattern flight only! We've all arrived at the airport at one time or another wondering if the ceiling would lift enough for us to take a simple flight around the pattern. Perhaps it was to brush off the "dust," warm up the oil, or just for the heck of it.
According to witnesses, the pilot had delayed her flight waiting for the ceiling to lift to 1,000' AGL. When it reached 1,200'AGL, she climbed in the airplane, taxied to the runway, and launched into what witnesses said was fog a bank located just off the departure end of the runway. Moments later, these same witnesses reported hearing an increasing engine pitch sound followed almost immediately by a "thud." The airplane was found inverted in a tidal flat approximately 3,600 feet from the departure end of the runway. The pilot died in the crash.
Here's
what the NTSB probable cause report said:
The probable cause(s) of
this accident as follows:
"The non-instrument
rated pilot becoming spatially disorientated after
inadvertently entering instrument flight
conditions." This tragic accident is filled with lessons for the rest of us. First, any pilot lacking instrument proficiency, rated or not, should never think about launching into low ceilings as were evident in this accident. Second, reported ceilings and actual ceilings, particularly in the presence of nearby fog, can be vastly different. What may appear on the ground to be a safe ceiling can be much different when viewed aloft. Third . . . and this is, perhaps, the most significant lesson conveyed by this accident. Having received a flight review 22 months prior to this flight, this pilot was "legal" to fly. This proves, again, that what is legal is not necessarily safe. Our big membership organizations, including AOPA, fight very hard to minimize training "burdens" on its member pilots. The absence of required annual flight reviews, as exist in corporate and airline operations, is one very good reason, in my opinion, why this lady pilot died. Let this pilot's lack of currency and failure to undergo more frequent flight reviews be a lesson to us all. Let's follow the example of our corporate and airline brethren and undergo aggressive re-training on an annual basis.
Making good sense about flying in sub-freezing clouds!
As readers of last month's OTA issue know, the FAA has finally departed from its longstanding notion (and notion held by far too many pilots) that all sub-freezing clouds produce airframe icing. In truth, most sub-freezing clouds are produced by microscopic water droplets either too small or too cold to produce ice on the wings. But what about the remainder of these sub-freezing clouds. They produce airframe icing, right? Answer: You bet! And the icing they produce can be sufficiently severe to turn our airplanes into ice-laden lawn darts! As illustrated above, moderate to severe icing can re-shape a wing in minutes while at the same time adding more weight than our airplanes can carry. So what is a prudent winter-time pilot suppose to do?
First, the wrong school of thought. This school of thought relegates our airplanes into seasonal vehicles, constrains flight students to classroom exercises, and denies pilots the winter dispatch reliability to justify the cost of ownership. In short, it says, "Never penetrate sub-freezing clouds in non-known ice certified airplanes, period." Proponents of this wrong school of thought view the meteorological world and the rules pertaining to it as "black and white" rather than shades of grey that typify the real world. Now for the correct school of thought. This school assigns sub-freezing cloud risks in the same way they evaluate turbulence, ceilings, and visibility. For example, the intensity of turbulence ranges from light chop to thunderstorms. Ceilings range from 4,000' overcast to obscured. Visibility can be greater than six miles down to ground-hugging fog. In other words, not all turbulence, ceilings, and visibility necessarily grounds airplanes. Some do, but most do not. The same is true for sub-freezing clouds. Okay, so how do we know which sub-freezing clouds to avoid? I recently asked my dentist if he treats HIV infected patients any differently than other patients. He said in reply, "No, I treat all patients as if they were HIV infected!" My dentist's response unlocks the door of understanding about sub-freezing clouds. We pilots should treat all sub-freezing clouds as if they contained lots of ice . . . then we should act accordingly. Acting accordingly, of course, means having an immediate, guaranteed accessible "back door" (VFR conditions or above freezing temperatures) to bolt to should airframe icing be experienced. Looking first at VFR conditions, here's what we're looking for:
Looking next at above freezing temperatures, here's what we're looking for:
If either of these two desired conditions do not exist, do not penetrate sub-freezing clouds. Additional meteorological factors to consider Three different meteorological factors determine the overall icing risk of sub-freezing clouds. One, of course, is temperature. Another is water-droplet size. And the third is the relative stability of the atmosphere. Let's look a bit more closely at the last.
The more stable the atmosphere, the lower the risk of icing. In stable conditions, water droplets too small to adhere to the airframe seldom grow to larger ice-creating sizes. Fronts and low pressure areas, on the other hand, create instability in the atmosphere. This instability circulates tiny water droplets to higher and lower altitudes thereby causing them to increase in size. Eventually, they grow into super-cooled large (sub-freezing) droplets that turn an airplane into a marginally flyable popsicle in minutes. Thus, if flying through sub-freezing clouds is contemplated, avoid any frontal passages or areas in or around low pressure areas. Most important decision we can make regarding icing! The most important decision we can make when encountering airframe icing is the decision to change altitudes without delay. Don't wait to see if it gets worse. Instead, anticipate that icing will ALWAYS get worse, so act immediately. Notify ATC, give them an icing PIREP, and request an immediate altitude change. In summary, the wrong school of thought is the guaranteed "safest" way to operate. In fact, it's almost as safe as flying in a classroom simulator. On the other hand, the correct school of thought contains about the same element of risk as any other IMC factor, e.g., low ceiling/visability, turbulence. You're the pilot.
You make the call. Forgetting the basics can kill us!
Early speculation suggested icing as the cause. Cries went out from so-called experts like former NTSB chairman, Jim Hall, to suspend all turbo-prop operations during winter weather. Others claimed that old technology deicing boots were to blame. The Southwest Airlines Pilots' Association even suggested that a defective glideslope signal caused the airplane to pitch up and down erratically. Okay, so the jury is still out on this one, but one fact is patently clear based upon information supplied by the aircraft's flight data recorder. That fact is, the airplane, while under control of the autopilot, was permitted to slow to stall speed before any pilot intervention was made. So who's minding the store, anyway? Airspeed management is covered in Basic Airmanship 101. We learn rotation speeds, climb speeds, cruise speeds, descent speeds, touchdown speeds. We learn Vx, Vy, Vno, Vne and a host of other V speeds before ever taking our first solo as primary pilots. The crew of Flight 3407 reported "significant" icing on the descent. They were well aware of the speed-sapping effect of airframe icing, yet they apparently paid little attention to the airspeed indicator as the autopilot continued to dial in increasing amounts of "up" trim to maintain the 2,300' altitude assignment issued by ATC. So why wasn't the crew paying attention to the desperately slow condition their aircraft was in seconds before the crash? Why were they not advancing power or lowering the nose to maintain precious flying speed? Perhaps they were talking about other things. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) likely holds the answer It is curious to note that the NTSB has shared with us, in moving animations, what the flight data recorder was able to report, yet no mention has been made about the CVR. We haven't as yet been told about what conversations were taking place in the cockpit during the final minutes before the crash. Likely (strangely), we'll never be told! Is the NTSB protecting the public from the fact that cockpit crews sometimes violate the "sterile cockpit" rule? Are they protecting the pilots' families from learning of potentially embarrassing cockpit conversations? Curious questions. Whatever the reason(s), this crew apparently failed to note the critical loss of airspeed in the final minutes before Flight 3407 augured into the ground. That, my friends, should be a telling reminder to all of us about not forgetting the basics. One final note . . . This tragic accident should never have happened. If we were to trace back through the very long chain of events that likely contributed to this accident, I'd place my bet on faulty flight instruction at the most basic level and, perhaps, an over-dependence upon autopilot flying. Despite all of the cockpit technology currently available to pilots, we must never lose sight of the fact that pitch controls airspeed and power controls altitude. Argue all you want, however . . . either lower pitch or increased power, applied at the proper time, would have prevented this disaster.
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"Airmets/Sigmets" is the latest in a series of podcasts Bob Miller has been doing with Aero-News.Net's Paul Plack. You can hear, or download for later listening, these 15 minute interviews and any of the previously conducted podcasts by clicking on the titles below: Podcast Titles[Click on desired titles - several minutes may be required to download.] Titles in RED are new since the last OTA. By the way, Aero-News.Net is a FREE daily online publication that is packed with aviation related news. It is the first thing I read every morning. You can log on to Aero-News.Net and subscribe for your free subscription by clicking HERE. It's Up to You to Fly Away - "The Waterfront Mansions of Historic Charleston, SC"
Not only do John and Connie spend nearly every weekend in either their Cessna 210 or their Cessna 180 on floats, they are eager to share their experiences with us via this new OTA feature. Click HERE to read the second in an ongoing series of "It's Up to You to Get Away." This trip is to the waterfront mansions of historic Charleston, SC!!!! This is particularly good reading for pilot spouses who haven't yet captured the excitement of flying!!!!! Helpful Sponsors Please support OTA's helpful sponsors by clicking on the images below where you will find ordering information.
Note: If you have an aviation-related product or service you would like to promote and help underwrite the continued publication of Over the Airwaves, please send an email to rjma@rjma.com."Stupid is what stupid does!"
Take the case of a Lancair pilot attempting an ILS approach last year to the Portland, OR (KPDX) Airport. Get this . . . the reported Runway Visual Range (RVR) was 600 to 700 feet (1/8th mile) with broken clouds at 100 feet. What every proficient instrument pilot knows: As every proficient instrument pilot knows (or should know), FAR 91.175(c)(e), titled Operation below Decision Height or MDA, says:
Take a close look at the published approach procedure for the ILS 10R approach to the Portland Airport. You will note that the Decision Altitude (DA) is 224' (200'AGL) with a required visibility of 1800' (1/4mile).
So what happened? The pilot failed to get in on his first attempt to land and flew the missed approach procedure. He tried it again. Below is an extract of the pilot/ATC communications that took place on this second attempt:
The tower controller attempted several times to contact the pilot with no response. The pilot was right. He did crash and killed himself in the process. Examination of his final flight path revealed that the airplane initially impacted the top of an 85-foot tall tree with its right wingtip, about 3,200 feet southeast of the approach end of Runway 10R, on a magnetic heading of about 160 degrees. A 5-foot long section of the outboard right wing and right aileron were located near the base of the impacted tree. The right main landing gear was found about 100 feet south of the impacted tree.
The airplane continued on the collision course before
impacting the ground in a left wing low, nose down attitude,
about 845 feet from the initial impact point with the tree.
It then traveled through an airport perimeter fence before
coming to rest on a perimeter road in an upright position,
about 15 feet from the ground impact point.
The first and most obvious mistake this pilot made was to attempt an instrument landing below published minimums. While it is permissible under Part 91 to commence an approach with reported weather below minimums (not permissible under Parts 121 and 135), FAR 91.175 clearly prohibits descending below published minimums unless the runway or other specified items are in view. The fact that he struck an 85' tall tree over 1/2 mile right of the final approach course is clear evidence that the pilot descended below minimums. A second and less obvious but equally deadly mistake this pilot apparently made was to initiate the published missed approach right turn prior to climbing to 900' as specified in the procedure. Remember, the first word in every published missed approach procedure is "CLIMB." The rules cannot protect us from flight risks! It has often been said by administrative law judges that we cannot promulgate rules to preclude every dumb pilot trick. But when we violate the rules that do exist, that falls under the definition of "stupid is what stupid does."
The airplane is a "Navigator 600-LSA." Sport pilot advantages The sport pilot program offers many advantages. Included among them are:
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Let's face it. The flight instruction profession is in a monumental mess. When many of the nation's largest flight schools, which are producing most of the next generation flight instructors, are still locked into a 65 year-old flight training model, there's little hope for improvement. Since when should we be avoiding grass fields? Grass fields are where any romance still remaining in aviation can be found. Avoiding spins? Since more fatal accidents occur during maneuvering than any other phase of flight, spin training is the last curriculum item we should be avoiding in flight instruction. As for pre-packaged cross-country flight itineraries to specified airports, what a gross waste of training time! Where do we develop realistic aeronautical decision making (ADM) and risk management skills if we cannot venture into new and different airports? Monkey see, money do . . . . which means, of course, that other flight schools follow the lead of the big boys. Graduates of these big flight schools teach the same way they were taught. Voila' - preservation of the status quo. Flight instructor organizations gone wild! Going beyond traditional flight schools, let's look at organizations that claim to represent the interests of flight instructors. Up until recently, the National Association of Flight Instructors (NAFI), with strong backing from EAA, was the big gorilla in this field. Today, NAFI is in disarray. A growing group of their more vocal members reacted badly to what they call NAFI's "good-old-boy" board of directors' non-representative form of leadership and their dismissal of Sandy and JoAnn Hill, architects of NAFI's master CFI program. These dissident members promulgated a split in the church and are now setting out to form their own association of flight instructors to be called the Society of Aviation and Flight Educators (SAFE). SAFE, they say, will be a more "member-centric" organization. Hmmm . . . the term "member-centric" has a nice ring to it but can this kind of organization straighten out the flight training community mess we're in? Can the very people who are at the root cause of the problem be expected to change their teaching methods in ways that will have a positive impact on reducing our chronically high fatal accident rate? There are approximately 180,000 card-carrying flight instructors in the United States. In its good days, NAFI membership never climbed above 6,000 members . . . and many of these members, believe it or not, were not even flight instructors! Can SAFE, without the backing of EAA's deep pockets, hope to do any better? So what will work? Before a solution can be found, we must first define the problem(s). The ultimate problem in general aviation is our unrelenting fatal accident rate (still 100 times higher than the airlines). Keep in mind that 80 percent of all accidents are caused by pilot factors, according to the NTSB. Thus, any attempt to reorganize the flight instructor community must first recognize this problem. An equally daunting but less costly in human terms problem is the fact that fewer than 60 percent of all new flight students ever make it to checkride. The rest (approximately 25,000 students per year) drop out for reasons largely attributable to inherent abuses in the flight instruction process. Got the picture? Fatal wrecks and student drop outs are among GA's greatest problems and we flight instructors are at the root cause of both! Therefore, if SAFE, NAFI or any other emerging CFI membership organization is to rise from the ashes, it must first rally itself around these two problems. Here comes the hard part . . . . As SAFE or NAFI moves through its arduous process of organizing or reorganizing itself, e.g., by-laws, board member appointments, etc., it must move quickly towards advocating regulatory reform as it pertains to pilot training and flight instructor qualifications. Below are a few places where this can begin:
2 - CFI Qualifications: One can become a CFI today with as little as 10 solo hours (required by the private pilot certificate). One can also qualify as an instrument instructor (CFII) without ever having flown in the clouds. This is ludicrous! 3 - CFI Currency Requirements: A weekend or 16 hour online course every two years is all that is required to maintain one's CFI certificate. One does not have to teach any students nor undergo any further in-flight assessment by the FAA to remain qualified as a CFI. Once a bad CFI gets into the system, there is no way (unless he precipitates an accident) for the FAA to remove him. 4 - FAR Part 141 FAA Approved Flight Schools: Part 141 flight schools should be given far greater latitude in altering and improving their flight training curriculum and methods of instruction. As it stands now, these schools are locked into the maintenance of the status quo training methods developed decades ago. These four simple little changes would eventually do wonders for GA, in general and, specifically, in the areas of flight safety and reducing the new student drop out rate. Will they ever be implemented? Likely not. And why not? First, nobody is pushing for these changes. AOPA isn't because such changes would incur "hardship" on their membership. NAFI nor its successor groups are not or will not because that, too, would create hardship on their members (besides, these organizations are too busy in-fighting). Lastly, the FAA isn't likely to promote such changes, first, because such changes require time and money, neither of which the FAA claims to have, and second, such changes would not be "politically correct." Remember, the FAA reports to both the White House and to Congress. So you see, the flight training profession remains in a monumental mess and will very likely remain so for a very long time to come. Thus, if we pilots are to remain safe aloft, don't depend upon outside forces to protect you. Instead, become the masters of your own initial and recurrent training! Fly safe, Bob Miller, CFII, ATP
Past Issues of Click
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I would like to thank the following technical assistance
contributors for their valuable help in producing OTA every
month: Cameron Dunlop, Corning, NY;
Dan Maloney, Clarence, NY; Barry McCollom, Kerrville, TX; Thom
Riddle, Buffalo, NY; and
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