Dear Pilots and Aviation Enthusiasts,

Demise of the 40 Hour Pilot?

When I was a boy, learning to fly was a whole lot simpler than it is today.  Flight training manuals were scarce and those we had read like a Boy Scout merit badge handbook.  There was very little interaction with air traffic control.  Most light singles didn't even have a radio. There were no transponder codes and few of us ever used headsets. 

As for flight experience, we soloed after six or seven hours, seldom flew more than 30 or 40 miles from home, and our navigation consisted of following familiar landmarks below.  We flew mostly tail draggers, only on sunny days and only the most affluent among us flew anything more sophisticated than a Cessna 170. 

Life was simple back then, yet we required the full 40 hours of the flight training curriculum to deal with the complexities of that much simpler world of aviation.

Let's fast-forward to today.  New pilots are stepping right into high performance, turbocharged, carbon composite aircraft and mixing it up in the upper altitudes with corporate jets and airliners.  Our avionic suites today make early B-747' cockpits look like archaic vestiges flown by the Wright Brothers. We have flight directors, autopilots, XM weather, terrain and traffic avoidance, synthetic vision systems, and known-ice certified "weeping wings" seductively luring us down through frozen, fog-shrouded approaches. 

Curiously, the feds expect us to become proficient pilots in our go-go, space-age world of today's aviation with no more than the same 40 hours (35 hours under the Part 141 curriculum) of mandated flight instruction that I did decades ago.  Not surprisingly, it is this same absurd expectation that is largely responsible for our unabated, chronically high fatal accident rate.

The faulty critical path

In the design of any complex system, there is a critical path of activity around which all other tasks evolve. For example, the critical path in an internal combustion engine is the movement of pistons within the cylinders.  In a jet engine, the critical path is the rotation of turbine blades.  Any defects in either the pistons or the turbine blades can produce catastrophic results in the operation of the engine.

We pilots are the products of another complex system known as flight training.  The critical path in this flight training system is the 40 hour flight training curriculum within which each of us learns to fly.  Like the pistons or turbine blades in an engine, any defects in this 40 hour flight training critical path can produce catastrophic results. 

Tragically, these catastrophic results reveal themselves in the over 300 fatal accidents we see every year in general aviation.  Thus, if we can fix the 40 hour flight training curriculum, we can eliminate the catastrophic results.

How do we go about fixing the critical path?

A number of our colleagues in the flight training community will be meeting in Atlanta this spring to find ways to improve the general aviation safety record.  They will gather together in a nice hotel, form committees, then spend hours together in convenient breakout rooms discussing ways to make our world of general aviation safer.

I applaud their efforts but, frankly, there is a much simpler way to achieve this end.  We do not need to meet in comfortable hotels, form committees, and beat the dead horse into submission.  Instead, all we need to do is petition the FAA to alter the critical path known as the 40 hour private pilot training curriculum. 

First, let's have the FAA recognize that most of today's flight students do not fit the Chuck Yeager or Sully Sullenberger skill profile required to master today's complex aircraft and sophisticated national airspace system with just 40 hours of instruction.  It simply cannot be done - safely.

Let's suggest a new number.  My vote is for a minimum 60 hours of instruction.  At least by doing this, we can be more intellectually honest with perspective students in telling them how long it will take for them to pass the private pilot check ride. This is far better then setting them up for frustration and perceived failure when they cannot meet the old 40 hour requirement.

Next, within that 60 hours, I would vote for a minimum of 10 hours (instead of 3) for dual cross-country flight.  This would assure students that they receive enough scenario-based training to better prepare them for the real world. Also within those 60 hours, I would vote for a minimum of 10 hours (instead of 3) of dual night instruction.  Similarly, I would require that at least three of those dual night instructional hours be conducted in actual or simulated IFR conditions. 

Then I would vote for a mandated requirement that the student perform at least 10 dual instruction takeoffs and landings having crosswind components of at least 14 knots.  This requirement, alone, has the potential of dramatically reducing or eliminating the number one cause of nearly all non-fatal accidents.

Lastly, I would vote for a minimum of 16 supervised solo hours (instead of 10) just to ensure that new pilots are being adequately monitored before turning them out on their own.

Whoa - this change would increase the already high cost of learning to fly!

Would this increase in required training hours REALLY increase the cost of learning to fly? 

Nope, absolutely not. Few properly trained students today ever make it to check ride with fewer than 60 hours in their logbooks.  So why not structure these 60 training hours in ways that will do the most good? Equally important, as mentioned above, let's begin being more honest with our students by not suggesting that 40 hours is the expected standard.  Instead, let's be truthful by requiring a full 60 hours of instruction. 

Finally, let's ensure that we get the instruction done in 60 hours instead of stringing students out mercilessly beyond the minimum required hours as is now being done in many flight training establishments.

No, we do not need any more committees, white papers, and endless hours in break-out rooms in fancy hotels.  Sure, doing that is fun and it makes us all think that people are doing something about the problem.  In truth, it's mostly smoke and mirrors.  Little really ever gets done except a lot of talk. 

The real answer to the problem is simple.  Look at the critical path and fix it. 

Bob Miller, CFII, ATP
Over the Airwaves
rjma@rjma.com

It's the old "Bird in the hand . . ." story all over again.

If we fly long enough, chances are we will experience some form of anomaly loft.  It could be as simple as persistent radio static, or it could be far worse - like a rough running or failed engine.  When we do experience that anomaly, particularly engine problems, what we do in the next several minutes could spell the difference between a minor inconvenience and serious injury - or worse.

Let's take the case of an airline transport certificated pilot of a Sonex who was returning home from an EAA meeting.  Along the way he radioed his traveling companions in an accompanying airplane that he was having some difficulties with his airplane. 

He advised his friends that he was returning to the departure airport.  Then, five minutes later, he reported that he was diverting to yet another airport.

En route to his alternate, another individual heard the pilot's emergency declaration along with the statement that "something is really wrong with the airplane.”  Moments later, the airplane was observed descending and flying very low.  

A witness reported seeing the airplane bank hard to the right and then descend “straight nose down.”  Other witnesses reported that the airplane cleared the trees and then nosed over, descending in a nose low attitude.

NTSB Report

Imagine ourselves in this pilot's predicament.  While we cannot possibly know precisely what was going on aloft, we can safely conclude that his engine began to stumble.  Regardless of one's level of experience and aeronautical skill - a rough running engine, when that's the only engine we have, is an attention grabbing event.  Our brain searches for solutions.  Sadly, as in this case, the solution we come up with is not always the best.

What happened in this case?

According to the NTSB report, the pilot's first action, after encountering engine problems, was to reverse course, announcing that he was returning to his departure airport.  This suggests that the pilot assumed he could keep the engine running long enough to return to the departure airport.  That proved to be a wrong solution.

The pilot then amended his plan by electing to proceed to a closer airport, again assuming that he had a chance of making it to that airport.  Here, again, this proved to be a wrong solution.  No longer without suitable airport options, the pilot was forced to put the aircraft down over trees.  Then, in an apparent vain attempt to avoid the trees, he attempted a low, slow steep turn, stalled, then spun into the ground, dying on impact.

Lesson learned

Here, as in all such fatal accident discussions, our point is not to criticise the pilot's actions simply because we do not have all the facts.  We do, however, have enough facts to strongly suggest that the pilot over-flew suitable off-airport landing sites in his attempts to put his airplane on the ground.

While there is nothing inherently wrong with trying to reach an airport after the engine fails, we should do so while maneuvering over crash-friendly terrain along the way to the airport.  In other words, just as soon as engine difficulties are encountered, maneuver first toward possible safe landing areas en route to your airport.  Then, if things do not turn out as hoped, we have a solid plan "B" option.  The old "Bird in the hand is worth two in the bush" story comes to mind here.  Let's not forget it.

High Altitude Flight - Beware of the risks!

There are few things in aviation as enjoyable as climbing up into the flight levels, high above the weather where the air is clear and smooth.  At flight level 240 (24,000 feet), the earth's curvature becomes readily apparent and the deep blue sky above gives us a sense that deep space is not far off.

That's the good news.  The bad news is; we are operating in an increasingly hostile environment where any interruption in the flow of supplemental oxygen in a non-pressurized aircraft can cause a serious loss of mental function - or worse.

Case in point

Take the case of an 18,500 hour ATP certificated Cirrus SR22 pilot who was flying at FL 250 (25,000 feet) when things started to go wrong. 

The flight had originated at York, Nebraska, on July 30, 2009, and was bound for Indianapolis, Indiana.  Upon departure, the pilot was cleared incrementally up to his planned FL 250 cruising altitude.  According to the aircraft's recoverable data module (RDM), the pilot activated the installed oxygen system while climbing through 12,000 feet.

Everything appeared to be proceeding nicely until the controller noticed a distinct change in the pilot's voice as he climbed through 23,000 feet. The controller said it took on "helium/Mickey Mouse" quality.  Several minutes later, the controller observed the aircraft climbing to the wrong altitude.  He queried the pilot, but the pilot's response was unreadable.

Several minutes later, the pilot requested a descent to 12,000 feet.  Again, the controller had difficulty understanding the pilot, noting that the pilot's reported call sign was "unreadable." 

After six minutes more of repeated calls, the pilot responded with, "Go ahead."  The controller instructed the pilot to start his descent.  An airline pilot monitoring the frequency later commented that the Cirrus pilot sounded "incoherent." 

The Cirrus continued traveling eastward, flying directly over its destination airport while still at FL 250.

An Ohio Air National Guard fighter was sent up to intercept the airplane, but once alongside, the intercepting pilot was unable to gain the pilot's attention visually or by radio. A North American Aerospace Defense Command spokesman stated that the intercepting pilot observed an "unresponsive individual who appeared to be unconscious."

Data from the RDM revealed that the airplane continued in cruise flight at 25,000 feet for another hour. After fluctuating for about 30 seconds, engine power and fuel flow parameters dropped to zero, and engine cylinder head and exhaust gas temperatures dropped significantly. The airplane then began to pitch nose-up while decelerating, until a sharp, descending left turn was entered. The airplane then commenced a string of spiraling left and right turns with changes in pitch, both up and down, until the data stream was lost.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The airplane impacted a hill about 6 miles north of the town of Ravenswood, West Virginia.  All major aircraft components were accounted for at the scene. The airplane was significantly fragmented and scattered over a wide area. The Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) was deployed due to impact forces.

The oxygen cylinder was found intact, with the regulator and pressure transducer still attached. All the other Precise Flight Oxygen System components were substantially damaged or destroyed. The RDM data also indicated that the oxygen tank was at 29 percent capacity at the time of the accident.

Curiously, the accident investigators discovered the presence of a portable Mountain High EDS-O2D2 Pulse Demand oxygen system on board the aircraft. This system consists of a small, AA-battery-powered unit equipped with two nasal cannulas, two clear plastic oxygen masks, and adapter oxygen tubing.   This system is designed to provide a short burst of oxygen when it detects inhalation rather than providing a continuous flow of oxygen through the mask.

Note:  The Precise Flight pilot's operating handbook and airplane flight manual supplement states, "The FAA, under 14 CFR Part 23 Regulations, require the complete Oxygen System (including the breathing stations, flow meters, cannulas, and masks) be certified as a complete System. The use of other breathing equipment in conjunction with the built-in portion of the System has not been tested, nor is it FAA-Approved."

In addition, a letter available from the Mountain High website stated, "...we do not have any supplemental type certificates (STC) or currently manufacture under a PMA at this time".

NTSB Findings

So what REALLY happened?

As is evident from the NTSB Probable Cause finding, the pilot was likely using a portable after-market oxygen regulator that meters the flow of oxygen to the pilot on inhalation demand, much like a scuba regulator. 

As a portable, non-permanently installed cockpit device, this unit may not specifically require a field approval (STC) by the FAA for its use. 

As for the portable Mountain High oxygen regulator itself, I have hundreds of hours operating at high altitudes using this unit.  It is a wonderful device that reduces the demand for oxygen by more than 50 percent.  It is easy to use and it provides the pilot an easy-to-hear clicking sound with each inhaled breath. 

Here's the problem that was likely encountered in this particular flight. If anything in the oxygen delivery system goes wrong at 25,000 feet, the time of useful consciousness is between three and five minutes only (see chart above). 

What actually went wrong is pure conjecture at this stage.  It could have been a kink or a broken connection in the oxygen line.  It may have been a malfunction in the Mountain High regulator itself.  The problem may have originated deeper within the Cirrus installed oxygen system.  We simply do not know.

As the NTSB strongly infers, the pilot's unauthorized alteration of the factory installed oxygen system should serve as a strong warning to all of us to exert extreme care when making any modifications to our aircraft's certified systems without FAA approval. 

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Trimming to preciseness

All of us would like to display our piloting prowess to our pilot-rated passengers? Curiously, there are only two ways to do this.  The first is to let the autopilot do the flying. The other is to always fly in a precisely trimmed condition.

The lost art of trimming the aircraft

Learning to trim an aircraft in flight is one of the earliest taught and soonest forgotten of all piloting skills.  In the beginning of training, the instructor dutifully instructs the student pilot to "trim" the aircraft.  The student, in turn, reaches down and gives the trim wheel a few aggressive spins.  Before long, typically very long, the hapless student manages to find that sweet spot where the aircraft maintains altitude seemingly all by itself.

Later on, after the private pilot check ride, this same new pilot slowly slips into the bad habit of chasing altitude by pushing and pulling on the yoke.  Soon tiring of this, his airplane begins to wander about the sky as if it had a mind of its own. Not to worry, though, because that it seems when flying under visual flight rules (VFR), nobody in the national airspace system seems to care.

Later on, this same new pilot ventures into the wonderful world of IFR flight.  He begins his IFR training with a high level of enthusiasm, but soon becomes discouraged as his instrument instructor hounds him mercilessly for not maintaining heading and/or altitude.  The novice instrument pilot wants to give up in despair and frustration.

Worse, our hapless instrument student somehow passes his instrument check ride and then enters the challenging world of flying solely on the gauges.  This is where the "trim-challenged" pilot quickly finds himself in a world of hurt.

Chasing the needles, heading, airspeed, and altitude

Flying an out of trim airplane is no different than driving a car with a misaligned front end.  Just as soon as we take our hand off the wheel, the car pulls sharply to the left or to the right.  Sure, we can keep it on the highway, but it takes a concerted effort. 

The same is true in the airplane, except that we're operating in three dimensions instead of just two.  Worse - in instrument flight, unlike driving, we have no outside references to help keep things sorted out.

Fixing the trim problem

The first step in mastering trim is to engage in hands-free flying. Yep, put your right hand on the throttle control and your left hand on your lap. This technique forces us to use other methods, like power and trim, to keep the aircraft flying at a given altitude.

Okay, let's begin.  Climb to a safe altitude. Level off, set the power to a low cruise setting, e.g. 2,200 rpm or 22 inches of manifold pressure.  Hold that altitude precisely using the yoke or stick.  Once the speed stabilizes (and not before) begin trimming off any forward or aft pressures on the yoke or stick using the trim wheel.

Once done, take your hands off of the yoke or stick.  From this point forward, very slight changes in POWER should be all that is necessary to maintain altitude.  In fact, when we really become proficient at this, we will find that very slight changes in MIXTURE are all that is necessary to maintain altitude.

Let's work at this process each time we fly, and before long, we will discover what I like to call the "poor man's autopilot."  In other words, our precisely trimmed aircraft will fly on heading and altitude as if controlled by an autopilot.  Better yet, our pilot-rated passengers will be impressed with our flying skills.

Should a Type Rating Be Required on a Cirrus or Corvalis?

Long-time Over the Airwaves readers know that I have long ranted on the deplorable difference between the remarkably good safety record of air carriers versus the less than enviable general aviation safety record. 

While, I have commented month after month on things we GA pilots can and should be doing to narrow this difference, there are things that the FAA should consider doing as well.

Looking at the differences between air carrier and general aviation operations, there is one matter that clearly stands out. That is the fact that every air carrier pilot must receive an aircraft-specific type rating for each make and model aircraft he flies.   Just because he holds an airline transport pilot certificate does not mean that he is legal to fly any transport aircraft.

We GA pilots, on the other hand, who hold a private pilot certificate are authorized to fly ANY single engine, land piston powered aircraft (weighing less than 12,500 pounds) without any further required training other than a simple endorsement from a certificated flight instructor for aircraft having a retractable gear and constant speed propeller and/or more than 200 horsepower. 

This means we can pass our private pilot check ride in a Cessna 150, then go out and legally fly a Cessna 172 or a Piper Warrior.  Sure, the high performance/complex endorsement is required for a private pilot to fly a Beech Bonanza or a Cessna 210. This requirement has proven to be workable over the many years since this required endorsement was enacted.

Today is different

Unlike the complexity of a larger engine and a constant speed propeller and retractable landing gear, today's new high performance aircraft present a whole new set of flying characteristics.  Advanced carbon composite materials coupled with sleek airframe designs make airplanes like the Cessna Corvallis and the Cirrus SR22 fly more similarly to jet powered aircraft than the venerable Bonanza or C-210 ever dreamed.  Their wing loading is higher, their stall characteristics are different, their approach and landing speeds are higher, and they are, frankly, far less forgiving. 

As such, the following question needs to be asked and answered.  Should a type rating be required by the FAA before high performance carbon-composite aircraft such as the Cessna Coravalis and the Cirrus SR22 can be flown?

From a new aircraft buyer standpoint, this question is moot simply because Cessna and Cirrus both require some form of factory-authorized training before their customers are permitted to fly these aircraft.  But what about the vast market of used aircraft buyers?  These pilots are purchasing these same high performance carbon-composite aircraft with no knowledge of the manufacturer's requirements.  Like operating beneath the radar, there is no control other than insurance company requirements as to who needs what training to fly these aircraft.

The answer to this pressing question requires a careful look at the accident data to see what training requirements should be implemented.  Unfortunately, we do not have a sufficiently long history of these aircraft from which to draw statistically valid conclusions yet. 

Something to think about.

It's Up to You to Fly Away - "Rutland, VT"

Join with John and Connie Bouck as they share their adventuresome getaway weekends and extended journeys to romantic places around the globe. Whether in their Cessna 210 or Cessna 180 on floats, the Boucks make the best of general aviation. You can too!

Click HERE for your trip to Rutland, VT.

Click on the titles below to experience John and Connie's other general aviation travels around the world.

Post inspection Engine Run-up - Beware!

It's a ritual all airplane owners go through once a year.  At the end of this annual ordeal, we pay the bill, shake hands with our mechanic, climb into our freshly inspected airplane, and fly off into the sunset believing we're good to go for another year.

But it was not so for one unfortunate pilot in New Hampshire last year.  In what is, arguably, one of the saddest examples of aircraft maintenance oversights ever recorded in the NTSB records, the owner of a Cessna 172RG took off after having an annual inspection completed on his aircraft, climbed to several hundred feet, then crashed and died on impact.

What happened?

According the NTSB report, the engine failed shortly after takeoff due to oil starvation.  When the investigators traced the events backwards through the proverbial accident chain, they discovered that the A&P IA who had conducted the annual inspection had failed to perform the required engine run-up leak check prior to returning the aircraft to service.

In not completing this engine run-up leak check, nobody had apparently noticed that the oil cooler return line attachment nipple was fractured.  This fracture was likely caused by an inadvertent contact with a wrench slipping off of a nearby bolt or nut and striking the surface of the hose end socket.

Thus, when the pilot started the engine and taxied for takeoff, he was not aware of the steady stream of oil that was flowing from his engine to the taxiway below. 

The first link in the accident chain was created when an otherwise well-intentioned A&P IA had signed the aircraft logbooks but deliberately waited 24 hours to perform the required post inspection run up.  He did this to allow for the installation of a replacement windscreen, installed during the inspection, to cure properly prior to starting the engine. 

In the meantime, the owner of the aircraft, without the knowledge of the mechanic, arrived at the airport, picked up the signed logbooks, boarded the airplane, and departed.

See why this is so sad?

In this, as in so many such actions, everybody involved in this event were acting in a genuinely sincere fashion.  In fact, the mechanic told the owner that he would be happy to come in on his day off to complete the required engine run-up before the airplane was returned to service.  The owner, too, was acting sincerely when he picked up his airplane, reviewed the logbooks, and noted the signed inspection entry, thus assuming it had been completed as required.

The devil is in the details

According to CFR Part 43.15 (C) Additional Performance rules for inspections, Annual and 100-hour Inspections, states in part ". . . each person approving a reciprocating-engine-powered aircraft for return to service shall, before that approval, run the aircraft engine or engines to determine satisfactory performance in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations of – power output (static and idle rpm.); magnetos; fuel and oil pressure; and cylinder and oil temperature."

Thus we see the first link in the accident chain. The mechanic signed the maintenance logbook, thereby authorizing its return to service - perhaps as a convenience to all concerned, prior to his intended completion of the inspection. 

Lessons learned

There are two valuable lessons arising from this tragedy. The first is, of course, no aircraft should ever be returned to service following any form of maintenance without first ensuring that the logbook entries are complete, that the work performed was actually completed, and all of the necessary signatures are in place.  Had the owner of this aircraft done this, he would likely be alive today.

The second lesson has to do with the post inspection engine run-up itself.  In this instance, note that the broken oil line nipple was on the oil cooler.  On this particular engine, and others as well, there is a valve which allows cold oil to by-pass the oil cooler until it is sufficiently warmed.  Therefore, it is critically important that when doing a post inspection or oil change engine run-up, we allow the engine to run long enough on the ramp to permit full flow of the hot oil through the oil cooler.

NTSB Findings

In summary, all of us (I mean ALL of us) occasionally bristle over the rules governing safe flight.  Whether they be maintenance regulations or pilot currency requirements, the long road of history proves to us that the rules are there for a reason. 

Sure, we can skip over them and, most of the time, nobody ever finds out.  But just about the time we allow a simple oversight in either record-keeping or in flight operations, fate steps in and takes us to task - as occurred in this sad tragedy.

News from BMFT-Online

While much of the northeast U.S. has been blanked by unrelenting snow, we at BMFT have been busily designing a unique series of interactive flight safety webinar programs.

Rather than a boring re-hash of traditional flight training manuals, each of our planned webinars draws from decades of real-world flying in some of the harshest weather in the world. Interlaced between the reality and wonderment of "take-no-prisoner" flight will be enough theory and academics to make each of our participants more proficient and consummately safer pilots. Best of all, each session will contain a mix of wit, wisdom, and reality that you have come to expect in each issue of Over the Airwaves.

We will not only talk about the world of flight, we will also dig deeply into the aircraft and equipment we operate. We'll go behind the scenes of the new glass panel technology to unlock the golden secrets that can make each of us true power-users of this 21st century technology.

We will also dissect the airplanes we fly, from the new Cessna SkyCatcher, to the venerable C-172SP, and on up to the amazingly fast carbon-composite beasts that bring us within a whisker of jet aircraft performance.

Speaking of "us," our webinar producers include some of the most talented technical specialists in the world today to make each webinar a memorable experience. Our team includes Matt Speare and Bryan Clements, each of whom oversee millions of dollars in global communications technology here in Buffalo, NY.

Upcoming BMFT-Online webinar programs

"8-Week Private Pilot Ground/Refresher Course"

This fast-paced course is designed for both new and experienced pilots seeking a thorough review of the basic principals of aerodynamics, navigation, aviation weather systems and reports, air traffic control procedures, communications, airport operations, FARs, the national airspace system, and the essentials of aeronautical decision making and risk management assessment.

Unlike traditional ground school classes, Bob Miller takes you out of the textbook and into the real world of flight where the decisions you make often spells the difference between a safe landing and a tragic outcome.

This is the perfect course for getting ready for the private pilot check ride, an upcoming flight review, or simply getting ready for that long trip you've been planning. It is also a great way to get up to speed for the coming flying season. This is also a great course to watch with your non-pilot spouse or other family member who may one day be called in to "pinch-hit" for you!

Dates: Thursdays, March 17 through May 5, 7pm-9pm EST.

Remember, all webinar courses are recorded for easy downloading at a later date.

Cost: $149.00

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"4-Week Fatal Accident Analysis - Critical Lessons Learned from the Mishaps of Others"

The accident data reveal the tragic repetition of the same pilot mistakes that lead to fatal accidents day after day. Pilots who know what these mistakes are can take specific steps to prevent them in their own flying.

Bob Miller dramatically explores each link in the accident chain of several dozen classic fatal mishaps. Like going to the doctor for immunizations, each participant will be inoculated against the major causal factors that contribute to our unrelenting GA fatal accident rate.

This course is ideally suited for every pilot, from student to veteran heavy metal driver who steps into a general aviation aircraft.

Dates: Tuesdays, March 15 through April 5, 7pm-9pm EST.

Cost: $99.00

 

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Below is a list of additional upcoming webinar titles. Watch for details on times and dates.

* Weather Flying for the IFR Pilot
* Preflighting the Cessna SkyCatcher
* Garmin 300 Course
* High Density Airspace Operations
* Unlocking the Secrets of GPS Precision Approaches
* Preflighting the C172SP
* Garmin 1000 Course
* IFR Ground/Refresher Course
* PPL Ground/Refresher Course
* Defensive Icing Strategies
* IFR Accidents
* Thunderstorm Avoidance
* Aeronautical decision making and risk management assessment
* In-flight emergencies
* IFR Sweet Talking the System
* IFR On the Approach

VFR Night Flight in Marginal Weather - A lesson in Russian Roulette

Load one bullet in a six chamber revolver, spin the chamber, point to head, then pull the trigger.  Pretty easy, right? It is a game that no sane person would ever play, but non-instrument rated or proficient pilots play something equivalent to this game every time they fly at night in marginal VFR conditions.

Sadly, our unrelenting fatal accident rate continues as VFR-only and non-proficient instrument pilots elect to fly at night in marginal VFR conditions. These hapless pilot then find themselves disoriented and unable to control the airplane. Moments later, they become smoking lawn dart in somebody's back yard.

What is it about night flight that adds to the risk of operating in marginal VFR conditions?

Night flying can be one of the most enjoyable experiences we pilots ever encounter.  The twinkling stars above, the glow of a full moon, and the brilliant lights of the city below adds a wonderful new dimension to flight. 

On the other hand, turn off the stars and eliminate the moon, then throw in some dark clouds amid the black background of high overcast skies or even deep space, and you have a sure-fire formula for "blind flying."

In daylight conditions, clouds, fog, and simple declining visibility are easily observed. Similarly, safe passage ways around areas of obscured vision can often be found when operating during the day.  At night, it is an entirely different story.  Areas of obscured vision are not easily observed and, once penetrated, finding ways out may not be possible.  Within minutes, untrained or non-proficient instrument pilots do become disoriented and often lose control of the airplane.

This very scenario happens far more frequently than many of us believe.  For example, a non-instrument rated Cessna 182 pilot and two passengers lifted off from the Slidell, Louisiana, Airport (ASD) on a 124 mile night flight to the Marksville, Louisiana Airport (MKV). 

The weather was reported to include scattered clouds down to 900 feet with broken clouds at 1,800 feet, broken clouds at 2,600 feet, overcast clouds at 7,000 feet.  All in all, it was not a good night for VFR flight.

The aircraft climbed in a southbound direction then turned onto a westerly heading towards its destination airport. It then turned north until reaching 2,700 feet, then back to the west. 

Over the next 30 minutes its altitude varied from 2,100 feet to 2,700 feet, then later climbed up and down between 3,000 and 3,300 feet.  It then reversed course onto a northeasterly heading, then back to the north.  It then descended down to 1,600 feet before radar contact was lost. 

The wreckage was found in a debris path approximately1,200 foot long by approximately 200 feet wide. Parts of the aircraft observed along the debris path included part of the right aileron, pieces of windscreen, the left cabin door window, and the right wing strut. The aircraft impacted soft muddy ground in a thickly wooded area. 

So what really happened on this fateful night flight?

As in all such accidents, we will never know what the pilot was thinking or observing moments before the crash.  But FAA advisory circular (AC) 60-4A, titled "Pilot's Spatial Disorientation" does give us some insight as to what VFR night flying is all about.  Below is an extract from this advisory circular:

Given the marginal weather conditions that existed on this night, coupled with the pilot's lack of an instrument rating, and confirmed by the somewhat erratic flight path the aircraft followed, we can be reasonably certain that the pilot fell victim to spatial disorientation.

This conclusion is confirmed by the NTSB in their probable cause finding noted below:

What can we learn from this tragic accident?

The lesson here is simple. Night operations on a moonless, starless night over remote terrain or over open water requires instrument interpretation to maintain aircraft control. Sure, the weather may be reported as VFR, but the flight is being operated in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC).

Doing so without proper instrument training, currency, and proficiency is, as suggested above, is a game of aerial Russian roulette.

Aero-News.Net Features OTA in Podcasts

The Difference between the PTS and Proficiency" is the latest in an ongoing series of podcasts with Paul Plack of Aero-News.net. Click HERE to listen to this podcast. If you enjoyed this podcast, click HERE for an index of Paul's previously recorded interviews with Bob.

The Instrument Approach Chart - Do you know it?

There are few documents more important to the instrument rated pilot than the instrument approach chart, yet many of us breeze through familiar approaches without ever digging deep into the little "gotchas" printed on the chart.

The chart amendment number printed on the lower left corner of the chart, for example, tells us if we have the latest version of the chart.  Could the approach minimums have changed since the version we have attached to our yoke clipboard?

Then, again, why would the published approach minimums ever change? Trees grow, right.  This stuff happens.

Another "gotcha" is the missed approach procedure.  The recent erection of a tall broadcast antenna could change where you go in the event of a missed approach.

Step-down fixes on a non-precision approach could have changed due to the recent construction of a shopping mall near the approach end of the runway. 

Radio frequencies that we often look to the approach chart to find could likewise have changed, particularly ground control or clearance delivery frequencies.

Anybody who has even been assigned the task of updating a Jeppessen subscription for the continental U.S. quickly learns the shear volume of changes that occur in instrument approach plates every month.   Those changes occur for a reason, and those reasons could hurt us if our instrument approach plate is not up to date.

One last note about last minute changes

Let's not forget that anything printed on paper could become instantly out of date before the ink dries.  This is the reason why we check NOTAMs (Notices to Airmen) prior to commencing any flight, particularly when operating solely by the gauges is anticipated.

Now a word from our trusted sponsors

They say that there is nothing as useless to the pilot as the runway behind us and the fuel remaining in the truck. We might also conclude that truth in advertising is as rare as above-freezing days in Buffalo in February!

Nonetheless, advertising pays for much of what we read and do in aviation, from magazines, to membership organizations, and even publications like Over the Airwaves.

Unlike other publications, however, we accept advertising support ONLY from those organizations with whom we have done business and for whom we can wholeheartedly endorse their products or services. Thus, if you trust what OTA has to say, you can certainly trust those who advertise in this publication.

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Quotable:

Somewhere in the annals of aviation history, we pilots have come to accept the ill-advised notion that passing an FAA pilot rating knowledge and practical test somehow qualifies us to meet the real-world in-flight challenges of that particular pilot certificate or rating. Well, it does not.  If you do not agree, take a close look at our accident data.

Take, for example, the instrument pilot knowledge test.  You can incorrectly answer EVERY weather related question on the exam and still pass the test.  Moving up the pilot certificate scale, you can pass the certificated flight instructor - instrument (CFI-I) practical test without ever once flying in actual instrument conditions.  You can pass the private pilot practical test and never have demonstrated any cross-wind landing skill.  You can even pass the commercial pilot practical test without ever pressing a GPS button or activating an autopilot system, or flying behind a digital glass instrument panel - even though nearly every new aircraft rolling out of the factory today is equipped with one or more of these items.

The simple truth

The simple truth of the matter is that it is impossible for the FAA to come up with a fool-proof knowledge or practical testing model that could accurately assess total pilot performance before turning them loose in the national airspace system.  At best, all we have is an elementary sampling mechanism that spot-checks what the student should have been taught by his or her flight instructor.

Sadly, however, we have flight school mills and a huge array of independent flight instructors who have de-coded the FAA's spot-checking formula.  These so-called flight educators have learned how to get their students through the test in the minimum time possible.  As a result, they enter the national airspace system with only a sampling of what they are really supposed to know and do.  Again, if you do not agree, check the accident data.

Equally sad, flight instructors and the schools that employ them are not alone in this deeply flawed flight training industry.  Also culpable are the authors and publishers of many of our training materials.  Both ASA, Gleim and, perhaps others sell thousands of books and DVDs containing actual FAA knowledge test questions originally obtained under the federal freedom of information act.  We have a huge array of published oral exam preparation guides, both written and recorded, that prepares even the most inept student for check ride day.

Even the FAA, itself, is partly to blame for sending ill-prepared pilots into the national airspace system.  Under their rules, FAA designated pilot examiners (DPEs) are required to prepare and file reports if their annual student pass rate falls below 90 percent.  No self-respecting DPE wants to prepare any more paperwork than he has to!

The worst offenders

While flight instructors, their employing flight schools, the aviation publishing community, and the FAA is at fault in this regard, the real culprits are the students who pay the flight training bills.  With the admittedly high cost of learning to fly, every dollar expended beyond meeting the basic threshold of performance is aggressively challenged. 

Long accustomed to negotiating the best price in the world from Craigslist, Priceline.com, eBay, and a whole host of other online shopping opportunities, we equate overall value with price paid.  In other words, the lower the price paid, the greater the perceived value.  Curiously, if our purchasing decision proved incorrect (because we received a faulty product), we simply throw that product away and replace it with another bargain-priced product.

So how do we fix this problem?

Answer:  We fix the problem by changing the perception of students or pilots working toward their next rating or certificate.  We stop telling them what the minimum acceptable standards are and, instead, explain what the word "proficiency" really means.  It doesn't mean passing.  It means having the ability to fly safely within the limitations defined by the rating or the certificate.

I came about this solution following my completing the design and preparation of two separate eight week pilot webinar-based seminar syllabi, one for the private pilot and one for the instrument pilot.  In putting these syllabi together, I found it easy to address the minimal acceptable standards of knowledge.  It was far more difficult to equip our students with the knowledge and skill to meet the challenges of real-world flying.

I can only imagine how profoundly our fatal accident rate would be reduced if all of us in the flight training industry embraced this understanding.

Fly safely,

Bob Miller, CFII, ATP
Over the Airwaves
rjma@rjma.com

Technical Assistance

I would like to thank Barry McCollom, from Kerrville, TX, and Allen Murgatroyd, from Auckland, New Zealand, for their valuable help in producing OTA each month. They have been working together with me to tidy-up some of the grammatical rough edges and produce a truly world class journal. Both Barry and Allen are passionate about accuracy in media presentations, especially when it comes to sharing our knowledge with others. They, like many of you, always look forward to learning something new from a flawless presentation of any subject material, especially if it is about flying and aeronautical subjects.

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